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th. They deserve honesty. The 
best music, you can seek some shelter in it momentarily, but it's essentially 
 with. 
 God have mercy on the man who doubts what he's sure of.
“Brilliant Disguise” 
n the popular 
een asked as 
erger of Live Nation and Ticketmaster, and 
we do so with the objectivity and honesty called for by The Boss’s quotes above.  The 
 whether the 
ation are two 
t the merged 
petitive.  We 
ing industry.  
try, and along 
res based on 
a competitive 
kets to their own events and can thus easily forgo 
ibution is an 
ely that even 
a monopolist provider of fully outsourced ticketing services could exercise market power.  
Ultimately, a proper assessment of the horizontal effects of this merger would have to 
The second category of arguments by critics opposing the merger rests on claims that 
vertical aspects of the transaction would produce anticompetitive effects.  Indeed, 
Alan J  M
People deserve better.  They deserve the tru
there to provide you something to face the world
gsteen--Bruce Sprin
Tunnel of Love (1987) 
As great admirers of The Boss and as fans of live entertainment, we share i
dismay over rising ticket prices for live performances.  But we have b
antitrust scholars to examine the proposed m
proposed merger has been the target of aggressive attacks from several industry 
commentators and popular figures, but the legal and policy question is
transaction is at odds with the nation’s antitrust laws.
One primary source of concern to critics is that Ticketmaster and Live N
leading providers of ticket distribution services, and these critics argue tha
entity would have a combined market share that is presumptively anticom
observe, however, that this transaction is taking place within a rapidly chang
The spread of Internet technologies has transformed the entertainment indus
with it the ticket distribution business such that a reliance on market sha
historical sales is misleading.  A growing number of venues, aided by 
bidding process that creates moments of focused competition, can now acquire the 
requisite capabilities to distribute tic
reliance upon providers of outsourced distribution services.  If self-distr
available and attractive option for venues, as it appears to be, then it is unlik
weigh heavily the emerging role of Internet technologies in this dynamic business and the
industry-wide trend towards self-distribution. 
*  Ball Professor of Law, William and Mary, ajmees@wm.edu
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, and thus the 
ement among 
 competitive 
 of academic 
 our vantage 
the proposed 
at the merger 
 downstream 
 a number of 
ry, are likely 
erger and would be unlikely but for the 
companies’ integration.  For these reasons, we submit this analysis in an effort to inform 
the debate with current economic and legal scholarship. 
Ticketmaster’s and Live Nation’s core businesses are in successive markets
proposed transaction is primarily a vertical merger, but there is broad agre
economists and antitrust authorities that vertical mergers rarely introduce
concerns and are usually driven by efficiency motivations.  This wealth
scholarship, which is reflected in current antitrust law, has not—from
point—been properly incorporated into the public dialogue concerning 
merger.  To the contrary, critics articulate concerns, including the fears th
would lead to the leveraging of market power and the foreclosure of
competition, that are refuted by accepted scholarship.  Moreover, there are
specific efficiencies that, consistent with economic and organizational theo
to emerge from a Live Nation-Ticketmaster m
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Executive Summary
ment, Inc. 
ment.  The proposed 
 changing 
Internet
technologies and respond to disruptions to previously reliable revenue flows.  The 
er the merger is 
 us to examine the 
ences of the merger in light of public criticism.  Our 
ana  is based 
 Live Nation and Ticketmaster both provide multiple services that contribute to the 
tion and 
related
 operates. 
arketing company, 
sells tickets in the primary and secondary markets, licenses technology that facilitates the 
self-distribution of tickets for assorted venues, and manages entertainment talent.  
Because Live Nation’s primary business is in live entertainment promotion and 
Ticketmaster’s primary business is in primary ticket sales distribution, the proposed 
transaction is chiefly a vertical merger and leads to the integration of successive stages in 
 On February 10, 2009, Live Nation, Inc. and Ticketmaster Entertain
announced their intentions to merge and create Live Nation Entertain
merger is one of several recent and significant developments in a rapidly
industry, and it reflects the search for new business models that capitalize on 
Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division has been investigating wheth
permissible under the nation’s antitrust laws, and the parties have asked
legality and competitive consequ
lysis reflects our own views, not those of the parties or their counsel, and
only on publicly available information. 
production of live entertainment.  Live Nation, the world’s largest producer of live 
concerts, engages in the promotion of concerts and other events, the opera
management of live entertainment venues, various forms of entertainment-
merchandising, and the sale of tickets for events at venues it owns or
Ticketmaster, the world’s leading live entertainment ticketing and m
 ii 
the value chain for producing and delivering live entertainment.  Economic theory 
rmissive approach to 
cket sales 
 poised to 
 which it has 
no affiliation.   We therefore examine both the horizontal and the vertical consequences 
w a Live Nation-
n.  Following 
arket 
kelihood of any 
coordinated or unilateral adverse effects caused by the merger; any potential competition 
y the merger.  
Our m
he principal 
vant market 
itory price 
.  Many enter 
d agents, but an 
tegies, in which 
lf-distribute tickets to the events they host.   Some pursue vertical 
integration strategies by developing in-house technology to self-distribute 
tickets, and some purchase “enabling” technology and services from ticketing 
technology companies that support ticket self-distribution.  This “enabling” 
option has become increasingly common, indicating that the technology 
underlying Internet ticketing has become widespread and has measurably 
contributed to major organizational changes in the marketing of live 
entertainment. 
instructs that such vertical arrangements are usually motivated by efficiency 
considerations, and antitrust law accordingly has adopted a very pe
such mergers.   Nonetheless, Live Nation is also engaged in primary ti
(primarily for venues it owns or operates), and some have argued that it is
compete vigorously with Ticketmaster to distribute tickets for venues with
of the transaction. 
Horizontal Analysis.  Our horizontal analysis focuses on ho
Ticketmaster merger would impact the market for primary ticket distributio
the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, it includes a discussion of m
definition, market participants, and approximation of market shares; the li
that is foreclosed by the merger; and any horizontal efficiencies created b
ain conclusions are as follows: 
 Venues (rather than ticket purchasers, i.e., concert-goers) are t
purchasers of ticket distribution services.  Defining the rele
requires evaluating how venues would respond to a non-trans
increase by providers of these services. 
 Venues pursue many different methods of distributing tickets
into contracts with ticket distributors that serve as outsource
increasing number have pursued vertical integration stra
venues se
 iii 
 Many venues consider vertical integration to be a reasona
outsourced ticket distribution.  If self-distribution technology i
available, then venues would self-distribute in response to a s
increase by a hypothetical monopolist of outsourced ticket dis
services.  Thus, a critical question in evaluating the competitiv
proposed merger—one that overrides the significance of calcula
shares and most other determinations required by the merger g
whether the ease and attractiveness of self-distribution strategi
any possibility of supracompetitive pricing.  For this reason, cr
proposed merger
ble substitute for 
s widely 
ignificant price 
tribution
eness of the 
ting market 
uidelines—is
es would offset 
iticism of the 
 that rests on the parties’ historical market shares fails to 
likely to accurately 
f ticket 
itigate the 
g remaining 
t venues 
adopt when ticket distribution contracts expire creates moments of focused 
can increase 
participants appears 
so require a 
  If self-
s many providers 
teral increase in 
rs have responded to 
nt invitations by venues for bids to provide or support ticket distribution 
ipants have the 
o a merged 
storical market 
distribution
he ticket distribution 
stribute and tailor 
gies for venues, such as Veritix, or from large 
venue operators and promoters, such as AEG.  These firms are at least as 
likely to sustain a competitive threat to the merged company as Live Nation 
was to pose a threat to Ticketmaster if the merger were not consummated.  
Moreover, if enablement technologies have become as attractive and 
widespread as they appear to be, then the ready availability of these 
technologies could alone deter a merged Live Nation-Ticketmaster from 
charging supracompetitive prices. 
recognize the market’s technological dynamism and is un
identify market power. 
 The widespread possibility of self-distribution, heterogeneity o
distribution contracts, and concealment of contractual terms m
likelihood that the merger would encourage any collusion amon
market competitors.  Moreover, the competitive bidding process tha
competition in which outsiders can gain entry and small firms 
market share, with the result that collusion among market 
unlikely.
 An analysis of the merger’s unilateral competitive effects will al
determination of the attractiveness and ease of self-distribution.
distribution technology is widely available, then the market’
of enabling technology would promptly respond to any unila
price by the merged entity.  A number of assorted provide
rece
services.  These experiences suggest that current market partic
capabilities to meet the needs of venues that seek alternatives t
Live Nation Entertainment.  It additionally confirms that hi
sales belie the current level of competitiveness in the ticket 
market.   
 Competitive entry into, and competitive expansion in, t
market could either come from the many companies that di
Internet ticketing technolo
 iv 
 It is possible that horizontal efficiencies could result from the 
merger, perhaps if one company can provide ticket distr
lower cost than the other, but we have not encounter
proposed
ibution services at a 
ed any evidence 
suggesting that horizontal efficiencies will be more than modest. 
 legal scholars 
erally reflect 
rtical elements of 
the proposed Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger therefore suggest that many efficiency 
motivations underlie the transaction.  Nonetheless, critics of the proposed Live Nation-
nents of the 
ecades ago, when 
ost vertical 
 theory have 
revealed deep flaws in those suspicions.  Current antitrust law has evolved accordingly, 
becoming much more accepting of vertical mergers, and nearly all such transactions 
rs also have the 
ry and 
ggest that the 
 Investments in promotion and information
Vertical Analysis.  There is broad consensus among economists and
that vertical mergers only very rarely pose competitive risks and instead gen
procompetitive efforts to minimize transaction costs.  The substantial ve
Ticketmaster merger persist in expressing opposition to vertical compo
merger.  Such criticisms were common in antitrust decisions several d
the “inhospitality tradition” directed antitrust policy to be suspicious of m
arrangements, including vertical integration, but advances in economic
survive antitrust scrutiny. 
In addition to posing little risk of competitive harm, vertical merge
potential to generate many efficiencies that would be unattainable through contractual or 
market organization.  Recent developments in the live entertainment indust
statements made the management of both Live Nation and Ticketmaster su
proposed merger has the potential to generate the following efficiencies: 
.  Internet technologies have 
presented lucrative opportunities to generate new content, consumer data, and 
promotional strategies for fans of live entertainment.  Creating the platforms 
for these strategies, however, requires investments that are difficult to specify 
and monitor by contract.  When activities such as these are hard to observe 
and are therefore noncontractible, yet are important in creating value, vertical 
 v 
integration is a common efficiency response.  Vertical integrat
could help providers of live entertainment invest in promo
to reduce exces
ion strategies 
tion (for example, 
s capacity in concerts) and develop Internet content and 
marketing strategies. 
 Meeting Artist Demands and Market Changes.  The Wall Stree
described the world of live entertainment as “an industry underg
shifts.”  Adjusting to a changing market environment is addition
when different players contribute at each stage in the value ch
hallmarks of vertical integration, however, is the ability to p
adaptation.  Vertically integrated strategies such as the L
t Journal has 
oing seismic 
ally difficult 
ain.  One of the 
ursue cooperative 
ive Nation-
nize the 
odel.
Ticketmaster merger could facilitate innovations that would orga
assorted inputs to live entertainment into an effective business m
 Linking Venues, Entertainers, and Fans.   The many market seg
to produce live entertainment in today’s mostly non-integrated in
distance between artists and their fans, and establishing direct l
between artists and fans is perhaps the most oft-stated justificati
Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger.  One of the attributes of v
is the ability to facilitate the sharing of knowledge.  It is 
artists and
ments required 
dustry create 
inkages
on for the 
ertical integration 
thus no surprise that 
 venues are seeking vertically integrated mechanisms to 
tes the creation 
 for better 
t and 
merchandise.   
Efficiencies such as thes aster merger, 
d towards vertical 
rged entity would 
 and that the 
merged entity would leverage its market power in one market for anticompetitive gain in 
the other.  We conclude that neither available evidence nor economic theory support 
these fears.  To be sure, the merged company would contribute to the changing face of 
the live entertainment industry, and industry players will need to continue searching for 
innovative business models.  But the merger does not change market concentration or 
communicate with fans.  Moreover, vertical integration facilita
and dissemination of information that could serve as a platform
artist-fan communication and the marketing of additional conten
e are likely to follow from a Live Nation-Ticketm
and we suspect that they also account for the broader industry-wide tren
integration.
 Critics of the proposed merger have expressed fears that the me
foreclose entry in both the ticket distribution and the promotion markets,
 vi 
 vii 
entry possibilities in the promotion market, and we suspect that the spread of Internet 
arket power 
s competitive 
r to be procompetitive adaptations that the 
antitrust laws should encourage and not condemn.
technologies has greatly removed the possibility of obtaining or leveraging m
in the ticket distribution market.  To the degree that the merger generate
advantages to the merged firm, these appea
I.  Introduction
ent, Inc. 
ent.  This “merger 
tion services and live 
ve
 about their 
ability to compete with Live Nation Entertainment,  and public figures—including Bruce 
Springsteen, a particular favorite to one of the instant authors—have decried the 
tion was 
 On February 10, 2009, Live Nation, Inc. and Ticketmaster Entertainm
announced their intentions to merge and create Live Nation Entertainm
of equals” would combine the nation’s leaders in ticket distribu
entertainment promotion, creating by all accounts an industry leader in li
entertainment.1  Not surprisingly, smaller competitors have raised concerns
2
economic and artistic consequences of such a combination.3  Political atten
1 Press Release, Live Nation and Ticketmaster Entertainment to Combine in Merger of 
Equals to Create World's Premier Live Entertainment Company (Feb. 10, 
available at
2009),
&terms= (last 
r Consumers 
Antitrust, 
y, 111th Cong. 
z, Co-Owner 
z Testimony]; 
tection, Industry 
on, http://www.
tion Merger,
/02/04/bruce-
visited Sept. 9, 
ans stating that 
as furious as it has 
ket situation even 
worse for the fan than it is now would be Ticketmaster and Live Nation coming up with a 
single system, thereby returning us to a near monopoly situation in music ticketing.”).  
Joel Rose, Ticketmaster, Live Nation Merger Investigated, NPR, Feb. 12, 2009, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId =100616154  (last visited Sept. 9, 
2009) (reporting statement by Senator Charles Schumer, following the Live Nation-
Ticketmaster merger announcement, that , “[t]he last thing we should do is give 
Ticketmaster more influence… If these two entities were to merge, control of concert 
http://mediacenter.ticketmaster.com/Extranet/ 
TMPRArticlePressReleases.aspx?id=8080&fragment=0&SearchType=OR
visited Sept. 9, 2009). 
2 See, e.g., The Ticketmaster/Live Nation Merger: What Does it Mean fo
and the Future of the Concert Business: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciar
(2009) (written testimony of Jerry Mickelson, Chairman and Executive Vice President of 
Jam Productions, Ltd. [hereinafter Mickelson Testimony] and Seth Hurwit
of I.M.P. Productions and 9:30 Club Washington, D.C. [hereinafter Hurwit
National Association of Ticket Brokers, Press Release – Consumer Pro
Groups Joint Statement on Ticketmaster/Live Nation Merger Investigati
natb.org/MediaCenter/index.cfm?article=42. 
3 See Bruce Springsteen "Furious" at Ticketmaster, Rails Against Live Na
ROLLING STONE, http://www.rollingstone.com/rockdaily/index.php/2009
springsteen-furious-at-ticketmaster-rails-against-live-nation-merger/ (last 
2009) (publishing letter from Bruce Springsteen and his tour team to f
“[t]he abuse of our fans and our trust by Ticketmaster has made us 
made many of you . . . .  [T]he one thing that would make the current tic
 1 
recently directed at the proposed merger as Senator Herb Kohl, Chairman of the Senate 
tant 
arney requesting the Antitrust Division to scrutinize the 
mer
mon refrain in 
esigned to 
achieve.  The Sherman and Clayton Acts “were enacted for the protection of competition, 
5
irable conduct.  As 
y the parties to 
rger.  We 
iting in our capacity 
as experts in antitrust law and policy, and we are presenting only our own views and not 
those of the parties or their counsel.  We accordingly apply our analysis relying on 
publicly available information and our understanding of the legal and economic 
Subcommittee on Antitrust, and Congressman Bill Pascrell each sent letters to Assis
Attorney General Christine V
ger with skepticism and care.4
 Although such popular backlash against economic giants is a com
American antitrust law, these concerns do not reflect what antitrust law is d
not competitors,”  and it is not uncommon for certain resentments and intuitions to 
channel anger at what actually is procompetitive and economically des
scholars of antitrust law and institutional economics, we have been asked b
examine the legality and the competitive consequences of the proposed me
should state upfront that, while we are being compensated, we are wr
methodologies that guide merger analysis in the U.S.  
by one 
, having profound and far-reaching implication for consumers, promoters and 
, Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition 
Policy and Consumer Rights to Christine Varney, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust 
Division, United States Dep’t of Justice (July 27, 2009) [hereinafter Kohl Letter]; Letter 
from Congressman Bill Pascrell, et. al to Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney 
General, Antitrust Division, United States Dep’t of Justice (July 27, 2009) [hereinafter 
Pascrell Letter]. 
5 See Cargill Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, 479 U.S. 104, 115 (1986); Brunswick Corp. 
v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977). 
venues and representation of artists in those venues would be controlled 
organization
artists alike.”). 
4 Letter from Senator Herb Kohl, Chairman
 2 
This memorandum first describes the industry structure and emerging trends and 
petition.  We 
nment are 
 undergoing 
ndscape that the 
ation, wherein 
creators of live entertainment are generating efficiencies and valuable new markets by 
ution business, 
the proposed 
competition.  
d proceeding 
through calculation (or approximation) of market shares, assessment of possible adverse 
effects, prospect of post-merger entry, and consideration of horizontal efficiencies.  The 
til recently 
iewing
 vertical integration 
on into 
Ticketmaster’s use of exclusive contracts.  We then discuss the potential for merger-
specific efficiencies and assess arguments made by some of the merger’s critics, 
including Senator Kohl and Congressman Pascrell, who have warned that the merger may 
have anticompetitive consequences. 
then assesses the merger’s likely horizontal and vertical impact on com
observe that both ticket distribution and the entire business of live entertai
technologically dynamic and rapidly evolving industries, and each has been
substantial structural changes in recent years.  It is within this changing la
proposed merger reflects a broader industry trend towards vertical integr
interacting directly with fans.   
Because Ticketmaster and Live Nation are both in the ticket distrib
with Live Nation having recently entered, there is a horizontal element to 
merger, requiring analysis of how it might affect both actual and potential 
We conduct a full horizontal analysis, beginning with market definition an
merger also has vertical dimensions, with Live Nation having been un
Ticketmaster’s largest client.   We begin a vertical examination by rev
developments in institutional economics and antitrust law regarding
and briefly review the results of an earlier Department of Justice investigati
 3 
We do not have access to the same confidential information possessed by the 
elieve that a Live 
commonly 
ribute tickets is 
 emerged 
with platforms that can cater to clients’ specific needs, that there is a competitive bidding 
at an increasing 
 this rapid 
bution
likely do not 
f market power.  
A proper determination of the merger’s horizontal competitive consequences instead 
rests, above all, on how easily venues can pursue self-distribution strategies and how 
ternatives to a 
Although the results of this dispassionate antitrust analysis might be more 
supportive of the merger than many critics would hope, we offer this analysis echoing the 
Boss’s admonition to seek truth and maintain an appropriate amount of self-doubt. 
enforcement agencies or the parties.  Our information is thus incomplete and our 
conclusions can only be preliminary.  Nonetheless, we find reason to b
Nation-Ticketmaster merger is likely to produce certain efficiencies that 
accompany vertical integration.  We observe that the technology to dist
becoming increasingly widespread, that several technology companies have
process in which these offerings are presented to potential clients, and th
number of venues are now pursuing self-distribution strategies.  Given
emergence of new technologies and the evident attractiveness of self-distri
strategies, concentration calculations based on historical market shares 
accurately reflect the transaction’s propensity to facilitate the exercise o
many providers of ticket distribution services would be available to offer al
merged Live Nation and Ticketmaster.   
 4 
6II.  Background on Live Entertainment: Industry Structure and Trends
Overview
llion in ticket 
enerated by 
bits, and other 
ent industry 
also rely on revenue from ancillary products, such as sales of merchandise, concessions, 
ing increasingly vertically integrated, most 
con umber of different 
 business 
needs, and many of these managers further contract with booking agents to arrange an 
agreement with a promoter for individual performances or a tour.  The promoter is then 
responsible for securing a venue for the performances, and the venue is accompanied by 
ip, and band-
h ticket 
 The market for live entertainment events generated roughly $21 bi
sales in 2007, with $14.3 billion generated by sporting events, $6.7 billion g
concerts, and a small remainder generated by theatre performances, art exhi
events that utilized ticketing services.7  Participants in the live entertainm
and music.  Although the industry is becom
certs and performances require contractual arrangements among a n
and otherwise independent parties. 
 Artists contract with promoters to arrange live concert performances.  Artists 
often contract through a manager that handles the artists’ performance and
other revenue-producing services such as parking, concessions, sponsorsh
related merchandise.  The venue, or sometimes the promoter, contracts wit
6 This section relies heavily on Krueger, infra note 9, and Barclays Cap
70.
7 The Potential Anticompetitive Effects of the Proposed Combination o
Entertainm
ital, infra note
f Ticketmaster 
ent Inc. and Live Nation, Inc., Hearing on Competition in the Ticketing and 
Promotion Industry Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the  
House  Comm. on the Judiciary, 111 Cong. 7-8 (2009) [hereinafter Doyle Testimony] 
(written testimony of Robert W. Doyle, Jr., Partner, Doyle, Barlow & Mazard, PLLC).
Secondary ticket sales, which for 2007 totaled $2.6 billion, are brokered by agents who 
purchase performance tickets from the primary sales agents or initial purchasers and then 
resell to end-consumers either with a mark-up above the sales price or through auction 
mechanisms. 
 5 
distributors that administer ticket sales to performances through Internet, retail, telephone 
and box offi
oters have 
ey allocate serial 
ments vary 
oters, and other 
circumstances, the typical contract distributes the revenue generated by concert tours 
r a 
t for the venue, 
itional revenues 
with the band 
typically recovering around 85%.  These contracts allocate other revenues as well, with 
the band typically receiving revenue from merchandise sales and the venue receiving 
ented with 
tist a lump sum 
ual revenues,8 but 
contracts divide such residual revenue between promoters and artists.  This means 
that promoters and artists tend to share (though not equally) the economic risks and 
n venues are 
unfilled. 
ce sales.
 Contracts between artists (via their managers and agents) and prom
been likened to book contracts between authors and publishers in that th
revenues and often involve upfront payments.  Although contractual agree
significantly based on the popularity of the band, the record of the prom
sequentially.  The first-dollar revenues generated by the performances go to the band in a 
“guaranteed advance,” and then subsequent revenue secures for the promote
“guaranteed profit,” which includes expenses (including advertising, ren
labor, etc) and a negotiated profit.  The promoter and band then share add
(if any) that exceed both the guaranteed advance and guaranteed profit, 
revenue from parking and concessions.  Live Nation has recently experim
some “360” contracts with certain marquee performers that give the ar
guarantee for an entire tour, with Live Nation recovering all of the resid
most
benefits of ticketed performances, and both suffer from lost revenue whe
8 Ethan Smith, Deal to Rock Music Industry, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2009, at B10.
Record labels, such as Warner Music Group and Sony Music Entertainment have also 
experimented with 360 deals, though with lesser-known artists. Id.
 6 
 The contracts between artists and promoters also set the face value of concert 
nflation over the 
 prices on a 
arket is evidence 
s explanations for 
such underpricing),  but others describe the secondary market as a more flexible 
11 arying
cterizations of the secondary market, with different characterizations offering 
alte y market 
Many venues and promoters contract with ticket distribution service companies, 
such as Ticketmaster, to handle all their ticketing needs.  These contracts tend to be 
ervices for a 
 of time in exchange for the right to charge service fees that are 
tickets—i.e., the price of the ticket excluding any service fees, credit card fees, or taxes. 
Although face value ticket prices have been rising faster than the rate of i
past decade,9 many purchased tickets are later resold at significantly higher
secondary market.  Some suggest that the persistence of the secondary m
of underpricing by bands in the primary market (and there are variou
10
distribution mechanism that can cater to fans who are less able to purchase on the 
primary market.   Scholars and industry commentators have offered v
chara
rnative implications for how much social value players in the secondar
create.12
exclusive agreements, in which the ticket distributor agrees to handle all s
venue for a period
9 Alan B. Krueger, The Economics of Real Superstars: The Market for 
in the Material World, 23 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3 (2005). 
10 See, e.g., id. at 13. 
11 Pascal Courty, Some Economics of Ticket Resale, 17 J. ECON. PERSP.
(suggesting that ticket resale is a function of heterogeneous consum
some consumers prefer to plan ahea
Rock Concerts 
85, 86 (2003) 
er preferences, in that 
d while others prefer delay scheduling decisions, 
even if it requires paying higher prices). 
12 Although an assessment of the secondary market is beyond the scope of this paper, 
some commentators on the Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger have expressed concern for 
how the merger would affect the secondary market.  Any such assessment would first 
have to articulate what services the secondary market provides, whether those services 
enhance social welfare, and whether direct competition between the primary and 
secondary markets enhances social welfare. 
 7 
negotiated between the ticket distributor and the venue.   Most such agreements run for 
ts expire in any given 
 ticket 
dist e contract.15
r venues, 
establish whatever putative “processing fees” (alternatively called handling, convenience, 
ing fee revenues 
16 re fixed by a 
ny cases, the 
ue with an 
improvements 
to the venue or even construction of the venue itself.  The upfront payment amounts to a 
discount to the effective price the venue pays for distribution.17  The allocation of these 
fees, along with the length of the contract and any other payments or discounts, 
determines the effective price charged by the ticket distributor for the services it provides 
 has become 
13
several years, with typical contracts lasting at least three and running for an average of 
six, and approximately 20 percent of all ticket distribution contrac
year,14 and as these contracts approach their expiration dates, competing
ributors place bids with venues to compete for a subsequent exclusiv
These distribution agreements appoint ticket distributors as agents fo
or service fees) that are charged to ticket purchasers, and allocate process
between the distributor and the venue.   Such processing fees usually a
schedule agreed to by the parties and can vary from event to event.  In ma
ticket distribution agreement will require the distributor to provide the ven
upfront payment, which might help the venue to finance certain physical 
to venues.  There is evidence that the ticket distribution services industry
13 See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2003-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
96,239-40 (C.D. Cal.  2003) (describing process of “
 ¶74,013, at 
arms length” bargaining between 
sulting price structure). 
14 See id. at 96,240-41 (reporting that at least 20 percent of such contracts expire each 
year).
15 Id. (describing this bidding process). 
16 This should dispel the misconception, implicit in some critiques of the transaction, 
that the ticket distributor is solely responsible for, and retains all of, the processing fees.
Typically, none of the processing fee revenues go to the artists. 
17 See Ticketmaster Corp, 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,240. 
venues and ticket distribution companies and re
 8 
increasingly competitive in recent years, resulting in a larger percentage of the processing 
fees (or larger upfront paym 18
et sales, in 
venues have 
y operating their own 
 others or 
developed themselves or, more frequently, by licensing software from technology 
ple, by selling 
er venues may 
ands of 
 particularly 
demanding for events where demand exceeds supply, such as playoff sporting events and 
marquee concerts).  Several technology companies, such as Paciolan (acquired by 
, TicketReturn, and 
AudienceView, have developed and made available for licensing ticket distribution 
n behalf in lieu 
offer 
ents) allocated to venues and promoters.
 There are other mechanisms available to venues to administer tick
addition to outsourcing this task to a distributor.  An increasing number of 
chosen to “make” instead of “buy” their ticket distribution, either b
ticket distribution services with technology they have purchased from
companies.  Many venues have pursued a hybrid strategy, outsourcing their ticket 
distribution services while engaging in some self-distribution, for exam
directly to season ticket holders or purchasers at the box office.  Larg
demand more sophisticated software than smaller venues, to handle the dem
responding to a high volume of simultaneous ticket purchases (this is
Ticketmaster in 2008), Veritix, Front Gate, ShoWare, Tessitura
technologies that enable individual venues to distribute tickets on their ow
of outsourcing this task to agents such as Ticketmaster.19  These firms 
18 The Potential Anticompetitive Effects of the Proposed Combin
Entertainment Inc. and Live Nation, Inc., Hearing on Competition in t
ation of Ticketmaster 
he Ticketing and 
Promotion Industry Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the  
House  Comm. on the Judiciary, 111 Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Froeb Testimony] 
(written testimony of Luke Froeb, Oehmig Associate Professor of Management at 
Vanderbilt University). 
19 See infra notes 89-102 and accompanying text (listing numerous examples of venues 
that have recently taken on the task of distributing their own tickets). See also 
Ticketmaster Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,241 (explaining that the option of self-
 9 
technologically sophisticated support for venues’ efforts to gather, synthesize, and 
info ng strategies.20
istribution 
rts Enterprises based 
n, Comcast-
Spectacor (“Comcast”), and many others currently employ internal mechanisms to 
21 ftware
t it owns and 
verse range of 
iary of Major 
 team is permitted 
to develop (and many have) their own ticket distribution capabilities.  Other venues 
pursue hybrid strategies for separate clienteles, such as season ticket holders versus 
rts programs 
, and the 
interpret information about their ticket buyers, fans, and in some cases, donors, 
rmation that can facilitate targeted promotion and more rational prici
A growing number of venues have recently internalized their ticket d
operations relying on these technologies.  For example, Kroenke Spo
in Denver, numerous universities, International Speedway Corporatio
distribute tickets over the Internet.   Live Nation itself recently received a so
license from CTS to power the self-distribution of tickets to venues tha
manages.  Moreover, ticket distribution is being implemented through a di
vertical arrangements.  Tickets.com, for example, is owned by a subsid
League Baseball and distributes tickets to MLB games, yet each MLB
single-ticket purchasers.  For example, many universities with large spo
(including Maryland, Georgia Tech, West Virginia, North Carolina State
ster from 
y applying dynamic, 
fetime value of 
rs and fans.  With the use of advanced Veritix applications, clients have 
the unique capability of understanding the nature of the true attendees at every event . . . .
Never before has a single ticketing and live entertainment company delivered such 
advanced digital ticketing services and tools that empower clients to truly understand 
their customers’ habits, improve fan relationships and drive more revenue.”).  
21 See, e.g., infra notes 79-88, 103-110.  Note also that the University of Michigan, the 
University of Tennessee, and various other universities both self-distribute as well, using 
Paciolan technology. 
distribution via reliance on outside technology providers prevents Ticketma
exercising market power). 
20 See Veritix, www.veritix.com/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2009) (“B
client-branded technologies—like exclusive digital ticketing delivery tools—Veritix 
enables its partners to develop rich behavioral profiles that maximize the li
their ticket buye
 10 
University of Virginia) use technologies “powered by Paciolan” to distribute tickets to 
ns that providers 
 well as the many 
pportunities that can become available through integrated ticket 
dist
 The emergence of varied vertical integration strategies also illustrates how much 
distribution 
homable for 
 or perhaps 
e.  The 
centrality of Internet sales has called into question the requirement of establishing retail 
booths or call centers, both of which were necessary channels for ticket distribution not 
 reduced the costs and complexity for venues that decide to 
distribute their own tickets.  Internet technologies have leapfrogged the once-prevalent 
 self-
23
the public but maintain separate systems for student ticketing supported by TicketReturn.
These multi-pronged strategies illustrate the many organizational solutio
of live entertainment are currently pursuing for ticket distribution as
ancillary profit o
ribution systems. 
the industry has changed in a relatively short period of time.  Just eleven years ago, 
appellate courts and the enforcement agencies could describe the ticket 
industry without mentioning the Internet.22  Now, it would be unfat
professional ticket distribution to exclude substantial Internet distribution,
even to have anything but Internet distribution as the primary sales vehicl
long ago, and it has drastically
model of telephone and retail distribution and have enabled many venues to
distribute tickets over the Internet.
22 See Campos v. Ticketmaster, 140 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 1998); Brie
the United States and Federal Trade Commission, Campos v. Ticketmaster, No. 98-127 
f Amicus Curiae for 
(Dec. 1998). 
23 See United States v. SunGard Data Sys., 172 F. Supp. 2d 172, 188-89 (D.D.C. 2001) 
(noting that recent technological advances had significantly reduced the cost of vertical 
integration by customers who might otherwise suffer at the hands of a hypothetical 
monopolist.  Invoking prior decision for the proposition that “the market definition 
should be expanded because the ability of a substitute product to compete ‘will be 
enhanced in the future because of further technological and market developments.’”). 
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 There are similarly many variations in how promoters administer venues.  
y lease them 
ith others that 
ation also are 
 booking agents, 
where they not only organize and promote live performances but also coordinate and 
 job of 
ances.  The 
enues and 
et distributors.  It 
also suggests that ticket distributors contract directly with venues, whereas sometimes 
they instead contract with promoters.  But the chart effectively conveys the several 
vertical relationships and multiple inputs that are required to deliver live entertainment 
and associated products to consumers.  
Promoters may merely rent a site for a particular event, but many promoters have long-
term commitments to certain venues.  Promoters may own venues (and ma
occasionally to others) and may have additional exclusive arrangements w
preclude competing promoters from the venue.  Promoters such as Live N
providing services that traditionally have remained under the control of
arrange lengthy tours at many venues. 
 Figure 1, created by Barclay’s Capital, does a reasonably good
characterizing the different contractual relationships that enable live perform
chart understates the variation in both the extent of integration between v
promoters as well as the extent of integration between venues and tick
 12 
Parties to Proposed Merger 
 The parties to this proposed merger, Live Nation and Ticketmas
several of the market segments described above.  Ticketmaster Enterta
ter, are leaders in 
inment, Inc., 
includes Ticketmaster, “the world’s leading live entertainment ticketing and marketing 
company,”24 Front Line Management Group, “the world’s leading artist management 
a handful of other business company,”25 TicketsNow, a secondary ticket seller, and 
24 See About Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., http://www.ticketmaster.com/h/about_ 
us.html?tm_link=tm_homeA_i_abouttm (last visited Sept. 9, 2009). 
25 Id.
 13 
interests.   Ticketmaster’s central asset, and its primary mechanism for distributing 
one and at retail 
les account for 
age that 
l locations (not 
including those at the locations of the venues themselves) account for just 16 percent of 
overall transactions, a proportion that is fa
et sales than any 
 (which are based on 
gh TicketNews 
claims that Web traffic “has been shown to be a good estimator of the number of 
transactions made by a seller”27), Ticketmaster.com is the leading seller both among 
recorded sales 
-scale popular 
26
tickets, is its signature Website, Ticketmaster.com, but it was not always so.  Before 
Internet commerce became routine, Ticketmaster’s sales over the teleph
outlets dominated the firm’s business.  Currently, however, Internet sa
more than 73 percent of the company’s worldwide sales, a growing percent
reflects the rapidly evolving nature of the industry.  Sales from 6,700 retai
lling, and its 19 call centers account for 11 
percent. 
Ticketmaster.com attracts more Web traffic and enjoys more tick
other Internet sales site.  According to TicketNews’ power rankings
Web traffic received by a ticket seller’s Web site, not actual sales, thou
primary and overall ticket sellers, with about 60 percent and 31 percent of 
respectively.28  Some sources indicate that Ticketmaster’s share for large
26 s.
htm
27 us y_ra  (last visited 
Sep
28 the fo ng power 
sco y and combined ticket se
Top Primary Sellers  Score Top Combined Sellers Score  
1    Ticketmaster.com 60.29 1 Ticketmaster.com  30.68 
2  LiveNation.com  16.11  2 StubHub.com   20.14 
3  Telecharge.com  4.89 3  LiveNation.com    8.17 
4  TicketWeb.com  3.50 4  TicketsNow.com    5.48 
5  ETix.com   3.16 5  TicketLiquidator.com   3.33 
See Ticketmaster Businesses & Interests, http://www.ticketmaster.com/h/businesse
l (last visited Sept. 9, 2009). 
See TicketNews, http://www.ticketnews.com/ticket_ind tr nkings
t. 9, 2009).
For the week ending August 22, 2009, TicketNews reports llowi
res for primar llers: 
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music events might be even higher, approaching 75-90 percent.   Other full service 
n outsourced 
other, a distinction we find to 
be o
es a significant 
position in the market for talent management and “is widely regarded as the music 
world's m ent com 31
29
ticket distributors appear to have much smaller market shares, with most below 5 percent.  
Unfortunately, public data regarding ticket sales do not distinguish betwee
distribution, on the one hand, and self-distribution, on the 
f great competitive significance, as discussed in Part III, below.30
Ticketmaster Entertainment’s Front Line Management occupi
ost powerful artist-managem pany.”   Front Line’s roster includes close 
erTicke   1.82   2.48 
7  Tix.com   1.80 7  TicketCity.com   2.31 
 1.77 
  1.60 
ts.com  1.16 
e self-distributed tickets, a 
ave no 
rces we consult 
lightly different 
at
s from January 
thly unique visitors, 
audience also 
ster’s
/www.nielsen-online.com/emc/btn/0902_ 
 York Times reported 
nt of the $21 
 Stifel Nicolaus suggesting that 
ent.  Andrew 
kin, ed., Ticketmaster Merger Plan Could Touch on Antitrust, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
4, 2009, at B3.
29 Ticketmaster Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,241. 
30 We anticipate that the ultimate fact finder will have superior data that both 
distinguishes between outsourced and self-distribution and is not derived from proxy 
information, such as TicketNews’s power rankings. 
31 Ethan Smith, Ticketmaster to Acquire Star Power in Azoff Deal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 
2008, at B1. 
6  BrownPap ts.com  6  Telecharge.com  
8  Tickets.com  1.20 8  TicketWeb.com  
9  Wantickets.com   0.96 9  ETix.com   
10  SmithsTix.com   0.44 10  CoasttoCoastTicke
Id. (last visited Aug. 31, 2009) These figures apparently includ
fact that explains LiveNation.com’s inclusion on the list. 
  Data sources for ticket sales conflict slightly with each other, and we h
knowledge suggesting that one source is superior to others, but all the sou
generate similar results.  For example, Nielsen Online Netview offers a s
comparison of Ticketmaster and LiveNation.com that perhaps indicates th
LiveNation.com has a less significant Web presence.  Indeed, its figure
2009 reveal that Ticketmaster attracts roughly 12.1 million mon
almost four times LiveNation.com’s, and 53 percent of LiveNation.com’s 
visited Ticketmaster in January 2009, whereas only 14 percent of Ticketma
audience visited LiveNation.com.  See http:/
indnews/indnews_0902.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).  The New
data from Forrester Research indicating that Ticketmaster had 30 perce
billion events market in 2008 and data from
Ticketmaster’s market share for music concert tickets was closer to 70 perc
Ross Sor
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to 200 artists, including many who perform in large venues.  Ticketmaster’s purchase of 
 as an effort “to 
ifts.”32  The merger of 
f
odel, in which it is integrating its ticketing operations with 
oth
Live Nation, Inc. describes itself as “the largest producer of live concerts in the 
33  Live 
tes many others in 
 for 159 
of the 
o 38 percent 
of all live music concerts, although Live Nation owns or operates approximately 90 
percent of the outdoor amphitheatres in the US.  At congressional hearings, many smaller 
es have complained that they cannot offer marquee bands the revenues and venues 
 them to compete with Live Nation.
Front Line in October 2008 was characterized by The Wall Street Journal
find a new business model for an industry undergoing seismic sh
Ticketmaster Entertainment with Live Nation appears to be a continuation o
Ticketmaster’s new business m
er elements of live entertainment. 
world, annually producing over 16,000 concerts for 1,500 artists in 57 countries.”
Nation owns 18 venues in the US, has leases on 70 more, and opera
which it organizes live events.34  With its subsidiaries, it has booking rights
venues, with 140 in the US, and has been responsible for organizing many 
industry’s largest tours.35  Live Nation events represent approximately 35 t
venu
that would enable 36
32 Id.
33 See About Live Nation, http://www.livenation.com/company/getCompanyInfo (last 
on of Ticketmaster 
ation, Inc., Hearing on Competition in the Ticketing and 
try Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the  
House  Comm. on the Judiciary, 111 Cong. 13 (2009) [hereinafter Rapino Testimony] 
(written testimony of Michael Rapino, President & Chief Executive Officer, Live 
Nation).
35 Live Nation, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 1 (Mar. 5, 2009) http://www.sec.
gov/Archives/edgar/data/1335258/000119312509045320/0001193125-09-045320-
index.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2009). 
36 See supra, note 2. 
visited Sept. 9, 2009).
34 The Potential Anticompetitive Effects of the Proposed Combinati
Entertainment Inc. and Live N
Promotion Indus
 16 
 Live Nation, like Ticketmaster Entertainment, also has been expanding into 
plement a new 
n MusicToday, an 
e company’s 
ge their 
eir fan bases and provide a direct connection” in marketing music, 
tickets, and merchandise.
ow internally 
icketmaster 
ive Nation ended 
 an agreement 
with CTS Eventim, the largest ticketing company in Europe, to license CTS ticket 
distribution technology.  The agreement enabled Live Nation to create a technological 
 it owns or 
t sales 
mber 2008 that 
it had entered a strategic alliance with venue-operator SMG, currently a Ticketmaster 
client.  According to public reports, the agreement contemplates that Live Nation will sell 
otes
vertically related segments of live entertainment in an apparent effort to im
business model.  In 2006, Live Nation acquired a controlling interest i
online store for artist merchandise, and MusicToday became part of th
“Artist Nation” division, which “was formed to partner with artists to mana
diverse rights, grow th
37
 In another recent effort to integrate downstream into consumer sales, and thus to 
gain greater contact with consumer sales and preferences, Live Nation n
maintains its own ticket distribution operations.  Previously a long-time T
client (and the source of 17% of Ticketmaster’s revenues in 2007), L
most of its dealings with Ticketmaster in December 2008 after it entered
platform so the company could distribute tickets to events at the venues
operates, and the resulting (captive) sales account for all or most of the ticke
currently attributed to Live Nation.  Live Nation also announced in Septe
tickets to events at venues operated by SMG, regardless whether Live Nation prom
37 Press Release, PRNewswire, Live Nation's Artist Nation Division Redefines the 
Music Industry with Unified Rights Model, (Oct. 16, 2007), 
http://www.prnewswire.co.uk /cgi/news/release?id=210077 (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).  
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such events, after SMG’s contract with Ticketmaster expires in December, 2010.38
master.39  Some 
tmaster is 
 other distributors for Ticketmaster’s business as 
n contracts expire.
Recent Industry Developments 
a live 
dustry that is undergoing significant structural change.40  Accordingly, 
the company’s proposed merger should be viewed within the context of a rapidly shifting 
industry landscape.
Currently, LiveNation.com, which distributes tickets to events at Live Nation venues, is 
ranked a distant second in Internet primary ticket sales, behind Ticket
industry observers expect Live Nation (if and until its merger with Ticke
consummated) to compete along with
Ticketmaster’s distributio
Both Ticketmaster Entertainment’s and Live Nation’s recent acquisitions, and 
their respective pursuits of new business models, appear to be responses to 
entertainment in
38 See Live Nation Signs Ticketing deal with SMG, Reuters News Servi
11, 2008); 
ce (September 
334097
ecember 31, 
t fraction of 
ousand tickets 
09.”).  This is 
p to 5 million 
te all SMG 
ends that most 
y SMG are in fact owned by municipalities that employ a “request for 
utors and that 
tmaster expects to compete for such business even after its current contract with 
SMG expires on December 31, 2010.  Id. See also Michael Peters, Ticketmaster 
Responds to Live Nation/SMG Deal, BILLBOARD MAG., Sept. 11, 2008, available at:
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content_display/industry/e3ia6592177cf3e47ef913e13148
951ec2e (recounting Ticketmaster’s characterization of the deal and SMG’s response).
39 See supra, note 28. 
40 See supra, note 31 (describing the music world as “an industry undergoing seismic 
shifts”). 
http://investors.ticketmaster.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=
(detailing Ticketmaster’s exclusive agreements with SMG that expire on D
2010).  Ticketmaster has argued that Live Nation would sell only a modes
tickets to SMG-operated venues by late 2009.  See id. (“[L]ess than 250 th
(of the 141 million we sold in 2007) are at possible risk with SMG in 20
because, in part, although events at SMG-operated venues account for u
tickets annually, Ticketmaster suggests that the arrangement will not obliga
venues to rely upon Live Nation for ticket distribution.  Ticketmaster cont
venues operated b
proposal” or “competitive bidding” process for selecting their ticket distrib
Ticke
 18 
Perhaps the most significant development in the music industry, one with effects 
t the emergence 
oth significantly 
es in ticket 
l evidence for a 
“Bowie hypothesis” that suggests that “concert prices have soared because recording 
lementary 
42 nderpriced their 
 closer to what 
is hypothesis, 
rt revenues, 
fewer tickets sold, larger yet fewer concerts, and fewer sellouts.  Krueger additionally 
finds evidence for a predicted “superstar” effect that has channeled a disproportionately 
larg hese popular 
ination, with the 
seat.
In other words, data on concert ticket prices suggest that since 1997 concerts are 
er than being 
 become the 
well beyond live entertainment, is the Internet-driven spread of digital music technology 
and the concomitant rise of music piracy.  Alan Krueger has observed tha
of digital music coincided with a rise in concert ticket prices that was b
faster than the rate of inflation and additionally faster than similar increas
prices to movies, theatre, and sporting events.41  Krueger finds empirica
artists have seen a large decline in their income from record sales, a comp
product to concerts.”   In other words, whereas performers previously u
concert tickets in order to boost their record sales, they now are charging
the market will bear.  Consistent with the economic theory underlying th
these ticket price increases have been associated with higher overall conce
e and growing share of concert revenues to the most popular bands.  T
and established bands also seem to be engaging in more price discrim
prices for good concert seats rising faster than the price for the average 
increasingly being priced like single-market monopoly products, rath
underpriced to boost popularity and record sales.  They have accordingly
41 Krueger, supra note 9, at 7-10.
42 Id. at 25.  Kruger calls this the “Bowie hypothesis” because of David Bowie’s 
prescient remark in 2002 that “music itself is going to becomes like running water or 
electricity,” which meant that performers “better be prepared for doing a lot of touring 
because that’s really the only unique situation that’s going to be left.” Id. at 26. 
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primary source of revenue for most top artists.   In turn, they have unleashed new 
bined with the 
itable opportunities for promoters who organize 
eve
ar pursuit of 
t value chain.  Live 
Nation’s development of MusicToday and Artist Nation reflect these new Internet 
ing more 
tnessed the 
tribution
is spread of 
Internet technologies for ticket distribution, along with the growing economic importance 
of concerts, has meant that ticket platforms also have become important mediums to 
tribution market 
has historically taken the form of technological rivalry—Ticketmaster’s displacement of 
gical capabilities—
urced distributors or 
43
revenue opportunities for concert promoters and, especially when com
“superstar effect,” have opened prof
nts for the nation’s marquee performers. 
Additionally, emerging Internet technologies are permitting a simil
new revenue opportunities in other segments of the live entertainmen
opportunities to sell merchandise and other goods.  Meanwhile, Internet technologies—
including technologies to distribute tickets over the Internet—are becom
widespread and commoditized.  As noted above, recent years have wi
emergence of several technology companies that license or sell ticketing dis
technologies to venues that choose to distribute their own tickets.44  Th
market merchandise and related goods.  Consequently, the locus of competition in ticket 
distribution appears to be shifting.  Whereas competition in the ticket dis
Ticketron as the market leader was largely due to its superior technolo
competition now increasingly revolves around the ability of outso
43 Marie Connolly & Alan B. Krueger, Rockonomics:  The Economics of Popular 
Music, at Table 1.1, NBER Working Paper No. W11282 (Apr. 2005). 
44 See infra notes 79-110 and accompanying text (listing numerous examples of venues 
that have recently taken on the task of distributing their own tickets).  See also 
Ticketmaster Corp 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,241 (explaining that the option of self-
distribution via reliance on outside technology providers prevents Ticketmaster from 
exercising market power). 
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firms that support self-distribution to assist venues in promoting and marketing content 
and related products.
oducts explain 
y would 
 common when 
scale market 
production.   If competition were truly over efficient ticket distribution, then the 
 Internet ticketing technology and reduced costs in ticket distribution has given 
rise self-
rs and artists who 
are pursuing new revenue sources by establishing greater contact with fans.  For example, 
revenue sources that traditionally accompany live entertainment, such as merchandise 
s if they maintain 
hese profit 
g and interpreting 
ues and 
performers to develop targeted communications and marketing strategies designed to 
tainment.  
These opportunities are lost if independent ticket distribution firms lack the incentive to 
The growing importance of marketable content and ancillary pr
what would otherwise appear to be an economic curiosity.   Economic theor
normally predict that the outsourcing of a particular service becomes more
its underlying technology becomes commoditized and thus subject to large-
45
industry would rely on outsourced services.  In contrast to this prediction, however, the 
spread of
 to greater vertical integration, as venues are now increasingly pursuing 
distribution strategies.
This trend in vertical integration is apparently driven by promote
sales and perhaps music sales, might accrue to venues and performer
contact with consumers.  The “superstar” effect additionally magnifies t
opportunities, especially for top-name performers.  Similarly, acquirin
information about the profile of ticket purchasers facilitates efforts by ven
respond to consumer preferences and maximize fan demand for live enter
45 See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS & HIERARCHIES (1975). Cf. George J. 
Stigler, The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of Market, 59 J. POL. ECON. 185 
(1951).
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develop such profiles and acquire a more thorough understanding, and a broader data set, 
e 
about establishing direct linkages to, and 
info
e Nation 
at it needs to integrate 
away from the increasingly competitive market for ticket distribution,47 and both 
ore
s.  This industry-wide shift towards vertical integration, and the 
acc ains both parties’ 
ty of live 
concerts and the economic opportunities afforded by vertical integration—not only might 
explain Live Nation’s and Ticketmaster’s intentions to merge, but should also inform any 
g two sections, we 
of performers’ fans.  Accordingly, the value of ticket distribution services has becom
less about technological capabilities and more 
rmation about, fans and their interests in content.46
Such trends comport with public statements by Ticketmaster and Liv
explaining their rationale for the merger.  Ticketmaster has noted th
companies have argued that their integration would enable the production of m
content and more product
ompanying opportunities to pursue additional revenue sources, expl
motivations for the transaction. 
These industry-wide developments—the growing economic centrali
evaluation of how the merger might affect competition.  In the followin
46 Veritix.com, http://www.veritix.com (last visited Sept. 9, 2009) (descri
Veritix self-ticketing technology allows venues to “develop rich behavioral
maximize the lifetime value of their ticket buyers and their fans” an
truly understand their customers’ habits, improve fan relationships, and 
revenue”).
47 See
bing how 
 profiles that 
d “empower clients to 
drive more 
 Peter Kafka, Ticketmaster CEO Irving Azoff: How to Make Money While Music 
Becomes “Demonetized,” ALL THINGS DIGITAL, May 27, 2009, http://d7.allthingsd.com/ 
20090527/irving-azoff/?mod=ATD_search (last visited Sept. 9, 2009) (reporting that 
Ticketmaster’s merger with Live Nation is motivated by Ticketmaster’s need to integrate 
with promotion and marketing, without which Ticketmaster’s survival would be 
jeopardized, and quoting Azoff as saying “[a]ny of you guys can write a program that 
does what Ticketmaster does. . . .  I’ve been there a couple of months and I have gripes 
myself.”).
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evaluate the probable consequences of this transaction on horizontal and vertical 
competition while keeping these industry developments in mind.   
III.   Analysis of Merger’s Horizontal Consequences
An analysis of the horizontal consequences of the Live Nation-Tick
merger begins with identifying the market segments in which both c
although both firms have core businesses that lie primarily in specific segm
now participates in multiple levels of the industry.  Live Nation currently en
promotion of concerts and other events, the operation and management o
forms of merchandising, and the distribution of primary tickets.  Ticketm
engages in the distribution of primary ticke
etmaster 
ompanies compete.
The production of live entertainment involves a number of market segments, and 
ents, each 
gages in the 
f venues, various 
aster meanwhile 
ts, the secondary market for ticket sales, the 
licensing of technology that facilitates the self-distribution of tickets for a venue’s own 
events, and the management of entertainment talent. 
 into direct 
e Nation, which 
nts 
 distribution 
services to other venues. Accordingly, the parties now appear to be competing for 
contracts to provide ticket distribution services to venues that choose not to distribute 
their own tickets.  This recent competition has led some to criticize the transaction on the 
ground that it purportedly reduces present and future competition in a market for ticket 
Consequently, most of both firms’ business activities do not come
competition with each other.  However, on January 1 of this year, Liv
was previously an important Ticketmaster client, began to self-distribute tickets to eve
at venues it owns or operates and has also sought to offer outsourced ticket
 23 
distribution services, and it impels us to examine the horizontal consequences of this 
transaction.
 are numbers 
 of the industry 
 sales that this 
uggests that 
technological innovations have made this a very dynamic and rapidly changing market, in 
e 
ion for events it 
nt or future 
 defined market for ticket distribution.  
Con t would have a 
minimal effect on the market’s competitiveness. 
The remainder of this section employs the law of horizontal mergers as the 
osed
ent agencies to 
ascertain the competitive impact of a transaction upon “any line of commerce or [line of] 
alysis generally 
 market 
By most publicly available accounts, Ticketmaster and Live Nation
one and two in ticket sales,48 with combined sales approaching 80 percent
total.49  Some critics decry the purported reduction of competition in such
merger would entail.  A careful analysis of this market segment, however, s
which new products are facilitating vertical integration and easing entry.  At the sam
time, Live Nation’s ticket sales, nearly all of which entail distribut
promotes or venues it owns or operates, significantly overstate its prese
competitive significance in any properly
sequently, an appropriate evaluation of the merger suggests that i
framework for evaluating the probable horizontal consequences of the prop
transaction.  Section 7 of the Clayton Act requires courts and enforcem
activity affecting commerce in any section of the country.”50  Such an an
involves the following steps:  1) defining the relevant market, 2) identifying
48 Live Nation is primarily considered a large ticket distributor on account of its self-
distribution of its own tickets.  This qualification becomes meaningful in a horizontal 
merger analysis, see infra notes 129-130 and accompanying text. 
49 See, e.g., supra note 27 (attributing 60.3% and 16.1% of the market for ticket sales to 
Ticketmaster, and Live Nation, respectively).  Of course, TicketNews scores are only 
approximations of relative sales. 
50 15 U.S.C. §18 (2006). 
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participants and calculating market shares, 3) analyzing “other factors” that bear upon 
ining possibilities for 
itive effects, and 5) 
hether the merger might create horizontal efficiencies.51
Ma
f the country,” 
courts and the enforcement agencies must determine the relevant product market(s) and 
52
 enforcement agencies, bear the burden of pleading and 
pro .  Failure to discharge these burdens 
doo
 The market definition inquiry does not involve identifying “markets” in a 
colloquial sense or even in the sense that market participants or industry observers may 
igorous process 
nse that firms 
whether a transaction will produce anticompetitive effects; 4) exam
entry in the market, assuming the possibility of anticompet
determining w
rket Definition 
   To ascertain the relevant “line[s] of commerce” and “section[s] o
geographic market(s) in which the merging parties participate.   Plaintiffs challenging a 
merger, including the federal
ving the relevant product and geographic markets
ms any challenge to a merger.53
1.  General Standards Governing Market Definition 
employ the term.54  Instead, market definition in the merger context is a r
designed to identify markets that are “economically meaningful” in the se
51 See 1992 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizo
Guidelines, § 0.2 [hereinafter 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines]. 
52 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). 
ntal Merger 
7) (government 
United States v. 
 of market definition a 
 predicate” for a successful challenge to a merger); id. at 1152-68 (rejecting 
challenge because of failure to establish a relevant market);  SunGard, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 
181-93 (rejecting government challenge to a merger because of failure to prove relevant 
market in which transaction would result in significant concentration). 
54 2006 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Commentary on the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 11-12 (Mar. 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Commentary on
Horizontal Merger Guidelines] (“Industry Usage of the Word ‘Market’ is Not 
Controlling”).
53 See United States v. Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 199
challenge to merger fails for lack of proof of relevant product market); 
Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1110 (N.D. Ca. 2004) (proof
“necessary
 25 
participating in them could exercise market power.   If the participants in a proposed 
 market, then 
ingful and cannot serve as the basis for 
an e
ious factors 
(“practical indicia”) purportedly bearing upon the “reasonable interchangeability” of 
57 ore 
f courts.58
cluding but 
not necessarily lim  with respect to 
 market power 
55
market could not exercise market power, even when acting in concert, because a 
sufficient number of consumers would turn to products outside the putative
the “market” in question is not economically mean
valuation of the competitive effects of the transaction.56
 At one time, market definition involved the consideration of var
potential substitutes.   More recently, the enforcement agencies have articulated a m
rigorous analytic process that has been embraced by an increasing number o
Under this approach, the agencies seek to identify a category of products, in
ited to the type of products sold by the merging parties,
which a hypothetical monopolist of such products could profitably exercise
Joint Merger Guidelines, supra note 51, § 1.0 (“The analytic process 
on] ensures 
text of 
e exercise of 
 bearing upon 
ent of Justice 
 also Oracle
ct market is 
Joint Merger 
pp. 2d  at 181-82
, since the 
 necessarily impact any analysis of the anticompetitive effects of 
the transaction"; invoking both “reasonable interchangeability” test and agencies’ 
hypothetical monopolist test); FTC v. Swedish Match N. Am., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 
159-60 (D.D.C. 2000) (“practical indicia” are “not necessarily criteria to be rigidly 
applied” in a “talismanic fashion”; explaining that 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines’ 
hypothetical monopolist test is one method for evaluating “price sensitivity” and thus 
reasonable interchangeability) (quotations omitted); FTC v. Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 
2d 34, 45, n.8 (D.D.C. 1998). 
55 See 1992
described in this section [describing the standards governing market definiti
that the Agency evaluates the likely competitive impact of a merger within the con
economically meaningful markets, i.e., markets that could be subject to th
market power.”).   
56 See id., § 1.0. 
57 See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325 (identifying various “practical indicia”
reasonable interchangeability and thus market definition). 
58 See 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines, supra note 51, § 1.0; 1984 Departm
Merger Guidelines, §§ 2.1, 2.11 [hereinafter 1984 Merger Guidelines].  See
Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1110-13 (explaining that proof of relevant produ
“necessary predicate” for successful merger challenge and invoking 
Guidelines’ hypothetical monopolist methodology); SunGard, 172 F. Su
(market definition is the “key to the ultimate resolution of this type of case
scope of the market will
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because an insufficient numbers of purchasers would avail themselves of substitutes for 
the category of products in question.59
ncy to identify 
rovisional market.  
d sometimes 
promoters) to provide ticketing services for a particular event or series of events.  
ase their tickets from these distributors, 
who chasers of the ticket 
 by a 
sumer, is often 
central to a proper application of the antitrust laws.  Numerous decisions in the merger 
context have properly determined that business firms, and not individual downstream 
hypothetical
oduct to ultimate 
consumers.60  Moreover, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, on precisely this question 
in a previous suit involving Ticketmaster, ruled that venues, and not fans, are the initial 
viders of 
2.  Identification of Relevant Consumers 
 Applying the hypothetical monopolist test requires the court or age
the class of purchasers of the product or products that comprise the p
As is detailed in Part II, ticket distributors are retained by venues (an
Accordingly, even though concert goers purch
 act as agents for venues, it is the venues who are the true pur
distribution services.
 Understanding this arrangement, in which a distributor is retained
manufacturer or service provider and acts as a liaison to the ultimate con
purchasers, are the relevant consumers for the purpose of conducting the 
monopolist test, even if these businesses themselves sell a resulting pr
and direct purchasers of services provided by Ticketmaster and similar pro
59 See 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines, supra note 51, §§ 1.0, 1.11. 
60 See, e.g., Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 36  (defining market of wholesale 
warehousing and distribution of pharmaceuticals sold to retail pharmacies); Grumman 
Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1981) (approving product market of 
“major airframe subassemblies” sold to manufacturers of civilian aircraft).   
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ticketing distribution services.   Additionally, the Department of Justice and the Federal 
l purchasers of 
 is an 
er, the venues 
he typical contract 
provides that the venue is the ‘Principal’ who grants to Ticketmaster a right ‘to sell 
Principal’s agent 63
ines, the 
whether a price increase by all ticket distributors 
wou heir purchases of ticket distribution services so as 
to r
3.  Geographic and Product Markets 
 Given the portability of Internet software and the ease with which ticket 
distributors can provide services throughout the country, there are unlikely to be any 
geographic boundaries to this market.  In a related determination in 2003, before Internet 
ketmaster 
61
Trade Commission jointly filed a Supreme Court brief in 1999 endorsing an Eighth 
Circuit determination that venues, and not consumers, are the actua
Ticketmaster’s ticket distribution services.62  The joint DOJ and FTC brief
instructive interpretation of the economic relationship between Ticketmast
it serves, and fans of live entertainment.  As the brief pointed out, “[t]
[tickets] as the .’”  Thus, we think it likely that, for purposes of 
applying the hypothetical monopolist test articulated by the Merger Guidel
Department of Justice will examine 
ld cause enough venues to reduce t
ender such a price increase unprofitable. 
         
software became as widespread as it is now, a federal court found that Tic
61 See Campos, 140 F.3d  at 1171-72 . 
62 See Brief Amicus Curiae for the United States and the Federal Trade Co
Campos v. Ticketmaster, N
mmission in 
o. 98-127 (Dec. 1998). 
63 See id. at 9 (quoting plaintiff’s complaint) (emphasis in the brief).  Like the Eighth 
Circuit’s opinion, the joint brief of the DOJ and the FTC treated the allegations in the 
plaintiff’s complaint about the nature of the relationship between venues and ticket 
distribution companies as true, given the procedural posture of the case, i.e., appellate 
review of a decision to grant a motion to dismiss.  We have no reason to believe that 
these particular allegations were not well-grounded in facts about the industry at the time 
or that these facts have changed. 
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competed in markets throughout the United States,  and a court is likely to similarly 
define the market now. 
sers of ticket 
acities of 20,000, 
 smaller 
hrough any 
combination of four different channels: the Internet, telephone call centers, sales from the 
66 oters’ needs for 
erent
tain ticket 
ets
from their own box office and making group sales and/or selling season tickets.
Moreover, some venues and promoters rely upon distributors to support their box office, 
 to handle large 
volumes of ticket orders in a short period of time, e.g., shortly after the announcement of 
ssist in 
utors to assist 
64
Determining the product market is a more difficult task.  Purcha
distribution services range from large stadiums and arenas, with cap
50,000 or even 100,000 fans, to amphitheaters and local clubs with much
capacities.65  In addition, ticket distributors can supply distribution efforts t
venue’s box office, and retail distribution outlets, the latter of which are generally located 
in shopping malls or large department stores.   Venues’ and prom
distribution services can vary significantly, and they also can purchase diff
assortments of services.  For example, it is common for venues to re
distributors while also engaging in some self-distribution by, for instance, selling tick
season ticket, and group sales operations, while others require distributors
a popular concert or playoff schedule, and others expect distributors to a
promoting the venue’s events.  Finally, venues increasingly expect distrib
64 See Ticketmaster Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,241 (determining that 
compete i
the parties 
n markets throughout the nation). 
65 For example, Ticketmaster’s current clients include both Madison Square Garden, 
“the world’s most famous arena,” http://www.thegarden.com/, and Mercury Lounge, a 
Bowery Ballroom venue in New York City with a capacity of only 575. See Ben Sisario, 
A Small Strategy for Selling Concerts, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2001, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/07/arts/music/07bowe.html?pagewanted=all
66 See Ticketmaster Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,239-40 (describing these channels of 
distribution).
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the venue in managing customer-related information, so as to better gauge fans’ 
eaningfully 
67 vidually negotiated 
sion of ticket 
ue and presumably the particularized service expectations for each particular 
ven
A prior court defined the product market (though only for the sake of argument) 
69
thus separating distribution services for large venues from those designed for small ones.  
ment needs of 
preferences for live entertainment and ancillary products.  Such services m
facilitate the venue’s subsequent targeted promotional efforts.   Indi
contracts between ticket distributors and venues memorialize the divi
reven
ue.68
as “the market for full service ticket distribution services purchased by major venues,”
Observers supporting this distinction claim that the technological and equip
67 Indeed, we understand that in many cases loyal fans of particular enter
learn that th
tainers never 
motional efforts. See
ry,
Q 
ns given by fans 
auged
se fans who it 
e infra Part 
ptation and 
ntracts with 
d distributor). 
t relevant 
 FTC v. PPG 
gainst merger 
craft
d as “major 
eing and McDonnell Douglas).
In a different context, an economist has drawn a distinction between firms able to serve 
large and small clients, on the one hand, and those only able to serve smaller clients, on 
the other. See Mary W. Sullivan, The Effect of the Big Eight Accounting Mergers on the 
Market for Audit Services, 45 J.L. & ECON. 375, 396 (2002) (building model based upon 
distinction between “Big Eight” accounting firms, on the one hand, and so-called “fringe” 
firms, on the other); id. at 386 (“Fringe firms are reasonable alternatives to the Big Eight 
for small audit buyers, and the fringe firms are fairly competitive.”).  
eir favorite performer is “in town,” despite vigorous pro
Michael Rapino, Transcript of Hearing of Senate Committee on the Judicia
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights, C
Transcriptions, LLC (Feb. 24, 2009) (testifying that one of the top reaso
for not attending a concert is that they were unaware of the performance).
  Note in this connection that a venue can reduce its expenses on broad-g
advertising and prom d thootion if it can instead target its advertising towar
believes will have a particular interest in attending the event in question. Se
IV.3 (discussing efficiencies—specifically, the benefits of coordinated ada
targeted promotion—that often accompany vertical integration).   
68 Ticketmaster Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,240  (explaining that co
venues are individually negotiated and allocate revenues between venue an
69 See id. at 96,239-40 (describing and adopting for the sake of argumen
product market including only ticket distribution for large venues). See also
Indus., 798 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (affirming preliminary injunction a
between firms that produced glass and acrylic transparencies for sales to air
manufacturers); Grumman Corp., 665 F.2d at 13 (approving market define
airframe assemblies for large civilian aircraft” sold to Bo
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large venues are qualitatively distinct from those of smaller venues, so firms perfectly 
70 uch a 
 size of venues 
t otherwise similar 
tively
straightforward Internet-based ticket distribution, without complex ancillary services, 
ch as gate 
ities and other 
sis of information 
large and small, 
serve numerous purposes and promoters organize a diversity of offerings.  Popular 
venues may host concerts, sporting events, auto shows, and horse shows within a short 
period of time.  As such, the venue might require a complex bundle of ticket distribution 
services for some events, and a much more modest bundle for others.  And, in fact, some 
capable of serving the needs of small venues may not be able to serve those of larger 
ones.     At the same time, no precedent or economic principle compels s
distinction.  Moreover, any effort to define a relevant market around the
may fail to capture and account for the great diversity of needs tha
venues might possess.  For instance, some large venues may require rela
while other large or even medium-sized venues may require (or believe they require) 
ticket distribution in several channels, along with multifaceted services su
control, management of season ticket sales, donor management (for univers
non-profit organizations), event promotion, and collection and synthe
about fans.  Adding to this complexity is the fact that many venues, both 
70 As one neutral analyst has put it,  
Large events are typically associated with ticket sales through multiple 
distribution channels, including the Internet, call centers, retail outlets, and the 
box office.  Considering the potential for a high level of demand for tickets in a 
short period of time for large events, ticket distribution service providers must be 
able to handle large volumes and coordinate the distribution of tickets through all 
channels using complicated software and centralized inventory systems.   
See Evren Ergin, Barclays Capital, Ticketmaster-Live Nation Antitrust Analysis, Apr. 
30, 2009, at 5.
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venues employ different ticket distribution companies to service different event or fan 
catego 71
with any 
tion firms but not 
other,
ous facets of the 
distribution task themselves.   Thus, a legal challenge to this transaction could fail for 
rs.73  We may, 
bution services 
to large venues and promoters, or at least large venues and promoters with sophisticated 
needs, offer a distinctive set of services that constitute an identifiable product market.74
ries.   Promoters also have varying needs for a similarly diverse set of events. 
We therefore believe it would be difficult to articulate and prove 
precision the existence of a market that includes some ticket distribu
others.  There is no clear boundary separating one category of firm from an
particularly in light of the ability of venues and promoters to take on vari
72
this reason alone, i.e., the inability to conceive of, articulate, and prove a tractable 
distinction between some providers of ticket distribution services and othe
however, assume for the sake of argument that firms providing ticket distri
71 For example, the American Airlines Center in Dallas, TX uses Tick
concert and NBA Mavericks tickets, but Tickets.com to distribute N
etmaster to sell 
HL Stars tickets. See
ter.com/events-and-tickets/purchase_tickets.php  (last 
lub/page.htm? 
etmaster.com/artist/ 
 self-
ower
 provide 
hile other universities may obtain such 
73 See Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1159 (finding that government did not carry its 
burden of proving market definition because government’s efforts to “delineate” the 
boundaries of the product market could “[not] be expressed in terms to make a judgment 
of the court have meaning” and noting that plaintiff’s expert witness had conceded that 
there was no “quantitative metric” distinguishing products within the market from those 
outside it); SunGard, 172  F. Supp. 2d at 181-83.
74 See Ticketmaster Corp. 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,239-40. 
http://www.americanairlinescen
visited Sept. 9, 2009) and NHL.COM Network, http://stars.nhl.com/c
id=39263 (last visited Sept. 9, 2009) ; Ticketmaster, http://www.tick
805932?brand=mavericks (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).  Moreover, as noted in Part II, 
several universities employ Paciolan software to power most of their ticket
distribution while at the same time relying upon TicketReturn software to p
distribution of tickets to their students. 
72 For instance, some universities might require their ticket distributor to
integrated donor management software, w
software from independent vendors. 
 32 
4.  Applying the SSNIP Test 
n services are 
 sake of market 
 “large 
se” (SSNIP) in 
se would be 
profitable in light of that reaction.  Key to answering this question is the recognition that 
 of 
 reliance on 
e licensed 
 have developed 
ies that have enabled 
many venues to engage in Internet-based self distribution.  These developments reflect 
the rapid spread of Internet-based technologies that can handle rigorous ticketing 
, reduce the minimum viable scale of ticket distribution, and facilitate the 
real bution.  Courts 
cise of market 
75
eir own tickets, 
rom third parties, has 
Assuming the demands of large purchasers of ticket distributio
distinct from their smaller counterparts, the operative inquiry for the
definition focuses on how such purchasers, what we will provisionally call
venues,” would react to a “small but significant and non-transitory increa
the price of outsourced ticket distribution services, and whether this increa
venues have increasingly turned to self-distributing tickets to their own events in lieu
outsourcing this task to agents such as Ticketmaster.  Some have done so in
software they have purchased or developed; more frequently such firms hav
such software from third parties.  Indeed, in recent years numerous firms
and offered for licensing Internet-based ticket distribution technolog
demands
ization of the sort of efficiencies not available from outsourced distri
have recognized that such technological dynamism should inform the exer
definition.
Accordingly, the number of large venues that now distribute th
with apparent success, relying upon software they own or license f
75 See SunGard, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 189 (noting that recent technological advances had 
significantly reduced the cost of vertical integration by customers who might otherwise 
suffer at the hands of a hypothetical monopolist, and invoking prior decision for the 
proposition that “the market definition should be expanded because the ability of a 
substitute product to compete ‘will be enhanced in the future because of further 
technological and market developments.’”). 
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grown significantly.   Indeed, one might even say that such self-distribution has become 
77
enues do not 
ovide numerous 
 and, in the 
 highlight some of the firms that provide technological support for such vertical 
inte
 a software 
n Europe, to 
anages.  As 
phasize, Live Nation previously outsourced its 
hem.  Relying 
 for events at 
 2.   The Houston-Toyota Center, owned by the Houston Rockets of the National 
er of ticket 
vents at the 
erly a client of 
76
an industry trend.   Ironically, many of these venues were at one time clients of 
Ticketmaster, thereby suggesting that the firm’s exclusive contracts with v
have the exclusionary impact that some have suggested.78  Below we pr
examples of venues that have taken on the task of distributing their tickets
process,
gration.
1.  Live Nation is itself a prime example, having recently received
license from CTS, the leading distributor of entertainment tickets i
power its self-distribution of tickets to venues that it owns and m
opponents of the transaction em
ticket distribution services, relying upon Ticketmaster to provide t
upon this license, Live Nation now distributes millions of tickets
venues that it owns or manages. 
Basketball Association, has partnered with Veritix, another develop
distribution software, to facilitate self-distribution of tickets for e
venue, which seats up to 19,000 fans for basketball.79  Form
76 See Ticketmaster Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,239 (noting that g
portion of the [ticket distribution] market where the arena itself does its 
“there is a growin
own ticketing 
.”).
ous examples of 
s. at 96,239 
ution).
exclusive 
arketplace). 
 offers professional sports teams, universities 
ary ticketing 
ting database.
ures a paperless ticketing technology.  The company seems capable of handling 
large venues as it has had a partnership with the Houston Toyota Center since 2003.”).
See Toyota Houston Center, http://www.houstontoyotacenter.com/ about/atozguide.php
(last visited June 4, 2009) (reporting center’s seating capacity as “18,300 for basketball, 
17,800 for hockey [and] up to 19,000 for concerts”);
http://www.nba.com/games/20090514/LALHOU/boxscore.html (last visited June 4, 
2009) (reporting attendance of 18,501 in Houston playoff game against the Los Angeles 
Lakers).
business using software sold or leased to it by Paciolan . . . or [the plaintiff]
77 See infra notes 79-111110 and accompanying text (discussing vari
recent vertical integration by venues); Ticketmaster Corp., 2003-1 Trad. Ca
(discussing “growing portion of the market” characterized by self-distrib
78 See infra notes 169-171 and accompanying text (explaining that such 
agreements do not prevent competitive entry into the ticket distribution m
79 See Ergin, supra note 70, at 10 (“Veritix
and entertainment venues an electronic, integrated, primary and second
platform for managing ticket inventory and creat[ing] a relationship marke
It feat
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Ticketmaster,80 the Houston-Toyota Center also frequently ho
entertainers, including, in 2009 alone, Beyonce, Brittany Spea
Brothers, Pink, Eric Clapton and Steve Winwood, Elton John & Bil
Nickelback, Celtic Woman, and Fleetwood Mac.
sts premier 
rs, the Jonas 
ly Joel, 
ritix recently entered into a 
82
(capacity up to 
8,000), and 
“Denver’s best 
tly announced 
e company’s 
TicketHorse,
isted above, 
 Village of 
ement thus covers distribution of tickets for the 
Denver Nuggets, the Colorado Rapids (professional soccer), Colorado Avalanche 
(National Hockey League), the Colorado Crush (Arena Football), and Colorado 
Mammoth (National Lacrosse League).86
81  Ve
similar agreement with Salt Lake City’s EnergySolutions Arena.
3.   Kroenke Sports Enterprises owns Denver’s Pepsi Center arena 
20,000), Dick’s Sporting Goods Park Stadium (capacity just over 1
Denver’s Paramount Theatre, capacity 1,870, which bills itself as 
intimate concert venue.”83  In July, 2008, Kroenke and Veritix join
a partnership whereby the latter would “provide technology for th
newly established ticketing services organization, TicketHorse.”84
in turn, provides ticket distribution services for each of the venues l
previously served by Ticketmaster, as well as Infinity Park, in the
Glendale, Colorado.85  The arrang
80 See Jeff Bounds & Jennifer Dawson, Vertical Alliance in Houston Arena Deal,
/dallas/stories 
oyota/Vertical
e of the Internet has opened the door for 
”).  Vertical 
isited Sept. 9, 
tor.com/tix/ 
olutions
om/Veritix-
29188 
pt. 9, 2009) 
 is 18,129 for 
ith a center 
goodspark.com/Stadium/Facts.aspx (last visited Sept. 
-seat home stadium of 
rounding 24-field, fully lit soccer complex.”); Paramount 
Theater, http://www.paramountdenver.com/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2009). 
84 See Press Release, Veritix, Kroenke Sports Enterprises to Move Ticketing Operations 
for Pepsi Center, Denver Nuggets and Colorado Avalanche to Veritix in 2009 (July 30, 
0208), available at http://www.veritix.com/news/Veritix_&_Kroenke_Sports_Extend_
Partnership.pdf (last visited Sept.9, 2009). 
85 See TicketHorse, http://www.tickethorse.com/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2009). 
86 Bounds & Dawson, supra note 81. 
DALLAS BUS. J., Sept. 19, 2003, available at: http://dallas.bizjournals.com
/2003/09/22/story3.html (last visited Sept.9, 2009) (describing Houston-T
Alliance deal as example of how “the emergenc
smaller rivals, some of whom are quietly stealing Ticketmaster’s business.
Alliance, it should be noted, is the predecessor of Veritix.  
81  See supra note 80, http://www.houstontoyotacenter.com/events (last v
2009) (listing June through October 2009 events); http://www.ticketliquida
toyota-center-vv-tickets.aspx (last visited June 19, 2009). 
82 See Veritix Signs Exclusive Ticketing Contract for Utah Jazz, EnergyS
Arena, TicketNews (Sept. 9, 2009), available at: http://www.ticketnews.c
signs-exclusive-ticketing-contract-for-Utah-Jazz-EnergySolutions-Arena99
83 See NBA, http//www.nba.com/nuggets/contact/faqs.html (last visited Se
(“The capacity of the Pepsi Center for a Nuggets game is 19,155.  Capacity
Avalanche games and 17,600 for concerts with an end stage and 20,100 w
stage.”); http://www.dicksssporting
9, 2009) (“Dicks Sporting Goods Park is comprised of the 18,000
the Colorado Rapids and its sur
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4.   Kroenke recently announced that it is partnering with AEG, a
and manager of venues, to manage the Broomfield event center in B
Colorado.
 leading owner 
roomfield, 
00 for hockey 
n the partners and 
icketmaster as the 
olutions to power 
hicago’s Grant 
ront Gate also 
e Live, 
ltipurpose
ment with 
laced Ticketmaster as the distributor of tickets to Warehouse Live 
91
events at their 
AudienceView
to power its self-distribution of tickets to a wide variety of cultural and sporting 
, which has a 
s Arena, 
h enablement 
87  The venue is publicly owned and has a capacity of 6,0
and basketball and 7,500 for concerts.88  If negotiations betwee
the city council are successful, TicketHorse will replace T
distributor of the venue’s tickets.
5.  Lollapalooza relies upon software licensed from Front Gate S
its self-distribution of tickets to the event, which takes place at C
Park   In 2008, the event drew 225,000 fans over three days.89  F
recently announced a “long-term ticket selling deal” with Warehous
capacity 1,500, which bills itself as “one of Houston’s signature mu
facilities.”90  Warehouse Live is affiliated with AEG, and the agree
Front Gate disp
events.    According to one neutral source, Front Gate Software powers the 
platforms of 1,788 venues that have chosen to distribute tickets for
respective venues.92
6.  The University of Minnesota relies upon software produced by 
events, including Big Ten football games at its TCF Bank Stadium
capacity of 50,000, and basketball and hockey games at its William
which has a capacity of 16,000.93  AudienceView also provides suc
87 See Michael Davidson, Broomfield Event Center to Get N
BROOMFIELD ENTERPRISE, Aug. 26, 2009, available at
ew Management, Name,
ldenterprise. 
MFIELD ENTERPRISE, Apr. 14, 
13140448.
=
b (last visited 
lds of Pop, Rock 
se Live, 
www.warehouselive.com/index.php?content=home&section=1 (last visited [date]). 
09) (listing 
rammed by AEG.”). 
92 See Ergin, supra note 70.  It should be noted that Front Gate also maintains a 
ticketing agency for venues that outsource their ticket distribution services. See Front 
Gate Tickets, http://www.frontgatetickets.com/ (last visited Sept.9, 2009).  Front Gate's 
clients include the Austin Aztecs, who play at Nelson Field, which has a seating capacity 
of 8,800. 
93 See Audience View Ticketing, http://www.audienceview.com/customers/?t=6 (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2009) (listing customers to include the University of Minnesota); 
http://www.broomfie
com/ci_13204115.
88 See By the Numbers: Broomfield Event Center, BROO
2008, available at http://www.broomfieldenterprise.com/ci_
89 See Front Gate Tickets, http://pages.exacttarget.com/page.aspx?QS
c76003443ff9837dd4009700e262f1050f35994654bc7b06880d920a5ce5f38
Sept. 9, 2009); Greg Kot, Turn It Up: A Guided Tour Through the Wor
and Wrap, C . T ., Nov. 6, 2008, available at http://leisureblogs. HI  RIB  
chicagotribune.com/turn_it_up/2008/11/parks-aim-to-ex.html.
90 See Front Gate Solutions, http://www.frontgatesolutions.com/index 
.php?content=news&item=65 (last visited Sept.9, 2009). See also Warehou
http://
91 See AEG Live, http://aeglive.com/aboutus.php (last visited Sept.9, 20
Warehouse Live as one of the venues “owned, managed and/or prog
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software to several dozen other clients, including Dartmouth Col
Film Festival, the New York Red Bulls of Major League Soccer,
Liverpool Arena in Liverpool, England.
lege, the Tribeca 
 and the ACC 
lue Jays of 
ceView to 
95  The Blue Jays play their home games at 
 racing 
143,000
e venues host 
R and the 
 and American Motor 
eritix that helped 
com.   
its “New Era” 
by Comcast, 
ketball and 
 by premier 
he Wachovia 
c Clapton, Keith 
Urban, Miley Cyrus, the Jonas Brothers, Bruce Springsteen, and Pink.99  New Era 
ution of tickets by various 
nal Speedway 
ominion 
94  Similarly, the Toronto B
Major League Baseball also employ software licensed from Audien
power their self-distribution of tickets.
Rogers Centre, which seats over 49,000 fans.96
7.  International Speedway Corporation (ISC), owns 13 automobile
speedways, including tracks with capacities of 168,000 (Daytona),
(Talladega), 137,000 (Michigan), and 107,000 (Richmond).97  Thes
numerous events, including automobile races sanctioned by NASCA
lis Racing League (IRL), as well as the Grand AmIndianapo
Association leagues.   Recently, ISC purchased software from V
create a ticket distribution platform centered around Racetickets.
8.  Comcast Corporation employs Paciolan software to power 
Ticketing Subsidiary, which distributes tickets for venues owned 
such as Philadelphia’s Wachovia Center, which seats 21,600 for bas
18,000 for hockey.98  The Center also hosts numerous concerts
entertainers.  In 2009 alone the following artists performed at t
Center or are scheduled to do so later in the year: Beyonce, Eri
also provides technological support for the distrib
venues not owned by Comcast, including the Dover Internatio
(135,000); the Portland Rose Quarter, and Constant Center at Old D
rchase of 
 University of 
 Bank Stadium, http://stadium.gophersports.com/ 
t_the_stadium.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2009) (report that capacity of new TCF 
 of Minnesota 
last visited 
s 14,625).  
er_list.asp (last 
mlb_2790 (last 
oviding information about Rogers Centre and its environs). 
97 See ISC: A Motorsports Entertainment Co., http://ir.iscmotorsports.com/phoenix. 
zhtml?c=113983&p=irol-facilities (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).
98 See Online Seats.com, http://www.onlineseats.com/venue/wachovia-center.htm (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2009).  Comcast also owned the famous Philadelphia Spectrum, which 
was recently demolished.    
99 See Wachovia Center, http://www.wachoviacenter.com/events/calendar_calendar 
View.asp (last visited Sept. 9, 2009). 
University of Minnesota, Buy Tickets, https://www.tickets.umn.edu/ 
AudienceViewSplash/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2009) (“Shopping Cart for pu
Minnesota Gophers tickets states Powered By AudienceView Ticketing”) ;
Minnesota’s TCF
abou
Bank stadium, will be 50,000) ; GopherSports.com: The Official Website
Athletics, www.gophersports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?&ATCLID=310102 (
Sept. 9, 2009) (reporting current capacity of Williams basketball arena a
94 See supra note 93 at http://www.audienceview.com/customers/custom
visited Sept. 9, 2009). 
95 Id.
96 See ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/travel/stadium/index?stadium=
visited Sept. 9, 2009) (page pr
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University (capacity of 9,500).100  The Rose Quarter is hom
which seats over 20,000 fans for basketball, and is home to the Port
Trailblazers and Portland Winterhawks.  The venue also hosts nume
and other events, including, in 2009 alone: The Jonas Brothers, Ke
Dylan, Earth Wind and Fire, Killers, Miley Cyrus, Billy Joel and Elton Joh
Ringling Brothers and Barnum and Bailey Circus, religious f
e to the Rose Garden, 
land
rous concerts 
ith Urban, Bob 
n, the 
igure Joel Osteen, 
ers.101
, then an 
tribution of 
tribute tickets 
nment venues that outsource their ticket 
 to distribute 
cketReturn to power 
ham Bulls, Akron 
, Memphis 
ges and 
bution, 
ersity, Liberty 
n Francisco, and 
eturn platform 
University of South Carolina, Georgia Tech, North Carolina State, and West 
Virginia University.  Like Veritix, Front Gate, AudienceView and others, 
ncluding the 
 and their entertainment 
Disney on Ice, and “So You Think You Can Dance,” among oth
9.  In 2005 Major League Baseball (“MLB”) purchased Tickets.com
independent distributor of tickets.  Tickets.com now powers the dis
tickets for several major league baseball teams and continues to dis
for numerous other sports and entertai
distribution.   The firm also offers its technology to venues that wish
their tickets in house.102
10.  More than fifty minor league baseball teams rely upon Ti
their self-distribution of tickets.103  These teams include the Dur
Racers, Kansas City T-Bones, Lexington Legends, Toledo Mudhens
Redbirds, Charlotte Knights, and San Jose Giants.  Numerous colle
universities also rely upon TicketReturn to support their ticket distri
including Appalachian State University, Western Carolina Univ
University, Christopher Newport University, the University of Sa
William and Mary.104  Several larger institutions employ a TicketR
to power their student ticketing operations, including the University of Maryland, 
TicketReturn offers a wide variety of support to venues it serves, i
ability to gather and synthesize data about individual fans
preferences.105
100 See New Era Ticketing, http://www.neweratickets.com/our-clients/o
list/
ur-clients/client-
Office
rter,
last visited Sept. 9, 
 at Safeway 
me/TicketOutlets/tabid/58/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 
is powered by “CoxTix,” the 
wered by Paciolan and New Era Tickets.” 
101 See id. at http://www.rosequarter.com/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2009). 
102 See http://provenue.tickets.com/US/ticketing_solutions/index.shtml (discussing 
“ProvenueMax, an in- house licensed ticketing system”). 
103 See https://www.ticketreturn.com/prod2/customerspro.asp (listing the firm’s 
Professional Sports clients). 
104 See https://www.ticketreturn.com/prod2/customerscollege.asp. 
105 TicketReturn’s Website claims: 
 (last visited Sept.9, 2009); http://www.rosequarter.com/Home/Box
/tabid/56/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2009); Rose Qua
http://www.rosequarter.com/Home/BoxOffice/tabid/56/Default.aspx (
2009).  The Rose Quarter also lists fifty-six retail ticket outlets, most of them
Supermarkets in the Portland area.  See id. at 
www.rosequarter.com/Ho
2009).  Although the Constant Center advertises that it 
website indicates that it is “Po
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11.  Over a decade ago the New York Metropolitan Opera develope
launched its “Impresario” ticketing system de novo.
d and 
ly thereafter the Met 
ogy to 
n-profit
ding the Met, 
nedy Center, the 
ive foreign 
nternet
t)” as well as 
 memberships, 
utive information 
irm apparently 
site includes a 
’s attributes and capabilities to those of for-profit 
icant client, the 
ch had distributed 
ion before it, is 
n ives to Ticketmaster.  The report indicates that AEG is 
considering both distributors, such as Veritix and Tickets.com, as well as self-
that AEG has 
et for ticket 
106  Short
renamed the system “Tessitura” and formed a non-profit Limited Liability 
Company to own the new ticketing platform and license the technol
others.107  By 2002, the LLC had evolved into a licensee-owned no
corporation formed under Delaware law, with owner-licensees inclu
the Chicago Lyric Opera, the San Francisco Symphony, the Ken
Seattle and Santa Fe Operas and nineteen other licensees.  Today the entity boasts 
188 licensees and at least 80 sublicenses in the United States and f
countries.  The Tessitura system promises to provide “full no fee I
transactional capability for ticketing (including select your own sea
support for “customer relationship management,”   “fundraising,
sponsorships and contributions,” and “flexible reporting, exec
and analysis tools.”108 Although a “not for profit” enterprise, the f
considers itself a rival to commercial ticketing firms, as its Web
chart comparing Tessitura
technology firms.109  Indeed, just recently, the firm won a signif
Tennessee Performing Arts Center, from Ticketmaster, whi
tickets for the Center for 29 years.110
12.  Bloomberg.com recently reported that AEG, like Live Nat
exploring alter at
distribution strategies.  One industry analyst said of AEG’s move 
“the ability to instantly become a viable competitor” in the mark
distribution services.111
stems put you 
ch with customers and their ticket usage habits. Sell and deliver print at 
; Automate the return of unused seats; 
ce history; 
 Automate attendance 
inate audits of paper ticket stubs; 
iles for every 
 a timeline of 
).
107 See id.
108 See http://www.tessituranetwork.com/Products/Software.aspx.
109 See http://www.tessituranetwork.com/en/Products/~/media/Public Site/Tessitura 
Software Industry Comparison_2008.ashx.
110 See TPAC Dumps Ticketmaster After 29 Years, NASHVILLE BUS. J., July 1, 2009, 
available at: http://nashville.bizjournals.com/nashville/stories/2009/06/29/daily23.html.
111 Ticketmaster Client AEG Said to Explore new Partner, Bloomberg.com, Nov. 2, 2009. 
TicketReturn’s exclusive barcoding and Fanticket management 
in tou
sy
home e-tickets online; Target no-shows
Reward your most loyal fans; E-mail customers based on attendan
Develop qualified sales leads from pass-along ticket users;
counts with real time admission reporting; Elim
Track ticket ownership changes online; Create ticket usage prof
customer. 
See https://www.ticketreturn.com/prod2/customers.html.
106 See http://www.tessituranetwork.com/About/Timeline.aspx (providing
the development and widespread adoption of the Tessitura ticketing platform
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technological and commercial feasibility of a venue, whether large or mo
vertically integrate into the self-provision of ticket distribution services.
trend toward such integration strongly suggests that combining previously s
functions produces efficiencies not realizable through market contracting
there any reason to believe that these examples are idiosyncratic or that th
These various examples—and there are more—demonstrate, at a minimum, the 
re modest, to 
112  Indeed, the 
eparate
.113   Nor is 
e capacity for 
such integration in the future is somehow limited.   The necessary technology for such 
d that self-
iscipline any 
possible exercise of market power by firms like Ticketmaster.115  We would expect this 
xt few years. 
114
integration is more available now than just a few years ago, when a federal court—in the 
course of rejecting an antitrust suit against Ticketmaster—all but predicte
distribution would take on increased significance in the near future and d
trend to accelerate as more ticket distribution contracts expire over the ne
112 See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2003-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
96,241 (C.D. Cal.  2003) (explaining that numerous colleges and universiti
self-distribution). 
113 See infra Part IV.3. 
114 See generally SunGard, 172 F. Supp. at 190-91 (asking whether custo
would switch in response to a hypothetical price increase were truly represe
custo
 ¶ 74,013, at 
es rely upon 
mers who 
ntative of the 
 most of the 
e in this 
, 850 F.2d 
espond to SSNPI 
tive customers 
115 It should be noted in this connection that contracts between software providers and 
venues are generally non-exclusive, i.e., do not preclude the licensor from licensing the 
same ticket distribution platform to other venues or, for that matter, preclude the venue 
from employing that platform to distribute tickets to events at other venues.  For instance, 
New Era Tickets, a subsidiary of Comcast, both relies upon Paciolan technology to 
distribute tickets for events at Comcast-owned venues and, in addition, licenses the same 
technology to unrelated venues to facilitate their self-distribution.  In any event, for the 
mer population as a whole); Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 48-50 (holding that 
vertical integration would not defeat a hypothetical price increase because
hypothetical monopolist’s customers did not have the capacity to integrat
fashion); FTC v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 27, 37, vacated as moot
694 (D.D.C 1988) (fact that a trivial number of customers would not r
did not establish relevant product market where numerous more representa
would).
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 Indeed, the line between “outsourced” distribution, by agents such as 
instance,
e of its rivals retain 
ox office 
edly engaged in 
self-distribution nonetheless still outsource key aspects of the distribution function to 
116 erous firms —
h venue a 
h venue selects 
dle that may be 
h firms also 
offer software options that empower venues—whether engaged in outsourcing or self-
distribution—to gather and synthesize data for the purpose of better understanding the 
y services. 
s agent, as 
 managing 
 self-distribution 
Ticketmaster, on the one hand, and “self distribution” supported and enabled by 
independent technology providers, on the other, is by no means bright.  For 
many venues that “outsource” ticket distribution to Ticketmaster or on
the right and ability to distribute some tickets themselves, often from the b
and/or to season ticket holders.  At the same time, many venues purport
third parties, including technology providers themselves.   In truth, num
Ticketmaster, Tickets.com, Veritix, AudienceView, and others—offer eac
cafeteria-style menu of distribution options and related services, and eac
the particular bundle that suits its needs at the time of contracting, a bun
adjusted as a venue’s needs and/or capabilities evolve.  Moreover, all suc
characteristics of fans and the preferences for entertainment and ancillar
Importantly, whether a firm offers to distribute tickets as a venue’
Ticketmaster does, or instead enable a venue to distribute tickets itself, both services 
achieve the same functions of distributing tickets to fans and collecting and
related information.  It is therefore not surprising that firms that enable
e, as do the Guidelines, that self-distribution is 
infinitely available at current (per-merger) prices. See Joint Merger Guidelines § 1.11, n. 
9.
116 For instance, firms such as Veritix that focus on facilitating self-distribution also 
provide server capacity for venues that choose not to own and operate such capacity 
themselves.  Such firms may also provide or recommend equipment that scans barcoded 
tickets, for instance, as well as assistance processing credit card transactions.  See
https://www.ticketreturn.com/prod2/faq.html.
purpose of market definition, we assum
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effectively bid against firms like Ticketmaster when a distribution contract has expired 
117 The overlap 
ble self 
 distribution 
er, itself militates in favor of a finding that both firms occupy the 
sam
 To be sure, it is unlikely that all venues would pursue self-distribution strategies 
riety of 
 and not-for-
f those venues 
 we are not 
aware of any particular types or categories of venue for which such integration would be 
especially difficult or costly, thereby exposing such venues to selective price increases by 
a hypothetical monopolist.119  As a result, substitution by a even a modest number of 
hereby
and a venue is tempted to forgo outsourcing in favor of self-distribution.
and real world rivalry between the services provided by “firms that ena
distribution,” on the one hand, and those that provide “outsourced ticket
services,” on the oth
e product market.118
in response to a SSNIP by a hypothetical monopolist of outsourced ticket distribution 
services.  Nonetheless, the successful vertical integration by such a wide va
venues—large, small, and medium, sports, musical and mixed use, profit
profit—suggests that the option is in fact a realistic one for most if not all o
that still outsource the distribution of most or all of their tickets.  Moreover,
venues would  render a small but significant price increase unprofitable, t
protecting any venues that may be less price sensitive.120
117 See Ticketmaster, 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,241 (finding that “virtually all long term 
rms that 
ketmaster that 
118 Id. at 96,241-42.
119 Cf. Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 36-49 (finding that prospect of self-
distribution by large drug store chains would not protect small “Mom and Pop” chains 
from a hypothesized price increase).
120 See United States v. Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is 
possible for only a few customers who switch to alternatives to make the price increase 
unprofitable. . . .”); SunGard, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 193 (finding broader market even 
contracts are awarded after some form of bidding competition” and that fi
support and enable self-distribution are a “viable option” to firms like Tic
distribute tickets for firms that choose to outsource this task).
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Equally important, antitrust principles and legal authority readily support the 
vertical integration 
e task of 
reaten to do so as a 
 market 
definition itself, various courts have recognized that “captive production” resulting from 
vertical integration can be a clos d might thereby 
122
ces” must 
include not only outsourced ticket distribution services, such as those provided by 
uld provide 
treatment of such integration as a close substitute for outsourced ticket distribution 
services.   More than two decades ago, a leading jurist explained that “
is a universal feature of economic life,” and that firms frequently take on th
distributing their own product to displace an inefficient supplier or th
means of holding down the cost of outsourced inputs.121  When it comes to
e substitute for outsourced production an
prevent independent producers from exercising market power.
 Therefore, a properly defined market for “ticket distribution servi
Ticketmaster and similar firms, but also distribution services that venues co
vernment] is 
 698, 710 (7th Cir. 
cturer to take 
laces
t if they charge too 
. R.H. Coase, 
uction of 
e included in 
ork in-house in 
172 (asking 
crease were 
customer population as a whole); Cardinal Health, 12 Supp. 2d
at 48 (declining to include potential captive production in the relevant market because 
most customers would not, in fact, view such vertical integration as a plausible substitute 
for their current practice of purchasing supplies directly from wholesalers).  See also
Geraldine Alpert & Howard P. Kitt, Is Structure All?, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 255, 266-67 
(1984) (contending that “do-it-yourself” or “make or buy” options are often plausible 
substitutes for purchase of putative product on the open market and thus can be properly 
included in the relevant market). 
though “the demand of some customers [for the product identified by the go
inelastic”).
121 See generally Jack Walters & Sons v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d
1984) (Posner, J.) (“A common type of vertical integration is for a manufa
over the distribution of his product.… [T]he option of vertical integration p
competitive pressure on the firm’s suppliers and buyers, who know tha
much for their services the firm may decide to perform them itself.”).  Cf
The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 381 (1932). 
122 Grumman Corp., 665 F.2d at 13-14 (holding that potential captive prod
aircraft subassemblies by Boeing and McDonald Douglas would properly b
relevant product market if such manufacturers would in fact bring such w
response to significant price increases by subcontractors); SunGard., at 
whether customers who would switch in response to a hypothetical price in
truly representative of the 
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for themselves by licensing or purchasing technology from firms that support such 
123
port for such 
ult for any
 category of 
rice increase.  
Unlike some industries, the ticket distribution industry is not characterized by network 
at could hamper 
arket is simply not 
culation of market 
sha
Identification of Market Participants and Calculation of Market Shares 
 Following the definition of the relevant market, a challenger to a merger must also 
rket shares of 
ster, Etix.com, Tickets.com, Frontgate, 
distribution.   Given the current dynamic and rapidly evolving technological landscape, 
including the ready availability of licensing technology and other sup
vertical integration, one might therefore conclude that it would be diffic
hypothetical monopolist of outsourced ticket distribution services for any
venues or promoters to profitably maintain a significant, non-transitory p
effects that could entrench or protect a dominant firm in the face of vertical integration by 
venues.  Nor are we aware of any plausible exclusionary practices th
competitive challenges to incumbents.124   Perhaps, then, the m
“monopolizeable,” and our inquiry need not proceed to the cal
res.125  We nonetheless proceed with the complete horizontal analysis. 
establish which firms participate in that relevant market and the relative ma
such firms.126  Obviously firms such as Ticketma
123 Testimony of Luke Froeb before the House Subcommittee on Courts 
Policy, 5-6 (February 26, 2009) (treating firms such as Veritix and Audienc
participants in the same product market as Ticketmaster).
124 See infra notes 169-171 and accompanying text (explaining why exclus
arrangements between venues and ticket providers are not plaus
and Competition 
eView as 
ive
ible methods of raising 
125 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 82-84 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc)
(per curiam) (ease of entry into browser market suggests the market is not 
monopolizeable and supracompetitive pricing is not possible, even for a provider with an 
extremely large market share).  Cf. United States v. Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486, 510-
511 (1974) (declining to entertain government’s appeal of district court’s product market 
definition because government’s case would fail under any such definition). 
126 See 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines, supra note 51, § 1.3.
rivals’ costs and entrenching monopoly). 
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Metrotix.com, TicketWeb.com, and Tele-charge, participate in the market as defined 
ents and 
127  with other 
ple,
g needs of 
t would be 
providing ticket distribution services for venues that chose to outsource such distribution.
amic responses to price changes by venues that 
hav  the potential growth 
of vertical 
integration: (1) integration that has already occurred before the transaction that is under 
review, such as the numerous examples listed above, and (2) integration that might 
potentially take place after such a transaction.  Ironically, venues that engaged in self-
ive Nation, 
because they each distribute tickets on behalf of venues that host large ev
outsource ticket distribution.   It is also clear that any venues that contract
venues to provide ticket distribution services also participate in the market.  For exam
should Live Nation’s own ticket distribution operation service the ticketin
venues managed by SMG, it would clearly be a market participant because i
The more difficult market share determinations involve assessing the extent of self-
ticketing before the transaction, the dyn
e already vertically integrated into ticket distribution, as well as
of additional self-ticketing in the near future.128
 It is useful at the outset to distinguish between two categories 
distribution before this transaction, including those owned or operated by L
127 Some of these firms, of course, also distribute tickets for venues they o
but this fact does not militate against their inclusion in the market for ticket dis
services to the extent that they do, in fact, perform this function.
128 We pause here to note that our conclusions regarding market de
wn or control, 
tribution 
finition, the 
identification of participants in the relevant market, and the (unlikely) prospect of 
coordinated or unilateral anticompetitive effects do not turn on any determination that 
technology companies that support self-distribution are properly treated as market 
participants within the taxonomy employed by current merger law.  Whether or not such 
firms are technically “in” the relevant product market, they certainly provide inputs that 
facilitate and encourage venues’ self-distribution of tickets, and such self-distribution 
appears to be a reasonable substitute for outsourced ticket distribution services.
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are arguably less likely to be meaningful participants in the relevant market than those 
venues that m
internal or captive 
at it is 
e market in 
er.129  Moreover, 
merger law has long recognized that a firm’s nominal output of a product does not by 
ere,
s by contract, 
arketplace has no competitive significance, and a merger 
of t  the nominal 
Here “captive production” generally consists of a venue’s distribution of tickets to 
owns or 
oduction to a 
ight so integrate in the future.   
As the enforcement agencies have themselves emphasized, 
production should be included in the relevant market only to the extent th
economically meaningful, that is, could alter the competitive dynamics of th
response to collusive behavior or a monopolistic exercise of market pow
itself establish the magnitude of the firm’s competitive significance.  For instance, wh
before a merger, a firm’s future output is committed to particular customer
removal of that firm from the m
hat firm with another does not, in fact, reduce competition, regardless of
level of concentration that results.130
its own events, or a promoter’s distribution of tickets to events at venues it 
operates.  It is not obvious how venues or promoters could divert such pr
129 See 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines, §1.31 (vertically-integrated fi
as participants in relevant market “to the extent that such inclusion a
their competitive significance in the relevant market before the merger”);
Federal Trade Commission, FTC v. Cardinal Health, Nos. 98-595 & 98-59
(same).  See also 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, § 2.23 
vertically integrated firms would shift internal production to relevan
participate via
rms will be included 
ccurately reflects 
 Brief for the 
6, at 14-15 
(asking whether 
t market or 
 downstream competition in response to a small but significant non-
ede the 
believe that § 2.23 of 
the 1984 Guidelines states the appropriate methodology for determining whether in fact 
captive production is properly considered part of the relevant market. Indeed, the 1992 
Joint Merger Guidelines employ such an analysis to identify firms outside the relevant 
market that may “participate through supply responses.” See 1992 Joint Merger 
Guidelines § 1.32. 
130 See Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 501-510; Ball Mem’l Hosp. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins. Co.,
784 F.2d 1325, 1336 (7th Cir. 1985) (explaining rationale of Gen. Dynamics).
transitory price increase).  The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines supers
corresponding portions of the 1984 Guidelines.  Nonetheless, we 
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properly defined distribution market in response to a hypothesized price increase (the 
ket!).131   Thus, 
 is reserved by 
petitive 
tsource.  Live 
Nation, of course, is one firm with significant “captive production” of ticket distribution 
y of the data 
ting
se by venues the 
e in any economically 
meaningful sense to third-party venues that seek to outsource the distribution of their 
tickets, it is unlikely to significantly affect the relevant market and thus is not a 
meaningful substitute for venues that outsource their ticket distribution.133
 Vertically integrated firms could, however, participate in the relevant market if 
they would respond to a price increas
Houston Rockets, for instance, will not suspend their home games so the Houston Toyota 
Center can somehow divert its self-distribution of tickets to the open mar
because the pre-merger captive production of ticket distribution services
definition for venues themselves, such production does not have the same com
significance as services available for purchase by venues that choose to ou
services, given that it distributes tickets for events at the numerous venues it owns or 
operates as well as events it promotes at independent venues.  Indeed, man
purporting to show that Live Nation is a significant participant in the ticke
distribution market in fact refer to such captive production for internal u
firm owns or manages.132  Because such production is not availabl
e imposed by a hypothetical monopolist of 
131 By contrast, one can certainly imagine, say, a vertically-integrated power company 
that relies on plants fueled by natural gas and coal reducing its reliance on gas and 
diverting such gas into the “spot” market in response to a significant price increase in that 
market. 
132 See Kohl Letter, supra note 4 (asserting that Live Nation “start[ed] a ticketing 
business to compete with Ticketmaster (and as a result sold 5.8 million tickets in the first 
four months of 2009).  If the merger occurs, this direct competition will be lost.”). 
133 Cf. Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486. 
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outsourced ticket distribution services.   For instance, such firms could expand the 
135 and their own 
 necessarily entail increased 
pro
e in one or 
both of these ways, then it would be appropriate to attribute such incremental, expanded 
rket
ting a firm’s captive 
ution to a 
responses is 
ppears to be the 
motivation behind the vertical integration that has already occurred.  As explained 
previously, such integration appears to be an effort by promoters, venues, and artists to 
for instance, 
tainment 
134
scope of their distribution activities beyond their own venues, taking on the task of 
distributing tickets for other venues as well.   Such firms could also exp
downstream output of entertainment services, which would
duction of inputs to such services, including ticket distribution.136
 If vertically integrated firms respond to a hypothetical price increas
output to the relevant market for the purpose of determining overall ma
concentration.  However, such a finding might still not justify attribu
production to that market due to that firm’s inability to “sell” its self-distrib
venue that outsources it ticket distribution.   Although either of these 
possible, we think they are unlikely for any given venue in light of what a
capture efficiencies from marketing live entertainment directly to fans, by, 
facilitating the production and synthesis of information about fans’ enter
134 See SunGard, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 186, n.14, quoting P. AREEDA, IIA AN
¶ 535e (1995) (citing 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines, § 1.31); 1984 Departm
Merger Guidelines, §2.23 (“Captive production and consumption of the relevant product 
TITRUST LAW,
ent of Justice 
arket supply and demand.  Such 
e of two ways.
lternatively,
 of their production but increase their production of 
both the relevant product and products in which the relevant product is embodied.  Either 
kind of supply response could frustrate collusion by firms currently selling the relevant 
product.”).
135 See 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, § 2.23.  
136 See 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines,§ 2.23.  See generally 1992 Joint 
Merger Guidelines, § 1.11 (treating presence of downstream competition as a factor that 
can defeat a hypothetical price increase). 
by vertically integrated firms are part of the overall m
firms may respond to an increase in the price of the relevant product in on
They may begin selling the relevant product [i.e., in the open market], or a
they may continue to consume all
 48 
preferences.  It does not appear to be an independent effort to profit from ticket 
 such 
 Live Nation, have 
ey are not 
.  It seems 
ent if the cost 
of ticket distribution changes, especially because artists, more than venues or promoters, 
r ticket 
ase by vertically 
by meriting 
ination to 
make for any particular venue, especially because the trend towards vertical integration 
appears to be accelerating independent of any hypothesized price increase (and, in fact, in 
138 ntify with 
certainty the many firms that supply the technology and other inputs necessary to 
ate, Showare, 
g in this list 
distribution in the same way that Ticketmaster or Tickets.com seek to profit from
distribution.  While there may be vertically integrated firms that, like
endeavored to provide ticket distribution services for venues to which th
otherwise related, these firms appear to be the exception rather than the rule
similarly unlikely that venues would increase their output of live entertainm
are the primary drivers of output.   
More significant is whether venues that currently outsource thei
distribution services would respond to a small but significant price incre
integrating and taking on the task of distributing tickets themselves, there
treatment as participants in the relevant market.137  This is a difficult determ
the face of reportedly steadily declining prices).   We can, however, ide
vertically integrate in this manner, such as Veritix, AudienceView, Front G
TicketReturn, Tessitura, and Tickets.com (Paciolan would otherwise belon
137 See 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines, § 1.31. See also SunGard, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 187 
(“[W]hat is significant is not whether the companies that currently use inter
have the capacity to e
nal solutions 
nter the market as vendors for others, but whether the customers 
that currently use [outsourced] hotsites would switch to an internal hotsite [i.e., vertically 
integrate] in response to a SSNIP.”). Some may argue that such firms are better 
characterized as “firms that participate through supply responses.” See 1992 Joint 
Merger Guidelines, §§ 1.31, 1.321 & 1.322. 
138 Alpert & Kitt, supra note 122, at 266-67 (noting difficulty of calculating market 
concentration where “do-it-yourself” production is a meaningful substitute for purchasing 
input on the open market). 
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but is now owned by Ticketmaster).  These firms could be included as participants in the 
uestion is whether the 
 a 
as become, and as 
 determine the exact degree of additional post-
merger vertical integration with any certainty. 
cludes
 New Era’s 
has a market 
en hands-down 
s ion services—or, 
more precisely, the quantity of tickets distributed—have been used by opponents of the 
proposed merger to assert that Ticketmaster dominates the relevant market.140  But 
arguably such data do not accurately reflect the underlying competitive and economic 
realities in the industry.  Both courts and the antitrust enforcement agencies have 
repeatedly stated that reliance upon historical unit sales is merely one of several methods 
relevant product market as proxies for anticipated increases in vertical integration and 
assign them market shares accordingly.  Here again the central q
actual or potential captive production would be forthcoming in response to
hypothesized price increase.139  As widespread as vertical integration h
likely as it is to spread, it is difficult to
Within these parameters, a current market share calculation—whether it in
all or part or none of Live Nation’s captive production, whether it includes
growth outside Comcast venues, etc.—would indicate that Ticketmaster 
share far larger than its rivals.  There is no doubt that Ticketmaster has be
the industry leader, and historical measures of sales of ticket di tribut
139 See 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, § 2.23 (asking whether vertically 
integrated firms would shift internal production to relevant market or participate via 
downstream competition in response to a small but significant non-transitory price 
increase).  See also 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines § 1.32 (articulating similar test for 
identifying “firms that participate [in the relevant market] through supply responses”). 
140 See supra note 28 with TicketNews scores and other data sources approximating 
market shares. 
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of determining firms’ respective shares of the relevant market and may, in fact, result in a 
misleading a 141
lf-distribution.
ution software (a 
 historical sales 
Perhaps most 
important, the competitive bidding process that venues use to solicit competition 
 focused competition 
ircumstances such 
, the merger 
e on historical 
market shares and instead rely upon the capacity of individual firms to provide the 
s expressly 
ssessment of the competitive consequences of a transaction.
 To begin with, historical sales ignore venues’ ability to switch to se
Moreover, because the marginal costs of licensing Internet ticket distrib
non-rival good) is obviously low, participants’ capacity and not their
provides a more accurate estimate of overall market concentration.  
following the expiration of distribution contracts creates moments of
that dull any advantages of incumbency or historical market share.  In c
as these, in which all market participants have equal access to buyers
guidelines adopted by the antitrust enforcement agencies abjure relianc
service in question as the appropriate market shares.142  These Guideline
141 Joint Merger Guidelines § 1.521 ("[R]ecent or ongoing changes in the m
indicate that the current market share of a particular firm either unders
the firm's future competitive significance. . . . The Agency will consider rea
predictable effects of recent or ongoing changes in market conditions in
[historical] market concentration and market share data. "); Brown Shoe C
States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 n.38 (1962) ("Statistics reflecting the shar
controlled by the industry leaders and the parties to the merger are, o
index of market power; but only a further examination of the particular m
structure, history and probable future – ca
arket may 
tates or overstates 
sonably
 interpreting 
o. v. United 
es of the market 
f course, the primary 
arket – its 
n provide the appropriate setting for judging the 
84 U.S. Dist. 
e capacity" as "the 
appropriate statistical basis for measurement of future industry competitive 
performance"); FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 128 (D.D.C. 2004) 
(identifying reserves, loadout capacity, and production and practical capacity "all 
informative to some degree, yet . . . imperfect" indicators of future ability to compete," 
and therefore, considering all measures together).. 
142 See 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines, § 1.41 (“Calculating Market Shares: General 
Approach”); id. (“Physical capacity or reserves generally will be used [to measure 
probable anticompetitive effect of the merger."); FTC v. Bass Bros., 19
LEXIS 16122, *19 (N.D. Ohio June 6, 1984) (identifying "productiv
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provide that, “[w]here all firms have, on a forward-looking basis, an equal likelihood of 
143 ent of Justice 
ee bidders 
tmaster to provide 
ch as Veritix, 
AudienceView, Frontgate, Tessitura, TicketReturn, and others can bid for the right to 
HI much lower 
ived from historical market shares, regardless of the number of venues that 
wou summation of 
 Consequently, the identification of market participants and market shares brings 
the inquiry back to the original question of how easily a venue can acquire the Internet 
ndustry suggest that 
vertical integration is becoming both increasingly inexpensive and otherwise desirable, 
uch a strategy.
 both to 
securing sales, the Agency will assign firms equal shares.”   The Departm
has even gone so far as to argue—successfully—that the presence of thr
suffices to ensure sufficient competition for the right to publish a state’s official legal 
reports.144   Firms such as Tickets.com can bid head to head with Ticke
outsourced ticket distribution services,145 and at the same time, firms su
provide technology that enables a venue to forgo outsourcing in favor of self-distribution.  
As a result, a capacity-based approach in this context would result in an H
than that der
ld, in fact, vertically integrate into ticket distribution shortly after con
this transaction. 
technology required to self-distribute tickets. Developments in the i
such that venues could counteract any monopoly pricing by pursuing s
Ultimately, assessing the practicability of vertical integration is necessary
.”). See also 
oint Merger Guidelines, § 1.41 (“Calculating Market Shares: General 
Approach”), n. 15. 
144 See The Thomson Corp., 949 F. Supp. 907, 919 (approving consent decree that did 
not order divestiture of publishing contracts for the state of Washington because presence 
of two other publishers capable of bidding for the right to publish Washington official 
reports would, as the government argued, “ensure vigorous competition in Washington”). 
145 See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, 2003-1 Trade Cas. ¶ 74,013, at 96,240-41 
(C.D. Cal.2003).
concentration] if it is these measures that most effectively distinguish firms
United States v. Thomson Corp., 949 F. Supp. 907, 919 (D.D.C. 1996). 
143 See 1992 J
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properly define the market and to arrive at meaningful measures of market concentration 
Pot
ated that calculation 
uences.146  The 
enforcement agencies in particular have recently cautioned against “undue emphasis on 
erger analysis 
147 ach, enshrined in 
forcement 
otential post-
merger harms: “coordinated interaction,” whereby remaining participants in the industry 
hereby the 
and power. 
ential Adverse Effects 
 Both courts and the enforcement agencies have repeatedly st
of market shares and resulting concentration ratios is simply a “starting point” in 
determining whether a merger will likely result in anticompetitive conseq
market share and concentration statistics” as opposed to application of m
“as an integrated whole to case-specific facts.”   That integrated appro
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines and employed by both courts and the en
agencies, involves investigating and assessing the risk of two particular p
“pursue parallel policies of mutual advantage,”148 and “unilateral effects,” w
146 See Joint Merger Guidelines, § 2.0 (“Other things being equal, market 
affects the likelihood that one firm, or a small group of firms, could successfully exercise 
market power. . . . However, market share and concentration data pro
starting point for analyzing the competitive impact of a merger.”);  Depart
and Federal Trade Commission Commentary on Joint Merger Guid
agencies have often not challenged mergers involving market shares an
that fall outside the [safe harbors] set forth in Guidelines § 1.51.  This d
concentration
vide only the 
ment of Justice 
elines, at 15-16 (“The 
d concentration 
oes not mean the 
ares and 
‘starting point’ and that many mergers falling outside these 
onsideration
ssen
specific 
facts—not undue emphasis on market share and concentration statistics—determines 
whether the Agency will challenge a particular merger.”). 
147 See Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Commentary on Joint 
Merger Guidelines, at 15-16. 
148 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964); FTC v. Heinz 
Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Merger law ‘rests upon the theory that, where 
rivals are few, firms will be able to coordinate their behavior, either by overt collusion or 
[concentration thresholds] are not meaningful, but rather that market sh
concentration are but a 
concentration zones [i.e., in concentrated markets] nevertheless, upon full c
of the factual and economic evidence, are found unlikely substantially to le
competition.   Application of the Guidelines as an integrated whole to case-
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firm created by the merger itself exercises market power after the transaction, without 
regard to the reaction of other 149
t Distribution 
ticipants are 
d on historical 
aracterized as 
moderately or highly concentrated.  We might proceed with the additional assumption, 
bona fide arket participant (and 
ith committed 
ith
ption under 
f market power.150
Even if one were to make these various assumptions, the structure of the market for ticket 
distribution services and the nature of the rivalry that takes place within it make it 
unlikely that the merger will facilitate either coordinated interaction or unilateral actions 
that create market power to the detriment of purchasers. 
participants in the marketplace.
We assume for the sake of argument a relevant market of “Ticke
Services for Large Venues” and also assume that, regardless of which par
included in that market, Ticketmaster has a substantial market share base
sales as a clear market leader and, moreover, that the market would be ch
again for the sake of argument, that Live Nation is a  m
not, as we think more likely, far better viewed as an integrated producer w
output) and that Live Nation’s output is significant enough that a merger w
Ticketmaster would increase market concentration enough to raise a presum
the Merger Guidelines that the merger would facilitate the exercise o
ove competitive 
Cir. 1986); Joint 
Merger Guidelines, § 2.1 (describing theory of coordinated interaction). 
149 See Joint Merger Guidelines, § 2.2. 
150 See Joint Merger Guidelines § 1.51 (b) (mergers that increase HHI less than 100 
points in moderately concentrated market “are unlikely to have adverse competitive 
consequences and ordinarily require no further analysis”); id. at 151(c) (mergers that 
increase HHI less than 50 points in highly concentrated market “are unlikely to have 
adverse competitive consequences and ordinarily require no further analysis”). 
implicit understanding, in order to restrict output and achieve profits ab
levels.’") quoting FTC v. PPG Indus., 798 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. 
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We are of course aware that some opponents to the transaction have claimed that 
erger to monopoly.151
n and self-
cus on a 
iter—that is 
efinition of the 
market, which recognizes and incorporates the potential for vertical integration and self-
erous
 follow the template 
of t turn first to examine whether the transaction will lead to 
“co ely define it. 
1.  Coordinated Interaction 
To be successful, coordinated interaction requires participants in a collusive 
t to 
erstanding is 
ous and sold at a 
stances,
onitor each 
ervices are not 
the combination of Live Nation and Ticketmaster is effectively a m
Such arguments, however, ignore the availability of vertical integratio
distribution as substitutes for outsourced distribution, and thus narrowly fo
segment of the market—outsourced distribution of ticketing services simplic
not economically meaningful for antitrust analysis.  A more appropriate d
distribution, offers strong counterarguments to the claim that the proposed transaction 
will produce market power.  With this in mind, and recognizing that num
independent firms provide and support ticket distribution services, we
he Merger Guidelines and 
ordinated interaction” in the market as we believe courts would lik
scheme, at a minimum, to reach a mutual understanding regarding the price and outpu
which parties to the understanding will purportedly adhere.  Such an und
easiest when the product or service provided by the parties is homogene
standard price that is visible and known to all parties.  Under these circum
participants in such an arrangement can readily agree on price terms and m
other’s compliance with the scheme.  Where, by contrast, products or s
151 See, e.g., The Ticketmaster/Live Nation Merger: What Does it Mean for Consumers 
and the Future of the Concert Business: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, 
Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
3 (2009), available at: http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm 
?id=3674&wit_id=7624 [hereinafter Balto Testimony] (written testimony of  David 
Balto, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress Action Fund).  
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homogenous, and where price and related terms are not observable, reaching (and 
enforcing) such an understandi 152
idely and 
ickets.com, venues 
es to other 
tance from 
sophisticated technology companies, establish their own system of distribution, and firms 
153 gnificant, the venues 
grated firms that 
nues, for 
istribution
companies might provide for free or at a discount.154  Others might require training of 
box office personnel and/or assistance in deve
ng becomes much more difficult.
 As was noted above, providers of ticket distribution services vary w
include traditional distribution companies, such as Ticketmaster and T
that currently engage in self-distribution and also offer distribution servic
venues, an unknown but substantial number of venues that could, with assis
that have already vertically integrated whose captive output may perhaps influence the 
market even if not technically included within it.   Perhaps more si
that purchase ticket distribution services, including those vertically inte
“purchase” from themselves, exhibit a wide diversity of needs.  Some ve
instance, require upgrades to their computers and software, which ticket d
loping fan profiles and resulting targeted 
152 See Joint Merger Guidelines, § 2.11 (“reaching terms of coordination m
facilitated by product or firm h
ay be 
al Merger 
ies of various 
s, including the United States, that “[c]oordination is simplified when the level of 
 undifferentiated 
petitors to predict 
153 See 2006 DOJ And FTC Commentary on the Merger Guidelines, at 15 (noting that 
the Agencies will consider the impact of rivalry from products that, while technically not 
in the relevant marketplace, nonetheless still exercise some competitive influence on that 
market). 
154 See Ticketmaster Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,239-40 (reporting that, in some 
cases, Ticketmaster provides venues with upfront cash payments to help pay for the 
purchase and installation of new equipment). 
omogeneity”);  International Competition Network Merger 
Working Group, Report on Coordinated Effects Analysis Under Internation
Regimes, ch.4 at 13 (2004) (reporting consensus among enforcement agenc
nation
product differentiation is minimal.  Markets characterized by relatively
products typically involve fewer terms of sale, making it easier for com
the likely responses of their rivals.”).
 56 
promotional strategies.   Accordingly, contracts between ticket distributors and venues, 
e expectations that 
156 blic and 
 and vertically integrated 
arra
e is very 
unfriendly to collusion.  There is neither a single service nor a single price that can serve 
the provision of that service are hidden from rivals’ view.  Moreover, the process in 
venues do not 
155
for instance, are individually negotiated and presumably exhibit servic
are particularized for each venue.  Moreover, these contracts are not pu
therefore not observable to rivals before other bids are placed,
ngements of course are completely hidden from view.157
 A market characterized by such heterogeneity and lack of disclosur
as the focus and basis of a collusive agreement, and any meaningful details that underlie 
which competition plays out makes collusion additionally difficult.  Large 
155 For instance, Kroenke Sports Enterprises recently announced it had se
patented Flash Seats technology to power Kroenke's TicketHorse prima
lected Veritix's 
ry ticketing 
es to "know 
ore focused 
 (July 1, 
lease.pdf.
at such contracts 
o not follow a 
ities usually release 
question.  Such ex
t, in such a 
cheme.  For 
ansfer price that 
aring full 
nology is 
llustrates the variation in how ticket distribution services are 
provided and the difficulty of making meaningful comparisons. See generally Coase, 
supra note 121, at 381 (equating complete vertical integration with “suppression of the 
price mechanism” for allocating resources).  See also Joint Merger Guidelines, § 2.11 
(“reaching terms of coordination may be facilitated by product or firm homogeneity”) 
(emphasis added); (“Firms with similar capacity, similar cost structure, common aspects 
of vertical integration, similar market share, or some combination of these factors are 
more likely to coordinate.”). 
service, in part, because the Flash Seats technology allows teams and venu
who is in each and every seat, making marketing and customer service far m
on the actual ticket holder."  Press Release, Veritix, Kroenke Sports Enterprises Selects 
Flash Seats as Exclusive Digital Ticketing Provider for Venues and Events
2009), available at http://www.veritix.com/news/Kroenke_Flash_Seats_Re
156 See Ticketmaster Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,240 (explaining th
“are negotiated at arms length between the venue and [Ticketmaster] and d
standard form.  There are no contracts of adhesion.”). 
157 It should be noted that publicly-owned venues and public univers
the results of a bidding process, but only after awarding the contract in 
post disclosure of the terms of, say, a three to five year contract would no
dynamic industry, facilitate the actual or tacit negotiation of a collusive s
vertically integrated venues, it might even be impossible to specify the tr
corresponds to the market price for distribution services.  Moreover, comp
integration with self-distribution following the licensing of Internet tech
difficult.  This further i
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simply purchase such services in small increments in a spot market but instead seek bids 
paring
oviders of software 
 provide 
 manner that 
or such a long-
term arrangement may itself cause firms to deviate from putative terms of coordinated 
159
mediate 
ral court 
p of the possibility 
of vertical integration by venues themselves, “is a powerful deterrent” of the exercise of 
 that the 
for the long-term exclusive provision of such services from possible suppliers, com
the results of such bids to the cost of self-distribution enabled by pr
and expertise that support such vertical integration.158  These conditions
purchasers with the requisite incentive to structure bidding processes in a
protects themselves from collusive bids.  The prospect of winning a bid f
interaction.    At the same time, the prevalence of long-term contracts that guarantee 
firms a fixed amount of business may protect firms that do deviate from im
retaliation by firms seeking to enforce the tacit arrangement.160    One fede
concluded that such a bidding process, especially against the backdro
market power by ticket distributors.161  Other courts have also recognized
158 See Ticketmaster Corp. 2003-1 Trade Cas., at 96,239-41 (elaborating on process of 
om bid against 
 and the time 
t decided to 
ernative to Ticketmaster, Live Nation “had a line-up of companies 
Rapino
uld engage in 
arge relative to 
viate [from any 
, § 2.12 (“Where detection or punishment [of deviation] 
is likely to be slow, incentives to deviate are enhanced and coordinated interaction is 
unlikely to be successful.”). 
161 See Ticketmaster Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,241 (“The bidding nature of the 
competition is a powerful deterrent against the existence of monopoly power so long as 
there are competitors to bid so as to give the customer an alternative.”); id. (citing cases 
for the proposition that “the use of a bidding system is an indication of lack of power to 
exclude competitors from the market”). 
bidding for venues’ ticket distribution business and noting that Tickets.c
Ticketmaster on all 140 contracts that had become available between 1998
of the litigation).  Michael Rapino, Live Nation’s CEO, testified that when i
contract with an alt
around the world that wanted to be our ticketing company.”  See Michael 
Tesimony, supra note 67, at 36-37.
159 See Joint Merger Guidelines, § 2.12 (“Where large buyers likely wo
long term contracting, so that the sales covered by such contracts can be l
the total output of a firm in the market, firms may have the incentive to de
collusive agreement].”). 
160 See Joint Merger Guidelines
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existence of a bidding process can protect customers from the creation and exercise of 
162
n prevent an 
exe r, even in the face of a relatively concentrated marketplace.163
 and Federal 
Trade Commission articulate two scenarios under which a merger that does not lead to a 
arket 
ns by 
duce very close 
rice of one such 
product.164  The second is a merger in a market where the merged firm’s rivals do not 
have sufficient capacity to promptly meet a rise in demand prompted by an increase in 
market power.   This result is consistent with economic theory, which suggests that 
properly structured bidding among a small number of potential sellers ca
rcise of market powe
2.  Unilateral Effects 
The enforcement guidelines employed by the Department of Justice
monopoly may nonetheless cause a unilateral exercise of market power, that is, m
power that the merged firm can profitably exploit without regard to reactio
consumers and competitors.  The first is a merger between firms that pro
substitutes, thereby empowering the new entity unilaterally to raise the p
162 See Nat’l Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020, 102
1985) (no dangerous probability of obtaining a monopoly for court repor
where court adopted single vendor for such service after competitive bidd
5 (8th Cir. 
ting services 
ing); Owens
g how customers 
process and 
k-Mayer, Inc. v. 
6 F. Supp. 1168, 1171-72 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (no dangerous probability 
nment repair and maintenance contract where 
defendant obtained such contract after competitive bidding which set a fixed price, and 
any renewal of such agreement would require a new round of bidding). 
163 See Mary Sullivan, The Effect of the Big Eight Accounting Firm Mergers on the 
Market for Audit Services, 45 J.L. & ECON. 375 (2002) (finding that two mergers by Big 
Eight accounting firms did not injure purchasers of such services but instead produced 
significant efficiencies). 
164 See Joint Merger Guidelines, § 2.21.
Illinois, 681 F. Supp. at 48, vacated as moot, 850 F.2d 694 (explainin
protected themselves from potential price increases by adopting a bidding 
negotiating contracts requiring cost-justification for price increases); Kir
PAC ORD, Inc., 62
of obtaining monopoly over gover
 59 
price or reduction in output by the new entity.   Neither scenario appears to be a 
plausible result of the Live Na
etmaster do not appear to 
y of 
nues that have 
g the form of 
licensing technology to firms that choose to vertically integrate and engage in self-
arily
 Nation 
ffiliation, we 
ing to be particularly 
e market’s other 
offerings.  This could be because Live Nation (unlike Ticketmaster and its other 
competitors) might not yet tailor its services to meet the specific needs of the venues it 
aim  unaffiliated 
ticketing
tutes.   
ny better.  For 
one thing, such a challenge would depend upon proof negating the presence of product 
differentiation within the ticketi  one were to stipulate the 
absence of product differentiation, this theory requires demonstrating that rivals cannot 
promptly respond to supracompetitive prices.  However, the spread of Internet 
165
tion-Ticketmaster transaction. 
The first scenario is inapt because Live Nation and Tick
offer substitutable services to a common set of purchasers.  The majorit
Ticketmaster’s ticketing business consists of distributing tickets for ve
chosen to outsource their ticketing distribution, with the balance takin
distribution via the firm’s Paciolan subsidiary.  By contrast, Live Nation prim
distributes tickets on behalf of venues that it owns or operates.  While Live
appears to now offer ticketing services to some firms with whom it has no a
are aware of no evidence that venues consider the Live Nation offer
similar to that produced by Ticketmaster, especially when compared to th
s to service.  Indeed, the paucity of contracts between Live Nation and
venues makes it particularly difficult to determine whether purchasers of 
services view the services offered by the merging parties to be close substi
Nor would a challenge based on rivals’ capacity limitations fare a
ng industry.  Moreover, even if
165 See Joint Merger Guidelines, § 2.22. 
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technologies, the non-rival nature of distribution software, and the industry’s practice of 
ents in the 
es would have little difficulty to vertically integrate and self-
dist
im to capitalize 
on market power raises the same question, oft-repeated in this document, of how easily 
hanges
chnology partner 
 Veritix, AudienceView, Front Gate, or TicketReturn to assume ticket distribution 
itse  market 
power.
s of the nation’s 
soliciting bids for term contracts suggest that rival ticket distributors could quickly 
replace any reduction in output.  And more significantly, recent developm
industry suggest that venu
ribute their own tickets.166
Therefore, determining how the merged entity might unilaterally a
venues can acquire the requisite technology to self-distribute their tickets.  If such self-
distribution alternatives are as inexpensive and attractive as recent market c
indicate—and most venues have the capacity, by partnering with a te
such as
lf—then that would negate any opportunity for a distributor to exercise
167
 One alarm raised by some critics of the merger is that even if the technology for 
self-distribution is widely available, Ticketmaster “controls” the busines
166 See infra note 171 and accompanying text (explaining how biddin
distribution market undermines reliance upon historical market shares as
market concentration).   
167 Even some critics of the merger concede that the technology required fo
distribution is easily acquired and available from many market participants.
Robert W. Doyle, Jr., Testimony Before the U.S. House of Representativ
on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy (Feb. 
(stating that “[s]ome venue wi
g nature of ticket 
 indicators of 
r self-
  See e.g, 
es, Committee 
26, 2009) 
ll explain that they have been able to set up their own 
systems.  The venue operators that have been successful in setting up their own system 
did so by licensing software, hiring telephone operators, and opening a local box office . . 
.”).  To be sure, Mr. Doyle also suggested that self-ticketing is only likely when a venue 
sells a large number of tickets, such as when a firm controls more than one venue or more 
than one sports team.  See id. at 16. Nonetheless, we have identified numerous venues 
with relatively modest sales that currently distribute their own tickets.  See supra notes
90, 100, 106 and accompanying text. 
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largest venues with exclusive, long-term contracts.   Ticketmaster’s merger with Live 
rket position.
try leadership, 
hese exclusive contracts could endow the merged firm with anticompetitive market 
pow
 throughout the 
ticketing services industry, and venues in exclusive contracts are bound to particular 
169 venues are bound 
ree and 
ements with 
expiration of 
such agreements, the venue typically invites proposals from several different ticketing 
service and technology providers, initiating a competitive bargaining process for a new 
o Ticketmaster, 
ploying technology supplied by 
cipation of the 
icketmaster.  This competitive bidding process is pitting 
168
Nation, these critics fear, would further enshrine Ticketmaster’s current ma
If rivals and potential entrants are unable to challenge Ticketmaster’s indus
then t
er.
Although exclusive contracts appear to be commonly employed
distributors by contracts of varying lengths, it is easy to overestimate the impact of such 
contracts on the future market shares of market participants.   Where 
by express contracts, the terms of such agreements are generally for more than th
are for an average of six years, with the result that hundreds of such agre
large venues (approximately 20 percent) expire each year.170  Before the 
contract.  When Live Nation, for example, decided to seek an alternative t
it entertained a competitive bidding process and found many suitors with attractive 
proposals before settling on vertical integration em
CTS.171  AEG is now reportedly holding a similar bidding process in anti
expiration of its contract with T
169 Cf. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Raising Rivals Costs: 
Anticompetitive Exclusion to Achieve Power over Price,  96 YALE L.J. 209, 267 (1986) 
(“Certainly in most industries exclusionary rights contracts cannot be profitably 
employed for anticompetitive ends.”). 
170 See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2003-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶74,013, at 
96,240-41 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
171 Michael Rapino Testimony, supra note 158, at 36-37. 
168 Balto Testimony, supra note 151.
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distributors both against each other and also against AEG’s alternative vertical 
integ 172
everal bidding 
al others with 
of the Utah Jazz 
and until now a Ticketmaster client.   Ticketmaster loses many such contests to the 
r’s exclusive 
tribution business 
s indicating that 
er the next six 
years.  Because there are no apparent scale economies that would cause a large market 
share to reduce the costs of ticket distribution, nor would any other externalities give 
 to believe that 
Tic al bidders.
t is typical to ticket 
et power. 
nt, and as is discussed in detail in Part IV, infra, the 
 effects, and 
antitrust scholars, enforcement officials, and courts have historically overestimated the 
ration strategies.
Indeed, over the past three years, Ticketmaster has itself lost s
contests upon the expiration of contracts with large venues and sever
smaller venues.  For instance, Veritix recently announced that it will take over all 
ticketing operations for Salt Lake City’s EnergySolutions Arena, home 
173
venue itself, which chooses to take on the task of distributing its own tickets instead of 
renewing its distribution contract with Ticketmaster.  Because Ticketmaste
agreements with venues expire on a regular basis, the nation’s ticket dis
is subject to a regular and ongoing competitive process, with some report
perhaps all such business will be available for bidding at some point ov
advantages to incumbents with large market shares, there is no reason
ketmaster has an undue advantage in that bidding process over riv
Consequently, there is little reason to conclude that the exclusivity tha
distribution agreements would enshrine or facilitate any meaningful mark
Perhaps more significa
exclusivity of such agreements often have procompetitive purposes and
172  Bloomberg.com, supra note 111. 
173 See Veritix Signs Exclusive Ticketing Contract for Utah Jazz, EnergySolutions 
Arena, TicketNews (Sept. 9, 2009), available at: http://www.ticketnews.com/Veritix-
signs-exclusive-ticketing-contract-for-Utah-Jazz-EnergySolutions-Arena9929188  
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prospect that such agreements would produce competitive harm.  One reason that recent 
tions, such as, for 
venue.
 benefits stemming 
 desirable 
features such as “best seat available” searches and coordination of multiple marketing 
s.174  Any apparent “exclusionary” impact, then, is likely to be incidental to the 
crea
oncentration and 
y could deter and 
defeat any efforts by incumbent firms to exercise market power.   The entry analysis 
would turn on many of the same industry-wide conditions and trends that have been 
arely asked 
s would enable 
arket
participants section asked a similar question when determining whether venues that 
icket distribution might become market participants in the face of 
r’s unilateral effects 
scholars and policymakers have applied less scrutiny to such vertical exclusive 
arrangements is that they have easily recognizable efficiency explana
instance, encouraging investment in and financing of improvements to the 
Moreover, a court expressly ruled on specific efficiencies and mutual
from exclusive agreements used by ticket distributors, which also enable
effort
tion of economic benefits. 
Entry
 Even if the proposed transaction were found to enhance market c
pose a plausible risk of anticompetitive harm, the prospect of new entr
175
central to our analysis to this point.  Our market definition section squ
whether technology companies and other forms of technological progres
venues to self-distribute and thus become part of the relevant market.  Our m
currently outsource t
supracompetitive prices.  And our examination of the proposed merge
174 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2003-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 74,013, at 
96,241 (C.D. Cal.  2003). 
175 See United States v. Waste Mgmt., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that prospect 
of new entry rebutted government’s prima facie case that merger producing highly 
concentrated market would result in anticompetitive effects). 
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inquires whether vertical integration and new technologies would counteract any effort 
by a m
anies, promoters, 
ge venues, 
een noted above, there 
s, that 
technology companies are increasingly available to facilitate self-distribution, and that 
176  to the 
power.177
ry has already 
o as to realize 
efficiencies resulting from the integration of the production, promotion, and ticketing of 
live entertainment.  Thus, such entry would certainly be “likely” if incumbent firms were 
A review of entrants’ success suggest that the threat of additional entry is both 
erational within two 
arket leader to assert market power. 
 All of these sections turn on the ability of Internet software comp
and venues to spread the capacity to sell tickets for live performances at lar
either to venues themselves or to outsourced distributors.  As has b
is substantial evidence that venues are pursuing self-distribution strategie
there are a growing number of competitive options to venues seeking to contract for 
distribution services.   The Horizontal Merger Guidelines focus attention
timeliness, the likelihood, and the sufficiency of entry to counteract market 
Our sense is that the industry’s recent developments indicate that such ent
occurred and that venues will continue to adopt self-distribution strategies s
to attempt to exercise market power. 
real and imminent.  For example, Tessitura, a not-for-profit enterprise, entered the market 
in the late 1990s by developing its own software de novo and was op
176 See supra notes 79-111 and accompanying text (listing numerous examples of venues 
that have recently taken on the task of distributing their own tickets).  See also 
Ticketmaster Corp 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,241 (explaining that the option of self-
distribution via reliance on outside technology providers prevents Ticketmaster from 
exercising market power). 
177 See 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines § 3.0. See also Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 
54-58 (applying this taxonomy to evaluate defendants’ claim that prospect of new entry 
should rebut plaintiff’s prima facie case). 
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to three years.   Given technological developments since then, including the rapid 
 entry could 
 that Live 
 it decided to do 
ss could not 
ues, including the Los 
Angeles Staples Center, Miami’s American Airlines Arena, the Target Center in 
ong others.180  The 
tHorse, to manage a 
tion
arrangements  (indeed, the firm had earlier suggested that it might take its business 
elsewhere if the Live Nation/Ticketmaster merger is approved).183  If, contrary to our 
AEG and other 
ers are likely to create their own ticketing technologies or license 
178
diffusion of Internet ticketing technology, we would expect that de novo
occur much more quickly today.  Indeed, opponents of the transaction claim
Nation entered the ticket distribution market just a few short months after
so, and there is no reason that other participants in the entertainment busine
do the same.179  AEG, for instance, owns or manages dozens of ven
Minneapolis, Charlotte’s Time Warner Cable Arena, Portland, Oregon’s Rose Quarter, 
Kansas City’s Sprint Center, and San Antonio’s AT&T Arena, am
firm recently partnered with Kroenke Sports, the owner of Ticke
venue in Colorado.  Currently AEG outsources the distribution at most of its venues to 
Ticketmaster,181 but it reportedly is preparing to seek alternative distribu
182
expectations, the merger were to result in an exercise of market power, 
adjacent market play
178 .tessituranetwork.com/en/About/Timeline.aspx (repo See http://www rting that the 
t was 
ng numerous venues 
ed Aug. 10, 2009).
181 The Portland Rose Garden, however, self distributes with Paciolan technology.
182 See supra, note 111. 
183 See Ticketmaster Client May End Contract if Merger OKed, REUTERS, Feb. 26, 2009, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/innovationNewsConsumerGoodsAndRetail/ 
idUSTRE51P7W820090226 (reporting AEG letter advising Ticketmaster that approval of 
Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger would release AEG from its ticket distribution 
agreement with Ticketmaster).
New York Metropolitan Opera authorized entry in 1996 and that the projec
completed in 1998-1999). 
179 Balto Testimony, supra note 151, at 2. 
180 See http://www.aegworldwide.com/01_venues/venues.php (listi
owned by AEG) (last visit
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such technology from others and entering the distribution market (and they may do so 
uld, all by 
have the same 
s be “sufficient” to counteract any purported antitcompetitive effects from 
            Nor is AEG the only likely entrant.  At least one major record label—Warner 
arket, using 
186  follow in the 
nnounced that it 
ster client, along 
wsletter
opined that the spin off, creating a new entity worth $1.5 billion, would “instantly 
ed entertainment partners Ticketmaster and 
g.
even if the merged Live Nation Entertainment does not exercise market power).  One 
critic of the proposed transaction has argued that entry by Live Nation wo
itself, lower ticket prices.184  If so, then presumably entry by AEG would 
effect and thu
the transaction.185
Music Group—has predicted that it will soon enter the ticket distribution m
its relationships with artists as a segue.   Other major promoters could
steps of AEG and Live Nation.  Indeed, in August 2009, Cablevision a
would be spinning off Madison Square Garden, currently a Ticketma
with Radio City Music Hall and other assets.  The leading ticket industry ne
creat[e] a possible future competitor to propos
Live Nation.”187  Presumably such rivalry would include rivalry in ticketin
184 Balto Testimony, supra note 151, at 3. 
185 Cf. Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 58 (finding that entry, while time
would not be “sufficient” to counter-act hypothesized output reduction in th
market). 
186 See Transcript of Warner Music Group Call, Addressing Fourth Quart
Earnings (
ly and likely, 
e relevant 
er 2008 
February 9, 2009) (recounting the steps that the firm is taking to “broaden its 
sorship, fanclub, 
, touring, ticketing and artist management.”); id. (stating that the 
firm has been involved in “fan club management” since 2004, including “VIP ticketing”); 
id. (stating that, going forward “physical recorded music business will continue to be a 
smaller and smaller part of our business . . . . we’ll also be significantly in the business of 
sharing the revenues with artists, ticketing, touring, artist management, sponsorship, fan 
clubs, etc.”).  
187 See http://www.ticketnews.com/Ticket-News-Announces-Top-Ticket-Sellers-for-
Week-Ending-August-1-2009.
revenue mix in the growing areas of the music business, including spon
Websites, merchandising
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It is difficult to credit the claim made by some that exclusive contracts entered by 
er.188  With the 
ll-service 
 Ticketmaster.  For 
ts can 
actually facilitate this category of entry by providing upstart firms with the assurance that 
189
ted entry to 
 technologies 
w, have found 
ution, and it might 
be said that these enabling firms represent two different kinds of entry:  entry by venues 
into self-distribution, and entry by technology firms that enable self-distribution.
 firms has the potential to 
Ticketmaster, Tickets.com, and other providers of distribution services prevent the sort of 
entry that would be necessary to counteract any exercise of market pow
spread of ticketing technologies, there remains the potential for entry by fu
outsourced ticket distributors with the business model popularized by
firms aiming to enter the market with this business model, exclusive contrac
any sunk investments will pay off before a customer switches to a different supplier.
More significantly, recent technological developments have permit
take place through alternative mechanisms.  Firms that market “enabling”
that facilitate self-distribution strategies, such as Veritix and AudienceVie
a growing demand among venues to pursue cost-effective self-distrib
Accordingly, the emergence of even a small number of enabling
188 The Department of Justice in the 1990s investigated allegations of illeg
monopolization, which charged that Ticketmaster’s exclusive contracts res
and caused anticompetitive harm.  The Antitrust Division ultimately decl
these claims.  See U.S. Ends
al 
tricted entry 
ined to pursue 
 Ticketmaster Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1995, at 
concluded that 
s are procompetitive and that there are no barriers to 
entering the ticket distribution business. See Balto Testimony, supra note 151, at 1-2.
See also Ticketmaster Corp v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2003-1 Trade Cas.(CCH) ¶ 74,013 (C.D. 
Cal. 2003) (granting summary judgment against claim of attempted monopolization on 
similar and other bases).  In Part IV we offer a complete assessment of the competitive 
consequences of such agreements. 
189 See Joint Merger Guidelines, § 3.3 (explaining that “forward contracting” can help 
new entrants divest sales from incumbents). 
C14.  One opponent of this transaction has reported that the Department 
Ticketmaster’s contracts with venue
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significantly shape the economic impact of new sources of output.190  Should 
 entrants.  At the 
ers entrants to counter 
tive prices. 
Con n
 Some critics argue that, regardless of the transaction’s impact (or lack thereof) on 
current revent 
arate entities.  That is, 
on was poised 
cket
affiliation.  By merging with Live Nation, these critics claim, Ticketmaster would thwart 
Live Nation’s impending substantial and procompetitive expansion in a market segment 
whe he merger 
ght exist 
ctices that 
reduce competition that never in fact existed.  Still, it is perhaps possible to accommodate 
instance, just 
as a firm’s apparent market share might overstate its actual competitive significance, so 
too might its apparent market presence understate its competitive influence, influence 
Ticketmaster or any market participant raise prices, we would expect acceleration in the 
trend toward self-distribution and perhaps the addition of new species of
very least, it appears that currently available technology empow
any SSNIP by Ticketmaster with comparable services at competi
cerns About a Purported Loss of “Future” or “Potential” Competitio
the firms’  rivalry, combining Live Nation and Ticketmaster will p
competition that would have occurred had the parties remained sep
these critics claim that, before the announcement of this merger, Live Nati
to become a particularly effective rival in the non-captive segment of the ti
distribution market, distributing millions of tickets for venues with whom it had no prior 
re it now barely participates.  More colloquially, it might be said, t
eliminates “potential competition” in addition to whatever actual rivalry mi
between Ticketmaster and Live Nation. 
 The antitrust laws do not by their terms prevent transactions or pra
this sort of concern within the existing framework of merger doctrine.  For 
190 See Joint Merger Guidelines, § 3.3 (likelihood of new entry depends upon availability 
of sales and the minimum viable scale of production). 
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that a proposed transaction could eliminate.   That competitive influence could be 
ether poses a 
ercises of 
uld be nascent 
rediction that a competitive challenge would have 
occ
 At the same time, any potential competition claim should not serve as a vehicle 
erger 
late the 
antitrust laws.  The antitrust laws do not smash the economy into individual atoms and 
require courts to undo productive cooperation to ensure the maximum amount of putative 
191
tangible, such as when a recent entrant or a firm outside the market altog
credible threat of sudden output increases or new entry and thus deters ex
market power by established market participants.192  Or the influence co
and potential, resting merely on a p
urred absent the transaction.193
for circumventing and avoiding the rigorous principles that ordinarily guide m
analysis.  Every merger that eliminates a “nascent competitor” does not vio
191 Cf. Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 498-99, 503-10 (concluding that ma
concentration statistics significantly overstated competitive impact of me
192 See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 533-37 (19
this theory to remand decision for reconsideration by lower court); id. at 5
concurring in the judgment) (“From the perspective of the firms al
the possibility of entry by such a lingering firm may be an important consid
their pricing and marketing decisions.  When the lingering firm enters
acquisition, the competitive influence exerted by the firm is lost with no off
through an increase in the number of companies seeking a share of the 
The result is a net decrease in competitive pressure.”) (citation omitted)
rket
rger).
73) (relying on 
59 (Marshall, J. 
ready in the market, 
eration in 
 the market by 
setting gain 
relevant market.  
; Department of 
rger
ed on theory that 
sponse to 
tions by other market participants); Joint Merger Guidelines, 
§ 4.111 (“By eliminating a significant present competitive threat that constrains the 
behavior of the firms already in the market, the merger could result in an immediate 
deterioration in market performance.”). 
193 Cf. Tenneco Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346, 355-58 (2d Cir. 1982) (articulating standards 
governing application of actual potential competition doctrine); FTC v. Atl. Richfield 
Co., 549 F. 2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977) (same); 1984 Department of Justice Non-Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines, § 4.112 (same). 
Justice and Federal Trade Commission Commentary on the Horizontal Me
Guidelines, 24-25 (March 2006) (discussing enforcement actions premis
acquired firm was a “maverick” capable of rapidly expanding output in re
anticompetitive output reduc
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rivalry that is possible.   Moreover, as Yogi Berra put it, “prediction is very hard, 
idly evolving marketplace would have 
unf
iction that it 
would eliminate meaningful competition that has not yet occurred can deprive the public 
194
especially about the future,” and government agencies and courts have no special wisdom
allowing them to forecast how a dynamic and rap
olded but for a voluntary transaction under review.195
Banning otherwise beneficial integration based on an incorrect pred
194 See White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 781 F.2d 1224, 12
1986) (“[I]t is not this Court’s duty to permit only the most competiti
imaginable.  This Court may only block proposed transactions the effect o
to substantially lessen competition.”); United States v. AMAX, Inc., 402 F. 
959 (D. Conn. 1975) (mere fact that parties could achieve their objectives
restrictive means does not require condemnation of merger that does not 
substantially lessen competition).  See also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dis
466 U.S. 2, 44, n.13 (1984) (O’Connor, J. concurring) (purported les
achieving agreement’s objective only relevant for rule of reason purposes i
agreement produces harm in the first place); Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 44
(1979) (mere fact that agreement or merger eliminates competition does no
render it inherently suspect); Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 
(1911) (ban on any arrangement that reduces rivalry would “render difficu
33 (6thCir. 
ve agreement 
f which may be 
Supp. 956, 
 via less 
otherwise
t. No. 2 v. Hyde, 
s restrictive means of 
f the 
1 U.S. 1, 23 
t thereby 
106, 180 
lt if not 
); N. Sec. Co. 
 that majority 
opinion would 
 far as it could 
t Sherman Act 
etition).   
rity on mergers 
rocter and Gamble 
rocter and Gamble 
cter & Gamble Co., 386 
U.S. 568, 580-81 (1967) (sustaining FTC’s determination that Procter and Gamble was 
the “most likely entrant” into the household bleach market).  Four decades later, Procter 
still does not participate in the household bleach market.  Luke Froeb, Testimony Before 
the House Committee on Courts and Competition, 6 n. 4 (2009).  See also e.g. John E. 
Lopatka, United States v. IBM: A Monument to Arrogance, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 145 
(2000) (collecting numerous predictions by antitrust scholars and lawyers that IBM 
would perpetually retain unassailable monopoly over personal computers).  
impossible any movement of trade in the channels of interstate commerce”
v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 411 (1904) (Holmes, J. dissenting)  (noting
of the Court had rejected “an interpretation of the law which in [Holmes’] 
make eternal the bellum omnium contra omnes and disintegrate society so
into individual atoms”); id. at 361-64 (Brewer, J. concurring) (opining tha
only banned combinations that resulted in unreasonable reductions in comp
195 For instance, recent testimony about this transaction by a noted autho
recalled that, more than forty years ago, the Supreme Court ordered P
to divest Clorox at the behest of the United States on the theory that P
would then enter the household bleach market.  See FTC v. Pro
 71 
of beneficial integration and deter future beneficial transactions as well. 6  Indeed, this 
ergers
197  salient here, 
 vertical aspects of 
saction will create efficiencies that society would forgo if the transaction is 
scu
 Even if we assume that a potential competition doctrine applies here, we do not 
ore
al effects 
ready assesses the 
suggest that its 
eory of 
potential competition suggests that Live Nation is likely to expand in its non-captive 
d.  But even if 
19
concern may well explain why courts are so reluctant to sustain challenges to m
based upon a “potential competition” theory.   This concern is particularly
where the trend toward vertical integration raises the inference that the
this tran
ttled.198
believe that Live Nation’s future influence on the marketplace changes the m
conventional analysis of this transaction.  One reason is that our horizont
analysis—evaluating actual, as opposed to potential, competition—al
possibility of Live Nation possessing captive production, which would 
market share overstates its competitive significance.  A claim based on a th
ticket distribution capabilities.  No such specific plans have been announce
196 Cf. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Commenta
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 1 (March 2006) (“Mergers between com
‘horizontal’ mergers, are a significant dynamic force in the American econo
majority of merger
ry on the 
peting firms, i.e.,
my.  The vast 
ces, or 
ompete more 
ustice and Federal 
mission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, § 0.1 (“the agency seeks to avoid 
ither competitively 
197 See infra notes 210-212 (collecting numerous authorities in which courts rejected 
such challenges).  See also Donald F. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1317-18 (1965) (describing various benefits of 
mergers the existence of which counsels against overbroad rules prohibiting such 
transactions).
198 Specific efficiencies related to the vertical integration of Ticketmaster and Live 
Nation are discussed infra Part IV.3. 
s pose no harm to consumers, and many produce efficiencies that 
benefit consumers in the form of lower prices, higher quality goods or servi
investments in innovation.  Efficiencies such as these enable companies to c
effectively, both domestically and overseas.”); 1992 Department of J
Trade Com
unnecessary interference with the larger universe of mergers that are e
beneficial or neutral.”).
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Live Nation had such a credible plan, any showing that Live Nation would have 
aster 
d thus is 
susceptible to procompetitive influence.199  However, our evaluation of the ticket 
exercised procompetitive influence on the market but for its merger with Ticketm
requires a threshold showing that the market is less than competitive an
199 Thus, by analogy, courts and the enforcement agencies have repea
a “perceived potential entrant” and an “actual potential entrant” cannot 
procompetitive influence on the marketplace unless concentration and othe
establish that the market is otherwise susceptible to coordinated or u
anticompetitive behavior. 
tedly held that both 
exercise a 
r indicia 
nilateral
ly because Live 
Nat itself made it plain 
that e market in 
que
as meaning 
e comes into 
rget market 
he capacity 
ices.  If 
ust
spects of 
genuinely
). Accord e.g.
 was not 
ctrine). See also 
(“As Professor 
able to the 
competitive to 
nfluenced by 
nt
 7 of the 
ol. Foods 
f the perceived 
vior” and 
polistic practices”) 
(alternate holding); United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637, 645 (C.D. Cal. 
1976) (rejecting application of perceived potential competition doctrine because “the 
relevant market here is not highly concentrated and is freely competitive”); In re B.A.T.,
104 F.T.C. at 923, n.22 (collecting authorities for the proposition that the doctrine does 
not apply where nominally high concentration statistics present a misleading picture of
competition in the relevant market); 1984 Department of Justice Non-Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, § 4.111 (application of perceived potential competition doctrine depends 
 There is no reason to reject this logic simp
ion is already present in the marketplace.  The Supreme Court has 
 there can be no concern about a loss of potential competition if th
stion is already competitive. 
The [actual and perceived] potential-competition doctrine h
only as applied to concentrated markets.  That is, the doctrin
play only where there are dominant participants in the ta
engaging in interdependent or parallel behavior and with t
effectively to determine price and total output of goods and serv
the target market performs as a competitive market in traditional antitr
terms . . . . there would be no need for concern about the pro
long-term deconcentration of a market which is in fact 
competitive. 
See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602,630 (1974
Tenneco, 689 F. 2d at 352-53 (sustaining Commission finding that “market
genuinely competitive,” a necessary element for application of the do
United States v. Siemens Corp., 621 F.2d 499, 505 n.6 (2d Cir. 1980) 
Turner points out the perceived potential competition doctrine is only avail
Government if the market is oligopolistic.  If the market is sufficiently 
enforce competitive behavior on existing sellers, their behavior will not be i
the threat of new entry, thus making the loss of a perceived potential entra
insignificant.”) (citing Donald Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section
Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1363 (1965)); United States v. Cons
Corp., 455 F. Supp. 108, 139-140 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (rejecting application o
potential entry doctrine where there was “no evidence of oligopolistic beha
levels of profitability were “indicative of competitive, rather than oligo
 73 
distribution market suggests that it is an increasingly dynamic and competitive market, 
em that the 
is initial 
mpower courts to thwart a 
mer t.201
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that Live Nation—as opposed to any 
utsourced
hat is to say, 
e in this segment but 
for the merger, there are other firms that are well suited to enter the market or rapidly 
expand their presence within it.  If this is the case, then eliminating Live Nation’s 
such that Ticketmaster’s current significant market share, even when included with Live 
Nation’s output, is unlikely to translate into market power.  It would se
potential competition claim would have significant difficulty overcoming th
requirement and would thus fail.200  The antitrust laws do not e
ger merely to add yet another rival to an already competitive marke
number of other firms that could enter the distribution market or expand their presence in 
it—is uniquely well-suited to be the source of potential competition in the o
ticket distribution segment and thereby deter anticompetitive conduct.  T
even assuming Live Nation would have rapidly expanded its presenc
l competition 
firms” to “restrain their pricing in order 
 application of 
e
ive potential 
cision above, 
ministration and 
rity on antitrust doctrine and policy. 
ine,
otherwise it would swallow the whole of merger law.  See AMAX, Inc., 402 F. Supp. at 
959 (noting that the argument that internal expansion would be more competitive than a 
merger could be made “against any horizontal merger” and thus does not justify 
preventing such a transaction).  See also BMI, 441 U.S. at 23 (explaining that numerous 
mergers between competitors and other competition-reducing transactions properly 
withstand antitrust scrutiny). 
201 See White Consol. Indus., Inc., 781 F.2d at 1233; AMAX, Inc, 402 F. Supp. at 959. 
upon the “economic theory of limit pricing” and assumption that potentia
encourages “monopolists and groups of colluding
to deter new entry”).  See also Tenneco Inc., 689 F.2d at 355-58 (rejecting
the “perceived potential competition” doctrine where market had recently becom
significantly competitive independent of any influence exercised by putat
entrant).   It should be noted that Professor Turner, cited in the Siemens de
served as head of the Antitrust Division during President Johnson’s ad
was a preeminent autho
200 Moreover, there need to be meaningful limits on any potential competition doctr
 74 
competitive influence cannot produce anticompetitive harm and cannot serve as a basis 
for disallowing the m 202
s will, in fact, enter 
ndidates
EG, the world’s 
n) and the 
world’s largest owner of sporting teams and events.  If Live Nation, having entered the 
only for its 
ing its reported 
 is Veritix.
tinue expanding its 
client base, both independently and via its downstream relationship with Kroenke Sports 
aster and 
erger.
 As admirers of Yogi Berra, we hesitate to predict which firm
the market or expand their presence within it.  Nonetheless, two prime ca
emerged in the previous section discussing market entry.  The first is A
second largest promoter of live music and entertainment (after Live Natio
market just a few months ago after obtaining technology from a third party, is poised 
rapidly to expand its presence in a segment in which it now participates 
internal business needs, then presumably AEG could do the same by pursu
plans to acquire self-distribution technology.203  A second likely candidate
Given the trend toward ticket self-distribution, Veritix is likely to con
and its TicketHorse subsidiary, particularly as contracts between Ticketm
202 See Atl. Richfield Co., 549 F.2d at 300 (declining to ban merger that p
reduced potential competition because there were several other possible e
Hughes Tool, 415 F. Supp. at 646 (same).  See also In re B.A.T. Indus.
852, 924 (1984) (“[E]liminating one of many potential entrants could not
eliminate substantial future competition.”).  Here again one finds a re
“perceived potential competition doctrine,” the application of which require
that the alleged potential entrant is one of very few likely entrants s
of the entrant would in fact eliminate or substantially reduce the overall th
into the relevant market. 
urportedly
ntrants); 
Ltd., 104 F.T.C. 
be expected to 
ady analogy in the 
s a showing 
uch that elimination 
reat of entry 
See Siemens, 621 F.2d at 509 (rejecting application of the 
l entry doctrine where there were various other potential entrants into 
the market in question);  United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 
729,771-773 (D. Md. 1976) (same); Frank H. Easterbrook, Comment, Toehold
Acquisitions and the Potential Competition Doctrine, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 156, 169 (1972) 
(“If there are many potential competitors, the removal of one of them cannot be 
important, because the continued presence of the remaining firms will discipline the 
market to the same extent.”).    
203 See suora, note 111. 
perceived potentia
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various venues expire.   Any claim that an independent Live Nation, and not AEG or 
ake sizeable market inroads over the next few years rests on additional 
spe
hich by its nature 
tate of 
ing the Supreme Court, 
have repeatedly ruled out the imposition of liability based upon “uncabined 
206 207 208  Instead, as the 
mergers 
rts have placed 
particular emphasis on these considerations when assessing claims that mergers eliminate 
lied on these 
204
Veritix, will m
culation. 
 Some speculation is an inevitable part of merger analysis, w
requires courts and enforcement agencies to make predictions about the s
competition after the transaction.205  Nonetheless, courts, includ
speculation”  “ephemeral possibilities,”  or “remote possibilities.”
Supreme Court said more than four decades ago, Section 7 bans only those 
where the anticompetitive effect is “probable.”209  Not surprisingly, cou
competition that has not yet occurred.210  Indeed, at least one court has re
204 See supra note 170 and accompanying text (explaining that most distrib
agreements between Ticketmaster and various venues wi
ution 
 next three to 
stream 
Act is with 
 1045, 1051 
ies are not 
. Falstaff, 410 U.S. 
g)).
g with ephemeral 
 to be proscribed by 
this Act”); id. at n. 39 (citing legislative history to this effect); Tenet Health, 186 F.3d at 
1051 (Clayton Act “deals in probabilities, not ephemeral possibilities”).  See also
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, § 
0.1 (“Throughout the Guidelines, the analysis is focused on whether consumers or 
producers ‘likely would’ take certain actions.”). 
210 See Tenneco, 689 F.2d at 354 (rejecting government’s invocation of the actual 
potential competition doctrine for reliance upon “speculation” and “ephemeral 
ll expire over the
six years). Cf. 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines § 3.3 (providing that down
integration can facilitate entry into a new market). 
205 See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323 (concern of Section 7 of the Clayton 
“probabilities, not certainties”). 
206 See British Oxygen Co. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1977). 
207 See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323; FTC v. Tenet Health Care, 186 F.3d
(8th Cir. 1999); British Oxygen, 557 F.2d at 28. 
208 See Marine Bancorp., Inc., 418 U.S.  623, n. 22 (“[R]emote possibilit
sufficient to satisfy the test set forth in § 7.”) (quoting United States v
526, 555 (1972) (Marshall, J. concurrin
209 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323 (“[N]o statute was sought for dealin
possibilities.  Mergers with a probable anticompetitive effect were
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admonitions when rejecting the claim—like that made here—that a merging party’s 
re-merger 
211 n the 
etition” require a showing that future entry by one 
of t
irreplaceably
influential competitor but for this merger rests on the sort of unjustified speculation that 
 segment, the 
ct of other entrants, 
 on Live Nation, 
petitive
le ge to Ticketmaster seems to lack the factual grounding in objective reality that 
courts have repeatedly required (and often found wanting) when evaluating analogous 
market share understated its competitive significance because it had p
expansion plans.   Some courts have even suggested that claims based o
elimination of “actual potential comp
he merging firms was “almost certain.”212
 The claim that Live Nation would have become a particularly and 
courts have rejected.  Given Live Nation’s very limited track record in this
established records and capabilities of other participants, the prospe
and the lack of apparent structural features conferring unique advantages
any prediction that Live Nation would pose a unique and substantial com
chal n
claims.213
nt’s reliance upon 
t”).
n pre-merger 
e such an 
an the 
ility and 
iring “clear 
of the Clayton 
f that the firm 
would in fact have entered” such that preventing merger will lead to future entry “[g]iven 
the less than overwhelming case for prohibition to begin with”); id. at 1386 (advocating 
requirement that such future entry was “certain”). 
213 See Tenneco, 689 F.2d at 354; British Oxygen, 557 F.2d at 28-30; Atl. Richfield Co.,
549 F.2d at 300 (declining to ban merger that purportedly reduced potential competition 
because there were several other possible entrants as well); Hughes Tool, 415 F. Supp. at 
646 (same).  See also Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
possibilities”); British Oxygen, 557 F.2d at 28-30 (rejecting governme
“uncabined speculation” and “wholly speculative . . . 'eventual entry' tes
211 See AMAX, Inc., 402 F. Supp. at 960 (rejecting government’s reliance o
expansion plans to inflate merging parties’ competitive significance becaus
approach would “ask that this court adopt ‘ephemeral possibilities’ rather th
‘probability’ which § 7 requires”) (citations omitted). 
212 See Siemens, 621 F. 2d at 506 (requiring “at least” a reasonable probab
“preferably clear proof”); Atl. Richfield Co., 549 F.2d at 294-95, 300 (requ
proof”). See also Donald F. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 
Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1384 (arguing for requirement of “clear proo
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Horizontal Efficiencies Resulting from the Merger 
any
f the merger, 
ments would yield 
he consolidation of their 
tick le.
 Like most information technology services, there are probably some scale 
re interesting 
ketmaster, the 
de services of 
operate on its 
own.  Certainly, it is possible that Ticketmaster, a historically successful distributor, has 
certain capabilities that Live Nation, a relative a newcomer to ticket distribution, does 
not.214 that Internet 
widespread and 
commoditized, then any one company’s technological advantage would be limited.   
echnology
re likely to have capabilities that other companies cannot duplicate, even 
 Although Live Nation and Ticketmaster claim that their merger will create m
efficiencies, these efficiencies will likely result from the vertical elements o
discussed in Part IV, infra.  It is less certain whether the horizontal ele
any substantial efficiencies that are directly attributable to t
eting distribution services, but some efficiencies might be possib
economies in ticket distribution.  If scale efficiencies are nontrivial, then consolidation 
would avoid duplicative investments and could yield some savings.  A mo
possibility for horizontal efficiencies is that the merger would enable Tic
accomplished technology company, to handle ticket distribution and provi
higher quality and at lower costs than what Live Nation could build and 
  However, this argument is in tension with the growing evidence 
technologies are easy to acquire.  If the underlying technology really is 
 We suspect the truth lies somewhere in the middle.  Accomplished t
companies a
78 HARV. L. REV. at 1382 (“Unless a firm possesses unique capabilities, its preparation to 
enter a market by internal expansion suggests that the market presents attractive 
opportunities that at least one other firm will be likely to seek, also by internal expansion 
if necessary.”).  
214 Because Ticketmaster is the recognized industry leader and purportedly enjoys these 
efficiencies already, these particular efficiencies would be “merger specific.”  Live 
Nation could not realize them by, say, merging with a different entity. 
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when the market’s technological demands are not great, and this suggests that ticket 
erger than 
rse venues, 
veal that the venues’ 
r costs they 
e technologies 
themselves.  Accordingly, if any horizontal efficiencies are possible, they either are 
modest or they are easily swa
erger with the 
phistication,
Service providers also range from full-service ticket distributors to providers 
ough we lack 
ity tests for market 
wide variation in services offered and that 
ion. . 
 self-distribute their 
asingly 
 shares, 
ppears to be 
rket
 share, but most 
ively 
significant.
4. Even under narrow market definitions in which Ticketmaster and Live Nation 
enjoy large market shares, the ease and attractiveness of vertical integration as 
well as the nature of rivalry within the ticketing market prevents Ticketmaster, 
or any other ticket distributor, from exercising market power and charging 
supracompetitive prices.  This critical determination hinges on precisely how 
distribution for Live Nation events would occur more efficiently with the m
without it.  However, the proliferation of self-distribution strategies by dive
most of which do not have track records as technology companies, re
vertical integration strategies generate efficiencies that exceed whateve
encounter (and otherwise could save from outsourcing) by pursuing th
mped by the efficiencies from vertical integration. 
Summary
 We close this analysis of the horizontal elements of the proposed m
following preliminary conclusions: 
1. Venues that purchase ticket distribution services vary in size, so
and needs, and service providers accordingly present a menu of offerings.  
of technology that enables self-distribution. Subsequently, alth
sufficient information to conduct the required cross-elastic
definition, we observe that there is 
defining a distinct product market is a difficult determinat
2. The technology required for large and smaller venues to
tickets is becoming increasingly available, and venues are incre
vertically integrating into ticket distribution. 
3. Under most characterizations of market participants and market
Ticketmaster enjoys a large market share, such that the market a
moderately or highly concentrated.  Live Nation, under some ma
characterizations, has a much smaller but still sizable market
or all of its output is captive and thus is unlikely to be competit
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easy and attractive vertical integration is for large venues.  M
venues appear to solicit bids from multiple providers, there
focused
oreover, because 
 are moments of 
competition that dull any advantage of incumbency or historical 
ketmaster and 
utors is unlikely to produce anticompetitive harm 
cognizable under the antirust laws because the market is apparently behaving 
6. Any horizontal efficiencies produced by this merger appear to be modest. 
market share. 
5. The elimination of Live Nation as a potential competitor to Tic
other ticket distrib
in a competitive manner. 
IV.  Analysis of Merger’s Vertical Consequences
 Although the proposed Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger has some
horizontal elements, the companies’ core businesses lie in differen
Accordingly, the transaction is more accurately described as a primarily ve
resulting in the integration of successive stages of the process of producing
over the past three decades, the antitrust enforcement agencies have chall
handful of the thousands of vertical mergers that have occurred in the 
very few p
 important 
t market segments.  
rtical merger, 
 and 
delivering entertainment to the consumer.  There is a broad consensus among economists 
and legal scholars that vertical mergers only very rarely pose competitive risks.   Indeed, 
enged only a 
United States, and 
rivate challenges during this period have been successful.215  Such consistency 
among scholars, policymakers, and courts reveal a recognition that vertical mergers are 
 or protect motivated primarily by efficiency concerns, rather than efforts to acquire
market power. 
215 See, e.g, Alberta Gas Chems. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours, 826 F.2d 1235, 1244-46 
(3d Cir. 1987) (summarizing law governing vertical mergers); Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 
603 F.2d 345, 351-359 (2d Cir. 1979) (rejecting challenge to vertical merger); Crouse-
Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 416, 428-34 (same); Crane Co. v. Harsco 
Corp., 509 F. Supp. 115, 125-26 (D. Del. 1981) (same).   
 80 
Nonetheless, some critics of the Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger claim that 
us 
merger, we 
ubstantial 
hat have convinced Live 
o the 
procompetitive motivations that underlie the use of exclusive contracts between ticket 
ting those 
master merger 
but not limited 
iew the major 
ects of the transaction will produce anticompetitive harm, and 
we find them to rest on speculative predictions of harm that are generally implausible in 
light of the industry’s structure.
coordination, by 
rocess, where 
n, all business 
firms are “vertically integrated,” in the sense that they perform tasks by two or more 
actors who might otherwise operate as independent market actors and cooperate together 
by contract.  Even the child’s corner lemonade stand can exemplify such integration–if 
the child produces the lemonade (instead of buying lemonade on the market) and then 
distributes it at retail.  Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase first famously observed that markets 
vertical integration between these two particular firms will produce vario
anticompetitive consequences.  In reviewing the vertical aspects of this 
identify many reasons to believe that the merger will more likely result in s
transactional efficiencies.  Indeed, the efficiency considerations t
Nation and Ticketmaster to now seek vertical integration are analogous t
distributors, as the Department of Justice apparently concluded after investiga
practices during the 1990s.  Furthermore, the proposed Live Nation-Ticket
reflects the industry’s general trend towards vertical integration, including 
to the integration of venue ownership and ticket distribution.  We lastly rev
arguments that vertical asp
The Evolving Economic and Legal Treatment of Vertical Integration 
 Broadly conceived, “vertical integration” entails any conscious 
contract or ownership, of two or more successive stages of the production p
“production” can include the provision of services or goods.  By definitio
 81 
and firms are merely alternative mechanisms to organize economic activity,216 and this 
ics.  When 
 economic 
h, remarked 
ition in a ‘market’ 
 for a far more complicated continuum,”218 they were 
repeating Coase’s prescient insight. 
olars 
 integration 
 taking control of a 
h integration could 
s for 
distributing their products, thereby creating a “clog on competition” to the ultimate 
detriment of downstream consumers.219  A classic example was the merger between the 
Brown Shoe Company—a shoe manufacturer—and Kinney Shoe Co., which 
analytical lens has deeply penetrated the fields of both law and econom
Richard Posner stated that “[v]ertical integration is a universal feature of
life,”217 and Frank Easterbrook, shortly before his appointment to the benc
that “[t]he dichotomy between cooperation inside a ‘firm’ and compet
is just a convenient shorthand
Still, several decades ago, courts, the enforcement agencies, and legal sch
were quite hostile to vertical integration, despite its ubiquity, whether such
occurred by merger, internal expansion, or long-term contract.  By
new stage of the process of production or distribution, it was said, suc
“foreclose” rivals from particular upstream inputs or downstream channel
216 See Coase, supra note 121, at 389 (“It can, I think, be assumed that the distinguishing 
mark of the firm is the supersession of the price m hanism.”).  ec
217 See generally Jack Walters & Sons v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 
1984) (Posner, J.) (“Vertical integration is a universal feature of economic life . . . .  A 
common type of vertical integration is for a manufacturer
698 (7th Cir. 
 to take over the distribution of 
his own product.”); id. at 698. 
218 Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984).  To be fair, 
this remark (like Bork’s, supra note 230) embraces an approach that began with Ronald 
Coase’s seminal article, The Nature of the Firm, supra note 121, and predated TCE. 
219 See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 324 (invoking these metaphors when condemning a 
vertical merger); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1940) (invoking 
these metaphors when condemning exclusive dealing agreements).   
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manufactured shoes and also owned four hundred shoe stores throughout the country.220
ably “force” 
als from access to 
 various 
 courts and the 
e
“inhospitality tradition,” in which vertical arrangements, including vertical mergers, were 
s.222
 Although judicial and administrative hostility, or inhospitality, to vertical 
the time,223
After purchasing Kinney, the government argued, Brown would presum
Kinney stores to stock Brown Shoes, thereby foreclosing its riv
Kinney’s stores, which had, before the merger, stocked shoes from
manufacturers.221  This approach dominated antitrust analysis by
enforcement agencies, giving rise to what subsequently became known as th
suspected to have monopoly motivations and anticompetitive consequence
integration might have made sense given the state of economic science at 
220 See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 302-304 (reporting that Kinney owned 40
which sold about 1.6 percent of the nation’s shoes). 
221 See id. at 304 (finding that, after the merger, Brown supplied 7.9 perc
sold at Kinney stores); id. at 334 (banning merger because of “trend towar
integration in the shoe industry, when combined with Brown’s avowed po
its own shoes upon its retail subsidiaries, may foreclose competition from a substantial 
share of the markets for men’s, women’s and children’s shoes, without prod
countervailing competitive, economic or social advantages.”).  See also F
Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 31
0 shoe stores 
ent of the shoes 
d vertical 
licy of forcing 
ucing any 
TC v. Brown 
6, 320-21 (1966) (finding that a quasi-exclusive dealing agreement 
 of the Sherman 
ction 5 of the FTC 
 the policy of 
in the open 
f prohibited 
ision, was 
ons not 
 of antitrust law.”  
Alan J. Meese, Raising Rivals’ Costs: Can the Agencies Do More Good Than Harm?, 12 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 241, 260 (2003). n.98 (quoting Donald F. Turner, Some Reflections 
on Antitrust, 1966 N.Y. St. B.A. Antitrust L. Symp. 1, 1–2 (1966)). 
223 See JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 381 (1959) (“The trained observer 
tends to form a considerable suspicion from casual observation that there is a good deal 
of vertical integration which, although not actually uneconomical, is also not justified on 
the basis of any cost savings.  This is apparently true in particular of the integration of 
involving 1% of the nation’s shoe retailers offended the “central policy
Act” and thus constituted an “unfair trade practice” in violation of Se
Act); Dictograph Prod, Inc. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1954) (“It is
the Congress that [the defendant’s] merchandise must stand on its own feet 
market . . . without the competitive  advantage to be obtained by the use o
exclusionary agreements.”). 
222 Donald Turner, then head of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Div
famously quoted to have said, “I approach territorial and customer restricti
hospitably in the common law tradition, but inhospitably in the tradition
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economic theory has advanced significantly since the 1950s and views the causes and 
inent
fession has 
m and other 
onomists and 
t rvice) is best 
understood as an effort to economize on what Coase dubbed “transaction costs.”225  By 
ight 
consequences of vertical integration much more sympathetically.  In what one prom
economist has properly characterized as a scientific revolution, the pro
completely reconceptualized the theoretical rationale for the business fir
forms of vertical integration.224  Building on Coase’s original insight, ec
others have recognized that vertical integration (“making” a produc  or se
making instead of buying a product, Coase said, a firm could avoid these costs and m
f the 
 than a reduction 
ost Economics,
etic paradigm 
 thought to be 
UTIONS OF 
ation [under 
tion were 
abor is Limited By 
nomic theory 
firm does – 
ol shared the 
ies. See Robert H. 
, 200 (1954) 
t one level, or . 
mple of such 
l production, which 
ECONOMIC 
7 (1959); 
deed, as early as 
o this as a “stock” example of a technological 
determinant of vertical integration.  See George J. Stigler, The Extent and Bases of 
Monopoly, 32 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 22 (1942) (“[T]he stock example [of vertical 
integration producing economies] is the hot strip mill.”). 
224 See Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting  Antitrust, 76 GEO. L.J. 271, 274 (1986) 
(contending that Transaction Cost Economics and resulting reconception of the economic 
origins of vertical integration  was manifestation of a “genuine scientific revolution”). 
225 See Coase, supra note 121, at 390-92. 
distributive facilities by manufacturing firms.  In most cases the rationale o
integration is evidently the increase of market power of the firms rather
in cost.”). See also Oliver E. Williamson, Technology and Transaction C
10 J. ECON. BEH. & ORG. 355, 356 (1988) (asserting that under, price-theor
extant in the 1940s, 50s and 60s, “the ‘natural’ boundaries of the firm were
defined by engineering considerations.”); WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTIT
CAPITALISM, at 7-8 (“The prevailing orientation toward economic organiz
price theory] was that technological features of firm and market organiza
determinative.”); id. at 23-26, 86-89; George Stigler, The Division of L
the Extent of the Market, 59 J. POL. ECON. 185, 185 (1951) (stating that eco
has “generally treated as a (technological?) datum the problem of what the 
what governs its range of activities or functions.”).  Even the Chicago scho
belief that vertical integration produced only technological efficienc
Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157
(describing the benefits of vertical integration as “bypassing a monopoly a
. . enabling the achievement of internal efficiencies”).  The stock exa
technological efficiencies was the integration of iron-making and stee
supposedly produced efficiencies by eliminating the need to reheat iron before feeding it 
into a steel furnace.  See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND
PERFORMANCE, 70 (1970); JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 156-5
CARL KAYSEN & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY, 120 (1959).   In
1942, George Stigle ould refer tr w
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reduce its overall cost of production.226
omic actors to 
me scholars 
tion, are efficiency 
estments and the 
resulting vulnerability to post-transaction opportunism.    Others additionally 
recognized that vertical integration enabled coordinated adaptation and production that 
 Several decades later, scholars rediscovered Coase’s insight and proceeded to 
identify a much wider range of “transaction costs” that might induce econ
forgo reliance on market organization in favor of firms.227  For example, so
argued that committed vertical arrangements, including vertical integra
responses to transacting in the presence of relationship-specific inv
228
226 See id. at 390 (“The main reason why it is profitable to establish a fi
be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism.”). 
227 Major contributions include: OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMI
OF CAPITALISM (1985); Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford, & Armen Alc
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process
rm would seem to 
C INSTITUTIONS
hian, Vertical
, 21 J.L. &
CO f Production: Market 
Bork, The Rule of 
LE L.J. 373 
L. & Econ. 86 
 Barak 
onomics and 
an & Jeffrey T. 
pirical Research in the 
r s, Courts, and 
4 COLUM. L.
05);
 Crawford, & Armen Alchian, Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents, And The Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
297 (1978); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, 20-40, 82-105 (1975).
See also Oliver E. Williamson, The Logic of Economic Organization, 4 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 65 (1988) (articulating mainstream view regarding rediscovery of Coase’s insight);
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, at 31-32 (explaining 
that, where asset specificity is absent, discrete market contracting functions well despite 
bounded rationality and opportunism). 
E N. 297 (1978); Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration o
Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112 (1971); Robert H. 
Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YA
(1965); Lester G. Telser, Why Do Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.
(1960).
   The instant authors have also contributed to this literature.  See e.g.
Richman, The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Ec
Concerted Refusals to Deal, 95 VA. L. REV. 325 (2009); Barak D. Richm
Macher, “Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Em
Social Sciences,” Business and Politics (2008); Barak D. Richman, Fi m
Reputation Mechanisms: Towards A Positive Theory of Private Ordering 10
REV. 2328 (2004);   Alan J. Meese, Exclusive Dealing, Raising Rivals Costs and the 
Theory of the Firm: Toward a New Synthesis, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 371 (20
Monopolization, Exclusion and the Theory of the Firm, 89 MINN. L. REV. 743 (2005); 
Price Theory, Competition and the Rule of Reason, 2003 ILL. L. REV. 77. 
228 See Benjamin Klein, Robert
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market relationships could not produce.   All of these arguments rested upon the 
istic markets can invite certain market failures that 
ver
ng antitrust 
s vertical 
an instance of 
replacing a market transaction with administrative direction because the latter is believed 
230
 to partial and 
dly rejected 
g” rivals from access 
to inputs or channels of distribution.232  Instead these courts have adopted a much more 
flexible and multi-factored approach that focus the inquiry on whether the vertical 
229
assumption that transacting in atom
tical arrangements arise to correct.
 Antitrust doctrine has properly followed suit.  Prodded by leadi
scholars (Robert Bork once remarked that “[w]hat antitrust law perceives a
merger, and therefore as a suspect and probably traumatic event, is merely 
to be a more efficient method of coordination” ), the Supreme Court and lower courts 
have relaxed numerous doctrines from the inhospitality era that were hostile
complete integration.231  Beginning in the late 1970s, courts have repeate
arguments that challenged mergers injure competition by “foreclosin
229 See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPI
(1985).
230 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 227 (1978).  Bork is sig
expansive than Williamson, remarking that “Antitrust’s concern with vert
mistaken. . . . The vertical mergers the law currently outlaws have no effec
creation of efficiency.” Id. at 226. 
TALISM
nificantly more 
ical mergers is 
t other than the 
7) (reversing 
522 U.S. 3 
Jefferson Parish 
. 2 (1985) (significantly increasing nature and 
quantum of market power necessary to establish requisite element of tying case); Cont’l 
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (reversing per se ban on exclusive 
territories and location clauses). 
232 See Alberta Gas Chems., 826 F.2d at 1244-46; Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 
(2d Cir. 1979); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, 518 F. Supp. 416 (N.D.N.Y 1980); Crane 
v. Harsco Corp., 509 F. Supp. 115, 125-26 (D. Del. 1981). See also United States v. 
Loew’s, Inc., 882 F. 2d 29 (2d Cir. 1989). 
231 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (200
96 year ban on minimum resale price maintenance); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 
(1997) (reversing 28 year ban on maximum resale price maintenance); 
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S
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arrangements meaningfully enshrine or expand market power.   Applying this test, 
es in which the 
, supported, 
duce competitive 
erning vertical 
n -horizontal 
mergers are less likely than horizontal mergers to create competitive problems.”235
ilarly declined to condemn vertical integration in evaluating claims that a 
single firm has “monopolized” the market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act.236
233
courts have routinely rejected challenges to vertical mergers, even in cas
vertical foreclosure was several times that which had, in previous decades
along with other factors, a finding that the merger would probably pro
harm.234  At the same time, government enforcement guidelines gov
mergers reflected this new learning as well, expressly noting that “ on
Courts have sim
233 See Fruehauf, 603 F.2d at 353 (instructing courts to examine, among o
the “nature and economic purpose of the arrangement, the likelihood a
foreclosure, the extent of concentration of buyers and sellers in the i
cost required to enter the market, the market share needed by a buyer or sel
a profitable level of production (sometimes referred to as ‘scale economy’), the existence 
of a trend toward vertical concentration or
ther factors, 
nd size of market 
ndustry, the capital 
ler to achieve 
whether the 
To these 
d by the 
ngth of competing suppliers and purchasers.”); see also HTI Health 
 Miss. 1997) 
 merger that 
rging parties);  
d Section 7 
ure).
ph continued 
,” available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/07RoundtableonVerticalMergers.pdf (noting
that “vertical mergers merit a stronger presumption of being efficient than do horizontal 
mergers, and should be allowed to proceed except in those few cases where convincing, 
fact-based evidence relating to the specific circumstances of the vertical merger indicates 
likely competitive harm”). 
236 See Belfiore v. N.Y. Times, 826 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1987) (rejecting claim that vertical 
integration by a monopolist offended Section 2 of the Sherman Act despite negative 
 oligopoly in the industry, and 
merger will eliminate potential competition by one of the merging parties.  
factors may be added the degree of market power that would be possesse
enterprise and the stre
Servs., Inc. v. Quorum Health Group, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1104, 1136 (S.D.
(articulating the same factors). 
234 See Fruehauf, 603 F. 2d at 358-59 (rejecting FTC challenge to vertical
foreclosed rivals from selling 5.8% of the market’s output to one of the me
Crane Co., 509 F. Supp. at 125 (rejecting claim that vertical merger violate
despite 8.8% foreclos
235 See Department of Justice 1984 Merger Guidelines § 4.0.  This paragra
“they are not invariably innocuous.” See also “Roundtable Submission
 87 
 These are not, it should be emphasized, recent or untested developments, but 
ent agencies 
 years ago that Judge 
Ric by noting: 
egory under 
ons—that is, 
arket or to 
way it goes, 
been using a 
er to do the 
on services.  
 a computer 
service, it is 
s.  Vertical integration is a 
ife and it would be absurd to make it a 
suspect category under the antitrust laws just because it may hurt suppliers 
Although vertical integration is often used to denote the merger of two economic 
entities in sequential markets, it more accurately refers to a sp  of relationships that 
integration—
which includes mergers and acquisitions—is at one end of this spectrum with spot-market 
238
middle.  The 
instead principles that are now fundamental to how courts and the enforcem
approach vertical integration.  Indeed, it was more than twenty-five
hard Posner summarized the state of scholarship and antitrust law 
Vertical integration is not an unlawful or even a suspect cat
the antitrust laws: ‘Firms constantly face ‘make or buy’ decisi
decisions whether to purchase a good or service in the m
produce it internally—and ordinarily the decision, whichever 
raises no antitrust question.’ . . . .When a corporation that has 
law firm to handle a particular type of litigation hires a lawy
litigation in house, it is vertically integrating into litigati
When a law firm that has been buying a billing service from
time-sharing firm buys its own computer to perform the
vertically integrating into computer service
universal feature of economic l
of the service that has been brought within the firm.237
Scrutiny of Ticketmaster’s Vertical Agreements 
ectrum
spans a diverse array of organizational arrangements.  Complete vertical 
transactions at the other, and a variety of intermediate forms, or “hybrid”
arrangements that reflect assorted levels of partial integration, occupy the 
 692 (8th Cir. 1984) (en
984) (Posner, 
J.) (quoting Univ. Life Ins. Co. of America v. Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 
1983)).
238 Oliver Williamson employed this term to describe arrangements that lie between the 
“polar modes” of atomistic markets, on the on hand, and “hierarchy,” (complete vertical 
integration), on the other. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF 
GOVERNANCE, 104 (1996) (“hybrid” modes of economic organization include “various 
forms of long-term contracting, reciprocal trading, regulation, franchising, and the like”). 
impact on firm’s dealer); Paschall v. Kan. City Star Co., 727 F.2d
banc) (same). 
237 See Jack Walters & Sons v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1
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category of partially integrated hybrids includes long term contracts, exclusive contracts, 
putational effects, joint ventures, cross-ownership, and an 
asso
rs of ticket 
clusive
ents.  Both in the 
past and recently, the exclusivity of these contracts has drawn some antitrust ire from 
e contracts of this 
secure incumbent 
ave
hat the 
 share and stifled 
entry possibilities from potential and smaller competitors.241  Such critics therefore argue 
that Ticketmaster’s use of exclusive contracts is anticompetitive and amounts to an 
antitrust violation. 
ns of anticompetitive conduct, most notably from Pearl Jam, caused the 
tracting practices 
repeated interactions with re
rtment of other arrangements.   
Ticketmaster (as well as, we believe, other outsourced provide
distribution services) sells its ticket distribution services to venues under ex
contracts,239 which are a species of partially integrated hybrid arrangem
commentators and attention from some antitrust enforcers.  Exclusiv
kind, especially if extended for long periods of time, can sometimes 
firms with monopoly power against competitive entry by rivals and thus h
anticompetitive consequences.240  Some Ticketmaster critics have alleged t
company’s use of exclusive contracts has enshrined its leading market
Accusatio
Department of Justice to launch an investigation into Ticketmaster’s con
239 See supra, Part II. 
240 See, e.g., United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 200 ive 
vertical agreements by a market leader were also found to violate Sectio
States v. Microsoft, Inc., 253 
5).  Exclus
n 2 in United
F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam), but the 
Microsoft court was particularly concerned about how exclusive agreements might 
combine with the network externalities of the operating system market to lock in an 
inferior technological standard.  Network externalities of this sort do not appear to be 
present in the market for ticket distribution services.
241 Balto Testimony, supra note 151, at 1 (“Ticketmaster’s monopoly power is preserved 
through a series of exclusionary arrangements that diminish the potential for rivals to 
arise and challenge the monopoly.”) 
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in 1994, but the investigation was closed the following year without any finding of 
242
st Division 
 used for ticket 
signate a single 
 assurances to 
induce the distributor to make valuable investments in performing its services without 
nwilling or 
best seat 
nd therefore knows 
enabled Ticketmaster (and other distribution companies) to finance investments in 
upgrading a venue’s ticketing facilities.  Without an exclusive distribution period, which 
also tends to appear in contracts negotiated by Ticketmaster’s rivals, the distribution 
companies would be unwilling to sink upfront investments in improving a venue’s 
ith a renewed appreciation for the 
anticompetitive conduct.   It seems likely, as one opponent of the transaction has 
claimed, that the investigation was closed at least in part because the Antitru
recognized that exclusive contracts can yield identifiable efficiencies when
distribution.243  Like other forms of vertical integration, contracts that de
ticket distributor as a venue’s exclusive distributor provide the necessary
fear that a follow-on distributor would exploit those investments.  Consequently, 
Ticketmaster is able to provide certain services that it otherwise would be u
unable to provide.  For example, exclusivity enables distributors to offer “
available” searches, which are only possible if the distributor sells—a
the availability of—all of a performance’s tickets.244  Exclusive arrangements have also 
ticketing infrastructure.245   Courts, in conjunction w
242 U.S. Ends Ticketmaster Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1995, at 
Antitrust Division Statement, (July 5, 1995) 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1995/0264.pdf.
C14. See also 
243 See Balto Testimony, supra note 151, at 1-2.
244 See John Seabrook, The Price of the Ticket, NEW YORKER MAG., Aug. 10 & 17 2009, 
at 34, 39 (with the exclusive right to sell tickets to a particular event, “Ticketmaster could 
offer fans the best available seats, no matter where they purchased tickets”). 
245 See Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford and Armen Alchian, Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 298-
302, 302-307 (1978). Cf. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 22 (1979) (fact that 
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efficiencies of restrictive vertical contracts and vertical integration, have long recognized 
that ex 246
gements do limit a 
y body of 
mpetitive 
rrent array of 
exclusive contacts does not cause antitrust harm.  A significant number of such contracts 
et distributors 
rs to be a 
so small 
ently, it is 
 arrangements 
to block entry to the market.   Although a venue might encounter some switching costs 
when initiating a new contract with a different ticket distributor, there do not appear to be 
he ticketing 
s
clusive dealing arrangements can produce these and similar efficiencies.
Despite the efficiencies from exclusive contracts, such arran
potential competitive threat from rivals, so a complete evaluation of an
exclusive contracts would have to weigh the efficiencies against the antico
consequences.  There is reason to believe, however, that Ticketmaster’s cu
expire each year, and venues regularly invite bids from alternative tick
before considering renewing with Ticketmaster.  Moreover, there appea
relatively modest minimum viable scale for providing distribution services,
entrants do not require large volumes to offer profitable services.  Consequ
likely difficult for any monopolist in ticket distribution to employ exclusive
247
any network externalities that would enable a hypothetical monopolist in t
business to enjoy cost advantages over entrants, nor are there interoperability concern
censes militated 
 1898) (Taft, J.), 
 sleeping car 
xclusivity was 
re the necessary investment of capital in the discharge of the duty”). 
247 See IIA P. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 421f at 68 (1995) (“[A]ll customers 
might contract to buy exclusively from incumbents and yet allow effective entry if 20 
percent of the contracts expire monthly or even annually.”).  Cf. Gilbarco, Inc. v. Omega 
Envtl., Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1162-64 (9th Cir. 1997) (no chance that exclusive dealing 
contracts could foreclose competition among manufacturers for distributors where 
contracts were of relatively short duration and manufacturers could offer dealers better 
terms upon expiration). 
smaller performing rights societies had also adopted so-called blanket li
against their automatic condemnation). 
246 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 287 (6th Cir.
aff’d 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (explaining that railroad could confer upon
company the exclusive right to provide railroad such cars and that such e
necessary “to secu
 91 
that create an industry-wide lock-in effect.   Perhaps most significant, switching and 
-
ontracts expire, and 
ot appear to have 
s from 
Ticketmaster and its rivals.   For these reasons, a court evaluating a rival’s claim that 
t to accommodate their 
mpetition, but for the mutual economic benefit of both 
com  which no antitrust 
inferences may be drawn.”
However important it might be that Ticketmaster’s current use of exclusive 
contracts does little to stifle entry and competition, the more important observation is that 
 of partial integration 
248
negotiation costs evidently did not prevent a number of venues, including Live Nation 
itself, from leaving one distributor and selecting a new one or choosing self
distribution.249  Ticketmaster regularly loses clients as the exclusive c
the exclusive contracts—either individually or collectively—do n
deterred entry by firm  hoping to wrest ticket distribution business away 
250
Ticketmaster’s use of exclusive agreements foreclosed competition ruled that providers 
of ticket distribution services use “the long term exclusive contrac
customers’ desires, to their mutual benefit…. [the] exclusive contract is not for the 
purpose of excluding co
petitors. It is a mutually desired reasonable business practice from
251
these exclusive contracts generate identifiable efficiencies.  This use
248 Cf. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F. 3d 34, 54-56 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc)
ability
 erected barriers to entry for 
r Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,240-41 (describing vigorous 
competition between providers of ticket distribution services); id. at 96,241(explaining 
that the option of self-distribution via reliance on outside technology providers prevents 
Ticketmaster from exercising market power).    
250 See supra notes 79-111 and accompanying text (listing numerous examples of venues 
that have recently taken on the task of distributing their own tickets).
251 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2003-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 74,013, at 
96,241 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
(per curiam) (affirming district court’s finding that the benefits of interoper
contributed to Microsoft’s operating system monopoly and
new technological paradigms). 
249 See Ticketmaste
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hints at some additional benefits that might accompany the firms’ complete vertical 
Eff
rs with 
ine
ntrality of this 
inquiry highlights that while some mergers are little more than shortcuts towards 
 the other.  Even if economic 
theo ry, an 
ory suggests that 
many efficiency motivations underlie the Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger.  It might 
even be said, as a preliminary matter, that the companies were partially integrated by 
icket distributor.
how exclusivity 
nd services.252
f Ticketmaster 
with Live Nation is likely to create several additional efficiencies that might not be 
erger-specific 
efficiencies, all of which are consistent with economic theory, by themselves offer a 
compelling endorsement of the proposed merger. 
integration.
iciencies from Vertical Integration 
 Even though current antitrust law no longer views vertical merge
suspicion, it still inquires into the “nature and purpose of the agreement” to determ
whether efficiency motivations underlie a particular merger.  The ce
extracting market rents, others are motivated by innovative possibilities and pursuing 
efficiencies, and antitrust demands distinguishing one from
ry tells us that vertical mergers are presumptively in this second catego
efficiency analysis is still a routine element of any antitrust analysis.  
An application of institutional economics and organizational the
contract, when exclusive contracts fixed Ticketmaster as Live Nation’s t
The efficiencies of that partial integration, discussed above, illustrate 
facilitated valuable investments and the development of useful features a
A similarly motivated analysis suggests that the complete integration o
realized in their entirety without complete vertical integration.  These m
252 See supra notes 244-246and accompanying text (discussing efficiencies achieved 
from exclusive contracts). 
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1. Investments in Promotion and Information 
tracts.253  One 
ially effort that is 
e typical 
 investments 
that would enhance the value of collective assets when the rewards from those marginal 
investm
.254
romoters.  The 
 managers, and 
nd other 
products, but each party only receives a fraction of the revenue from each ticket sale.  
Accordingly, each party is not optimally incentivized to invest the resources and effort to 
ced ticket 
a fraction of the 
ng the value 
ning tickets 
and maximally utilize capacity.  Vertical integration is one efficiency response to this 
 management, 
and ticket sales, then it would be incentivized to make appropriate investments that would 
 It is well understood that vertical integration achieves efficiencies when it can 
organize behavior that is effectively beyond the reach of arms-length con
element that frequently is listed as a “noncontractible” is effort, espec
invested to enhance the value of already-sunk investments.   Parties, in th
collective action problem, routinely undersupply effort and other marginal
ents are shared by others.  In other words, when team effort among separate 
economic actors is required to maximize value, value is rarely maximized
 This is precisely the situation that currently confronts concert p
several players along the value chain, including artists, promoters, venue
ticket distributors, all benefit from maximizing revenues from ticket sales a
maximize value for the team.  To be sure, Ticketmaster and other outsour
distributors enjoy a commission for each ticket sold, but this fee is only 
overall cost of the ticket, and thus the distributor (like every other actor alo
chain) is underincentivized to invest in the promotion required to sell remai
coordination problem.  If a single firm is responsible for promotion, venue
253 See, e.g., OLIVER HART, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE NATURE OF THE FIRM (1988).
254 See, e.g., Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982); 
Ilya Segal, Contracting with Externalities, 114 Q.J. ECON. 337 (1999).
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improve efficiency, thus increasing both revenue for the performers and the collective 
welfare of all those in th
iciencies that 
ments.  One 
 unfilled capacity in 
nificant
unutilized capacity and lost income to the venues, promoters, and artists.  One potential 
.  If the returns 
allocated, parties are unlikely to invest the 
req would reap greater 
 Similar coordination problems might be responsible for impeding valuable 
innovations along the value chain.  For example, intensified advertising is only one 
ers might 
 fan base, such that 
ts.  Investments in 
ng information that 
increases capacity, also are vulnerable to a collective action problem that could be 
e principle also applies to other revenue 
sources, such as merchandise sales, that could be enhanced by obtaining better 
information about a fan base.  Because investments in the effort and resources necessary 
e value chain. 
 The live entertainment industry currently shows evidence of ineff
could be reduced by improving incentives to make value-enhancing invest
significant and growing industry-wide challenge, for example, is the
concert halls.255  These empty seats and unpurchased tickets represent sig
solution to reducing excess capacity is to make additional investments in advertising and 
publicity, especially in the form of targeted promotions for specific shows
from such targeted promotion are diffusely
uisite effort and resources.  Alternatively, an integrated promoter 
returns and is more likely to seek greater capacity.  
potential solution to the problem of unsold tickets, described above.  Oth
include investing in marketing research or acquiring information on a
promotional activities could be directed at specific consumer segmen
this sort of research, and any investments in acquiring or distributi
mitigated by vertical integration.  The sam
255 Krueger, supra note 9, at 12. 
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to obtain and disseminate new information are so difficult to specify by contract, vertical 
ed Comcast-Spectacor, attested to these same 
effi
 revenue have been 
nment 
industry, and the Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger has been characterized as an effort to 
mec rties from 
making the necessary investments to appropriate these revenue opportunities. 
2. Cooperative Adaptation to Meet Artists’ Demands, Respond to Market 
city to 
pursue cooperative adaptation.  That is, when unforeseen changed circumstances, 
including those that are common in a rapidly evolving industry, necessitate adjustments 
 facilitate the 
integration arises as a useful mechanism to increase efficiency along a value chain.  Peter 
Luukko, Chairman of vertically integrat
ciencies in his testimony before Congress.256
Decreasing the excess capacity and pursuing new sources of
described as two central challenges that currently confront the live entertai
pursue both opportunities.  Economic theory confirms that vertical integration is one 
hanism that can overcome collective action problems that prevent pa
Changes, & Pursue Innovations 
Another organizational feature that vertical integration exhibits is the capa
by numerous co-venturers, integration with within a single entity can
256 Peter Lukko, President and Chief Operating Officer, Comcast-Spectaco
Statement Before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on th
Subcommittee on Courts and Competition, at 2-3 (Feb. 26, 2009) (“By 
company that owns, manages, and/or operates venues, owns several sports t
other content, and provides its ow
r, L.P., 
e Judiciary, 
being part of a 
eams and 
n ticketing solution and food and beverage services to 
arenas, stadiums and amphitheatres throughout the country, we have the ability to cross-
promote among these different levels in the vertical distribution chain and to touch the 
fan directly at multiple points in his or her sports/entertainment experience. Additionally, 
because we have more assets in some cities like Philadelphia, we have the ability to 
create unique packages to offer to sponsors and fans alike. This is where the industry 
trend is clearly moving—in large part because content providers want to have more direct 
control of the connection to their fans.”). 
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required adaptation.  For these circumstances, vertical integration serves as a more 
efficient org 257
 performances, 
 increasingly 
 vertically 
er media that 
would help them shape their image and disseminate their music.  Such coordinated efforts 
ight be 
ho place value 
rdination of concert promotions, 
mer es to manage these 
Coordinated adaptation would also facilitate a collective reprioritization of 
promotional effort, and thus could also mitigate lost revenues from underutilization of 
able sums for 
ticket sales for 
l
kets258—would have 
s.  This is because 
 and therefore 
cannot specify how ticket distributors should direct consumer inquiries.  Vertical 
anizational form than alternatives.
Given the growing number of parties involved in producing live
coordination might be especially valuable to artists who find themselves
separated from fans as new market segments enter the production chain.  A
integrated infrastructure would give artists access to communication and oth
to promote merchandise, concerts tickets, and other reputational goods m
especially important for artists who target certain distinctive fan bases or w
in managing a particular brand image.  The coo
chandise sales, and other initiatives would enhance artists’ abiliti
activities that are commonly so important to performers. 
capacity in concerts.  Outsourced ticket distributors generally make compar
selling tickets of any sort, so they might not be incentivized to promote 
performances with substantial capacity remaining.  Under these contractua
arrangements, promoters—who feel most of the pain from unsold tic
difficulty directing distributors to promote sales for certain concert
promoters, at the time ticket distribution contracts are signed, do not know
257 See, e.g., CHESTER I. BERNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE (1954). 
258 As discussed above, see supra Part II,  the first dollar revenues generated by a 
performances goes to the band as a “guaranteed advance.”  Only after this guaranteed 
advance is paid does the promoter share in any revenue generated by the performance.   
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integration enables the coordination of promotion efforts along the value chain and could 
er
s by targeting 
gh mechanisms 
 adaptation, 
mstances after activities already commence, is a central 
economic benefit to vertical integration. 
ies.  For 
 ticketing,” in 
lue for a ticket 
r, securing an 
innovative pricing scheme, which would require new contractual relationships between 
artists (and their managers), promoters, venues, and ticket distributors, might require 
ith multiple 
y resisting change 
 such coordinated 
 accordingly 
often pursued by vertically integrated entities.  Although the literature regarding how 
organizations spur innovation is extensive, complicated, and replete with different 
conclusions, certainly it is plausible that innovations such as end-price ticketing and other 
creative reorganizations of ticket pricing would be pursued more effectively by a 
vertically integrated value chain. 
therefore respond effectively to unanticipated market developments and consum
behavior.  Vertically integrated promoters can flexibly adjust to initial sale
shows that have substantial numbers of available tickets, especially throu
that give promoters direct contact with ticket purchasers.  Such coordinated
which responds to changing circu
The ability to coordinate the many actors in the live entertainment value chain 
could also lead to innovations that might generate new revenue opportunit
example, Ticketmaster has said that consumers would prefer “end-price
which ticket purchasers are quoted a single end price rather than a face va
upon which taxes, service fees, and other additions are added.  Howeve
coordination and collective investments that may be difficult to engineer w
parties.  This is especially true if any one party could extort the others b
and holding out for a disproportionate share.  Innovations that require
investments and collaborative information sharing from multiple parties are
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3. Targeted Linkages Between Venues, Entertainers, and Fans
sts with their 
 the possibilities 
 creators of live 
ostly, and 
perhaps impossible, to achieve under the current fragmented industry structure. 
eir fan base.261  This 
nd serve a 
diverse and increasingly mobile fan base. 
d thus less 
The CEOs of both Ticketmaster and Live Nation have stated repeatedly in public 
that the merger’s objective is to develop new and better avenues to link arti
fans.259  These statements of “linkages,” and other statements suggesting
of creating “new content,”260 reflect the perception that connecting the
entertainment with their fans can create desirable activities that are very c
Firms that offer ticket distribution technology advertise that self-distribution
empowers venues with a complete and thorough understanding of th
is even truer for promoters like Live Nation that own numerous venues a
 The information garnered about ticket 
purchasers from Internet sales can facilitate the development of targeted an
259 Michael Rapino, President & Chief Executive Officer, Live Nation, Wr
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy of t
Committee on the Judiciary, CQ Financial Transcripts (Feb. 26, 2009) (“Th
help bring about the reconfiguration we urgently need. . . . Artists would b
itten
he House 
is merger can 
e able to 
ce with new 
ster, supra note 1 
ip of fans to 
velop that bond 
 the House 
company "will 
hance the fan 
ms of entertainment more accessible to everyone"). 
261 http://www.veritix.com/solutions/ticket_event_marketing.aspx (“Veritix offers the 
most advanced marketing and data management tools in the industry, which means you'll 
know more about your customers than ever before”); www.neweratickets.com/why-
net/whynet/you-own-your-data/  ("One of the first steps in marketing success is owning 
your customer data. . . .  New Era Tickets provides a fully integrated and sophisticated 
database marketing product with your ticketing system that helps you use your customer 
data to increase sales."). 
communicate directly with fans, and have the flexibility to experien
approaches to deliver music.”); Press Release, Live Nation & Ticketma
(“There is nothing more magical than the bond and the intimate relationsh
artists. It is truly an experience that needs to be embraced and nurtured with both integrity 
and respect. One of the mandates of the combined company will be to de
to unsurpassed levels.”).
260 Id.; Irving Azoff, Chief Executive Officer, Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., 
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy of
Committee on the Judiciary at 4 (Feb. 26, 2009) (Explaining the merged 
be better able to develop new and innovative products and services that en
experience and make all for
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costly marketing strategies.  Such information about the demands and preferences of a 
262 moters would be 
rest in the 
eir fan base such that 
would
complement their performances.  These interactions not only amount to new goods and 
content; they also create com e
other sources 
many 
tion would seem 
to enable a valuable business platform for marketing multiple sources of content, goods, 
and services.  Perhaps an important question is, if joining these sources of information 
ready entered 
information-sharing agreements to learn from each other’s consumer data and jointly 
oter is 
erally 
fan base also lays the ground work for the promotion of complementary goods and 
services such as recorded music, apparel, and other merchandise.   Pro
able to selectively market products to fans who have expressed specific inte
promoted artists.  Artists too can communicate and interface with th
they can both receive fan feedback and disseminate communications that 
plementarities to the concert experience that enhance th
quality of live performances. 
Information on ticket purchasers would likely enhance the value of 
of consumer information, such as data on music or merchandise sales that 
promoters have.  The synthesis of multiple sources of consumer informa
could be so valuable, why Ticketmaster and Live Nation have not al
launch an e-commerce platform.  Although a merger of the distributor and prom
one way to unite the complementary commercial interests, antitrust law gen
262  Acquiring information on ticket purchasers can easily support parallel revenue 
sources.  The Tessitura Network, for example, offers ticketing software that is tailored for 
the needs of non-profit organizations that produce arts and cultural entertainment.  Its 
software “fully integrate[s] in one database ticketing, fundraising, memberships, 
marketing, reporting, customer relationship management, Web transactions, custom 
capabilities and more.”  See http://www.tessituranetwork.com/Products.aspx.  Tessitura 
offers one illustration of how gathering information on ticket purchasers creates value for 
other organizational objectives.
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requires parties (before claiming merger-specific efficiencies) to first entertain whether 
an alterna
d the venues 
icies that would 
e Ticketmaster’s 
 the merger were 
prohibited it is possible that these contracts would emerge.   However, Internet 
at a 
an Internet 
fining property 
to contract for, 
ilar to the general problem, described 
above, that results in suboptimal promotion) that deters the complete development of a 
useful database of fan preferences and consumer behaviors.   
atform is that a 
tary
r making sunk 
e for an 
alternative distributor.  Mitigating the hazards of such exposure is often difficult to do by 
many risks that 
are difficult to anticipate.  Under such circumstances, vertical integration offers a reliable 
tive that is less restrictive to a merger would achieve the same efficiencies.   
It does seem possible that careful contracts between Ticketmaster an
it services—contracts that carefully define property rights and privacy pol
govern the consumer information for particular fan bases—could enabl
clients to pursue these revenue opportunities absent a merger, and if
263
marketing has consumed e-commerce for nearly a decade, and it is surprising th
successful technology company like Ticketmaster has not developed such 
platform for clients that are highly tuned to emerging markets.  Perhaps de
rights and privacy policies are either noncontractible or extremely costly 
or perhaps there is a collective action problem (sim
Another potential explanation for the lack of an e-commerce pl
Ticketmaster client might fear being beholden to Ticketmaster after proprie
information on its fans is assembled, or conversely, Ticketmaster might fea
investments in acquiring such information only to see a client will then leav
contract given that a contractual solution would have to anticipate a great 
263 Scott Masten, A Legal Basis for the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 181, 194-95 (1988) 
(observing that, in theory, multiple parties can always replicate the activities of the firm 
by entering into, monitoring, and perfectly enforcing multiple contracts). 
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solution.  An integrated entity would not suffer from imprecise property rights or 
entarities of, and the optimal incentives to produce and acquire, such consumer 
info
 not yet 
uld permit, and 
one ready explanation is that contracts could not provide both companies the necessary 
ise of new 
ations, and 
 merger, so one 
rtunities if 
ave.  Vertical integration certainly would enable them to pursue these new 
markets, and there is good reason to suspect that without complete integration they might 
be unattainable. 
ntegration is 
ing across the 
t such an 
industry-wide trend can constitute prima facie evidence that vertical integration generates 
btaining or 
protecting market power are pursuing such integration strategies, this trend is especially 
proprietary concerns over consumer information, and it would assuredly capitalize on the 
complem
rmation. 
In any event, it is curious that two highly successful companies have
managed to construct an e-commerce platform that current technology wo
security from expropriation of property rights or sunk investments.  The prom
content and fan-oriented complementarities seem to be compelling motiv
perhaps more than any other factor are the primary motivation behind the
would expect that the companies would have previously pursued these oppo
they could h
4. Industry-wide Vertical Integration
Perhaps the most convincing evidence of efficiencies from vertical i
that vertical acquisitions and integration strategies appear to be spread
industry.  Antitrust law and the enforcement agencies have recognized tha
substantial efficiencies.264  When, as here, firms without any chance of o
264 Dept. of Justice 1984 Merger Guidelines, § 4.24 (“An extensive pattern of vertical 
integration may constitute evidence that substantial economies are afforded by vertical 
integration.”).
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suggestive that the organizational shift reflects the realization of efficiencies not 
otherwise obtainable via traditiona 265
 is becoming an 
Self-
d companies 
market power) 
justifications.  But recent years have also witnessed an assortment of vertical integration 
ainment closer to their respective fan bases, not just through ticket distribution but 
me examples 
e NHL Colorado 
 Dick’s Sporting 
l company, and 
x Sports 
ore than 2 million 
households across the mountain west and created its own network called 
Altitude Sports & Entertainment.  In 2007, KSE unveiled TicketHorse 
adium, a year 
alanche would 
begin utilizing Veritix’s ticketing platform beginning in July 2009.266
l methods of ticket distribution.
As is discussed extensively in Section III, self-distribution
increasingly popular mechanism for venues to sell tickets to their events.
distribution strategies are being pursued by small and large venues alike, an
advertising the merits of self-distribution offer compelling efficiency (not 
strategies that have brought venues, promoters, sports teams, and other producers of live 
entert
also through broadcasting and an assortment of Internet-based products.  So
include: 
1. Kroenke Sports Entertainment (“KSE”) owns and operates th
Avalanche, NBA Denver Nuggets, MLS Colorado Rapids,
Goods Park stadium, Paramount Theatre, Opera Shop theatrica
the Denver’s Pepsi Center.  In 2004, Kroenke dropped the Fo
Network, which had delivered games of KSE teams to m
(powered by Veritix) as to service all events at KSE’s soccer st
later KSE announced that the Pepsi Center, Nuggets, and Av
265 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Influence, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG
(1988) (competition between economic actors will result in optimal degree 
integration).  
266 See Kroenke Sports Enterprises Extends Deal with Vertix, TicketNews 
2008), available at 
. 33, 39-40 
of vertical 
(July 31, 
tp://www.ticketnews.com/node/3411; Greg Griffin & Robert 
Sanchez, A Look Inside Kroenke’s Empire, Denverpost.com (July 8, 2007), available at 
http://www.denverpost.com/null/ci_6318716.  Kroenke Sports Executive Vice President 
Paul Andrews noted the value of vertical integration when he remarked, “[u]ltimately, we 
want the success or failure of that fan’s experience to begin and end with us . . . .  We can 
get you that ticket to the Rapids game; we can get you inside a great stadium; we can get 
you out of the parking lot quickly after the game; and when you get home, you can watch 
the highlights on TV.” Id.
ht
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2. Comcast-Spectacor is a growing sports and entertainment ventur
includes the Philadelphia Flyers, the Philadelphia 76ers, the AH
Phantoms, the Wachovia Center, and a 24-hour regional spor
network, Comcast SportsNet.  In 2003, Comcast-Spectacor used
enablement solutions to develop New Era Tickets, a full-service
company.  In addition to these ventures, Comcast-Spectacor 
marketing services com
e that 
L Philadelphia 
ts programming 
 Paciolan's 
 ticketing 
also operates two 
panies – Front Row Marketing Services (corporate 
sponsorships) and 3601 Creative Group (full-service marketing 
ted by Major 
February
ent to purchase 
g, allowing fan's 
content,
ll phones.268
ctober 2002, by 
t media company in the Spanish-speaking world, 
and Corporacion Interamericana de Entretenimiento, the leading live 
 U.S. market.  
certs for 
communications agency).267
3. Major League Baseball Advanced Media (“MLBAM”) was crea
League Baseball in 2000 to operate baseball's digital assets.  In 
2005, MLB announced MLBAM had reached an agreem
Tickets.com, which two years later introduced mobile ticketin
to receive ticket bar codes on their cell phones.  MLB.com also offers live-
streaming of all regular season games and other MLB-related 
including services that send content directly to subscribers’ ce
4. OCESA Entretenimiento is a strategic alliance, formed in O
Grupo Televisa, the larges
entertainment company in Latin America, Spain, and the Latin
The deal vertically integrates the ticketing and promotion for con
Televisa's roster of Latino stars.269
267 See http://www.comcast-spectacor.com/CompanyHistory.asp. Comcast-Spectaco
annual summary notes that “the resources of other Comcast-Spectacor co
a synergy that greatly benefits Global Spectrum clients. Whether it’s by c
finding and developing naming rights and evaluating sponsorship opportunities (Front 
r’s
mpanies create[] 
reating events, 
cessions
 out-of-the-box 
ets), Global 
ent Experience, 
ODAY, Dec. 5, 
baseball-
eague Baseball Agrees to 
r Fans,
InternetNews.com, Feb. 15, 2005, available at http://www.Internetnews.com/ec-
news/article.php/3483356.
269 Simeon Tegel, Televisa's CIE stake OK'd, Deal joins ticketing, live entertainment 
businesses, VARIETY, June 26, 2003, available at http://www.variety.com/index.asp? 
layout=print_story&articleid=VR1117888535&categoryid=1237.  The companies state 
that the merger was motivated the prospect of developing new content and 
complimentary products.  See Press Release, Grupo Televisa and CIE Form Strategic 
Row Marketing Services), establishing new revenue sources through con
improvements and upgrades (Ovations Food Services) or engaging in
thinking about new ticketing and technology breakthroughs (New Era Tick
Spectrum maximizes revenue potential and attracts a greater number of visitors at the 
venues it manages.”  Comcast Spectacor:  Providing a Total Entertainm
Annual Summary (2009), at 11. 
268 Jorge L. Ortiz, MLB’s Advanced Media Arm Pulls in Profits, USA T
2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2007-12-04-
online_N.htm; Tim Gray, MLB Acquires Tickets.com: Major L
Purchase the Ticket Seller to Make the Ticket-Buying Process Easier fo
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5. Edgar Bronfman, Jr., CEO of Warner Music Group, suggeste
record label will expand into downstream markets in an expa
market and sell music and music products.  Bronfman said th
taking steps to offer ticketing services, touring, merchandising, f
management, sponsorship, and artist management.  Warner Music also has 
d recently the 
nded effort to 
e company is 
an club 
adopted a “360 strategy” that acquires all revenue streams for an artist’s music 
rights, including ticketing, touring, merchandise, and sponsorship.270
 industry at 
large, but at minimum they illustrate that the Live Nation-Ticketmaster transaction is one 
 live 
 both vibrant and 
et power and 
sortment of 
spite the diversity of 
players moving towards vertical integration, they all seem to state parallel motivations 
and seek the same category of efficiencies in their organizational strategies.
Con ikely to result from a 
Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger. 
tee on 
It is difficult to determine how accurately these developments represent the
of several similar organizational developments in the vertical integration of
entertainment.  It is significant that this trend has included companies in
struggling economic sectors, companies that might plausibly enjoy mark
companies that in all likelihood have little-to-no market power, and an as
strategies that bring performers and content to end-users.  Yet de
sequently, they strongly hint at some of the efficiencies that are l
Addressing Critics of the Live Nation-Ticketmaster Transaction  
 On July 27, Senator Herb Kohl, Chairman of the Senate Subcommit
 and Televisa will 
nment vertical integration model, the 
production and promotion of the best quality concerts, theatrical, family and cultural 
events, as well as the operation of entertainment venues, the sale of entrance tickets, food, 
beverage and souvenirs, and the organization of special, and corporate events.”). 
270 Warner Music Group Corp F1Q08 (Qtr End 12/31/08) Earnings Call Transcript, 
http://seekingalpha.com/article/118835-warner-music-group-corp-f1q08-qtr-end-12-31-
08; Caroline McCarthy, Warner's Bronfman, MySpace's DeWolfe Talk Music,
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-10084715-36.html.
Alliance for Live Entertainment In Mexico (Oct. 18, 2002) (“CIE
benefit from the advantages of the live entertai
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Antitrust, sent a letter to Assistant Attorney General Christine Varney to convey his 
s competition 
271 ilar letter to Assistant 
e of 
sed transaction 
siness managers, 
artists, independent promoters, and music fans in every state are likely to suffer if the 
272 ns of recent opposition to the 
pro mon arguments 
in agency 
ed its ire at 
Ticketmaster.  In 1994, congressional hearings featured Pearl Jam’s testimony decrying 
Ticketmaster’s pricing policies.  These events illustrate the interesting tension between 
mands made on 
e are addressed 
 the consolidation of 
n in the market for 
iencies created in 
this industry by vertical integration, with one letter using “vertically integrated 
belief that the proposed Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger “presents seriou
concerns.”   That same day, Congressman Bill Pascrell sent a sim
Attorney General Varney, signed by fifty of his colleagues in the U.S. Hous
Representatives, that “urge[d] the Justice Department to analyze this propo
closely and with great skepticism” and concluded that “[c]onsumers, bu
merger is allowed to occur.”   These letters were reflectio
posed Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger and articulate the most com
predicting that the merger will lead to anticompetitive consequences.  
This is not the first time that congressional politics has intervened 
merger review and not even the first time congressional politics has focus
proper applications of antitrust law and popular (and often politicized) de
the enforcement agencies. 
Most of the arguments that the letters—and other critics—articulat
in the sections above.  Both letters, for example, express fears that
two current and future competitors will reduce horizontal competitio
ticket distribution services.  Both letters also fail to recognize the effic
271 See Kohl Letter, supra note 4 (asserting that Live Nation “start[ed] a ticketing 
business to compete with Ticketmaster (and as a result sold 5.8 million tickets in the first 
four months of 2009).  If the merger occurs, this direct competition will be lost.”).  
272 Pascrell Letter, supra note 4. 
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entertainment giant” as a pejorative term.   This section focuses on two arguments that 
rations of 
 entity to exploit 
nt economic 
utes these typical claims, and it similarly undermines the two arguments we 
address here. 
med that the 
ion and harm 
tion, it is said, the 
new entity will condition access to Ticketmaster’s ticket distribution services on venues’ 
agreement also to book only Live Nation-promoted acts, thereby foreclosing other 
pro 275 , these critics 
omoters they 
ld essentially amount to what one might call “a theory of 
nder Section 1 of the Sherman 
ve held parties liable for arrangements tha
273
are conveyed in the letters and by other critics yet are not addressed directly by the 
previous sections.  Importantly, these two particular arguments are also ite
common—and mistaken—fears that vertical mergers will enable a new
its presence in one market to create unfair advantages in another.  Curre
theory ref
1. Leveraging Market Power from Ticket Distribution to Concert Promotion 
Critics of the proposed Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger have clai
transaction will empower the merged entity to leverage its monopoly position in the 
market for ticket distribution services to anticompetitively expand its posit
competition in the market for concert promotion.274  After the transac
moters from doing business with these venues.   Put another way
predict that the new entity will be in a position to force venues to replace pr
currently retain with Live Nation. 
 Such conduct wou
prospective tying.”  Tying, of course, is already regulated u
c tA t, and while most ties are lawful, courts ha
273 Kohl Letter, supra note 4.
274 Kohl Letter, supra note 4 (“[I]ndependent concert promoters may find it very difficult 
to attract artists who could otherwise use the vertically integrated Live 
Nation/Ticketmaster for its range of services.”). See also Balto Testimony, supra note 
151.
275 See Balto Testimony, supra note 151. 
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create an undue risk of anticompetitive harm.   So-called “anticompetitive forcing,” that 
 the 
277 t the merged 
obability of such tying, then perhaps it would be appropriate to 
cha
ew entity will 
possess economic power in the ticket distribution market, and therefore is unlikely to be 
279 erged 
ation, such as cross-
 was to bundle 
 artists and 
s not coercively use 
rice of the 
276
is, the use of the seller’s economic power over the tying product to coerce purchase of
tied product, is one such tying violation.   If the evidence indicated tha
entity creates a high pr
llenge it on that basis.278
 However, as is explained in Part III, supra, it is doubtful that the n
able to coerce purchasers of live entertainment promotion.   To be sure, the m
entity would be entitled to reap the benefits flowing from such integr
marketing products, and many of the stated purposes of seeking the merger
goods and services such that multiple revenue streams would accrue to
promoters.280  Such bundling of goods is permissible so long as it doe
market power to force purchases for reasons unrelated to the quality and p
276 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).  Som
arrangements are still deemed to be per se violations.  Id.
277 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14-16 (describing purported harm fro
contracts in this manner).  See also Fortner Enter. v. U.S. Steel, 429 U
(same).    
e tying 
m such tying 
.S. 610 (1977) 
s determination 
ealing between 
tial suppliers to 
18 F. Supp. 416, 
mine whether vertical 
demnation).  
ation Merger,
 venue operators that 
Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger would not suppress competition in promotion market 
and that promoters would still bring live entertainment to small venues); cf. Jefferson 
Parish, 466 U.S. at 26-29 (holding that 30 percent share of the relevant market did not 
constitute economic power sufficient to establish per se tying violation).
280 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (describing the heightened economic 
significance of developing, and the corresponding plans to develop, Internet platforms to 
jointly market and distribute concert tickets with accompanying merchandise). 
278 Cf. FTC v. Consol. Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965) (affirming FTC’
that merger violated Section 7 because it resulted in probable reciprocal d
the remaining firm and its customers, thereby disadvantaging other poten
these same customers).   See also Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 5
442-43 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (applying such a framework to deter
transaction would result in a propensity of tying that would justify its con
279 See On the Case: DOJ Quizzes Live Venues about Ticketmaster-Live N
BILLBOARD, Aug. 22, 2009 (reporting confidence of several small
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products offered.   But the mere prospect of bundled sales does not implicate the 
possible only from the exercise of coercion that the merged 
enti 282
be would make little 
icket
opoly by subsidizing 
inefficient entry into the promotion market.  Rudimentary industrial organization 
economics instruct that a monopolist’s profit-maximizing strategy is to market its 
281
Clayton Act.  A violation is 
ty does not seem to have.
 More fundamentally, the sort of conduct these critics descri
economic sense.  Assuming the merged entity has monopoly power in the t
distribution market, it would be diluting the profitability of that mon
281 See Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2
large firm does not violate § 2 [of the Sherman Act] simply by reaping the com
rewards attributable to its efficient size, nor does an integrated business of
Sherman Act whenever one of its departments benefits from association wi
possessing a monopoly in its own market.  So long as we allow a firm to co
several fields, we must expect it to seek the competitive advantages of
activity – more efficient production, greater ability to develop compleme
reduced transaction costs, and so forth.  These are gains that accrue to any i
firm, regardless of its market share, and they cannot by themselv
d Cir. 1979) (“[A] 
petitive 
fend the 
th a division 
mpete in 
 its broad-based 
ntary products, 
ntegrated 
es be considered uses of 
 package sales so 
 Ry. Co. v. 
 either product by 
ms as a unit at 
.
tend on 
erge to do so.  
tion, in which 
t use the 
arrangements by 
ing as unfair trade 
ice arrangement whereby oil company coerced its dealers into stocking and 
promoting tires, batteries and accessories manufactured by Goodyear), and even the 
leading tying decision in the past three decades involved a contract-based tying 
arrangement, Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 5-8 (holding liable a hospital that allegedly 
required its surgery patients to employ anesthesiologists employed by an independent 
firm selected by the hospital).   Such a policy would have the very same effect (or lack 
thereof) on competition in the promotion market as would the consummation of this 
merger. 
monopoly power.”).   This even applies to monopolists, who may make
long as the purchaser’s purchase of the package is voluntary. See N. Pac.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (“Where the buyer is free to take
itself there is no tying problem even though the seller may offer the two ite
a single price.”); Marts v. Xerox, Inc., 77 F. 3d 1109 (8th Cir. 1996) (same)
282 It is worth noting that even if Ticketmaster and Live Nation did in
implementing a coercive tying arrangement, they would not have to m
Instead, they could simply pursue such a strategy via contractual coopera
Ticketmaster would only provide ticket distribution services to firms tha
independent Live Nation as a promoter.  Some firms have pursued tying 
contract, see, e.g., Atl. Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965) (bann
pract
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monopolized product independently.   Moreover, this strategy also is vulnerable to 
ould alienate many 
 likely 
ificant spread of 
edium term 
contracts, either with ticket distribution firms or suppliers of software that support self-
ire the 
romises made today several years from now, when conditions 
faci d not be a wise, 
ed several 
regional promoters and operators of small-to-midsized venues who feared being 
continually outbid by an industry giant.  Of course, outbidding competitors is part of the 
re important, a 
es who can 
ation’s merger with 
nment content 
s evidence of efficiencies 
not
anticompetitive—advantage over its rivals.  Smaller venue operators and promoters 
283
common sense scrutiny.  Requiring venues to deal with an unwanted promoter as a 
condition of employing the new entity’s ticket distribution services w
venues and effectively increase raise the price of its distribution services.  A
consequence would be a migration of business to competitors or the sign
additional self-distribution.284  And because many venues are subject to m
distribution, such a tying strategy would face a temporal problem, as it would requ
new entity to enforce p
ng venues may well have changed.  In the most basic sense, it woul
profit-maximizing strategy. 
 The congressional hearings examining the proposed merger includ
competitive process and translates into greater revenues for artists.  Mo
competitive bidding process means that promoters who win bids are the on
generate the greatest revenue from those live performers.  If Live N
Ticketmaster or its access to upstream markets and creators of entertai
enables it to outbid its competitors, then such bidding success i
that accrued from vertical integration and is a product of a procompetitive—
283 JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION §8.4 (1997). 
284 See Fruehauf, 603 F.2d at 355 (rejecting FTC’s conclusion that entity would favor its 
own downstream purchaser in time of shortage because such tactics would risk customer 
retaliation that would cause the new entity “greater economic harm”).  
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might be advised to seek similar vertical integration strategies to obtain comparable 
-enhancing merger 
ance a rival’s competitiveness is antithetical to the aims of the 
nati
Congressional critics of the transaction have also claimed that a Live Nation-
fects in the 
arket for 
concert promotion.  These critics suggest that harm to the market for ticket distribution 
irm will force 
efficiencies, and pursuing such strategies would make them part of the industry-wide 
trend towards vertical integration.  But seeking to block an efficiency
because it might enh
on’s antitrust laws.285
2. Foreclosing Competition in Ticket Distribution 
Ticketmaster merger will reduce competition and thus produce harmful ef
market for ticket distribution, separate and apart from any impact on the m
will occur through two mechanisms.  First, they argue that the integrated f
285 Live Nation’s competitors—and Senator Kohl’s letter to Assistant A
Varney—expressed a related concern about how a Live Nation-Ticketmast
might affect competition in the promotion market.  See Kohl Letter, su
Nation/Ticketmaster will automatically have valuable information about in
promoters' business, such as customer email addresses, demographics of co
and pricing of tickets, which they can use to directly compete for concert pr
business.”); see also Hurwitz Testimony,supra note 2.  Many of th
ttorney General 
er merger 
pra note 4 (“Live 
dependent
ncertgoers,
omotion 
ese smaller promoters 
ibutor, and 
s and their fan base over 
perators, who 
Entertainment will 
ge fair 
d, though we 
n artists and 
at an expropriation of this data would 
violate the terms of the service contract that Ticketmaster signed when agreeing to 
provide distribution services, and thus the merged company would be prohibited from 
improperly exploiting the data.  Moreover, the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of 
Consumer Protection monitors business use of private information, and any misuse of 
data by Live Nation Entertainment would invite appropriate scrutiny from that office.  In 
short, there appear to be other legal means to prevent the misappropriation of private data 
in addition to preventing an otherwise efficient merger. 
and venues had previously contracted with Ticketmaster as a ticket distr
Ticketmaster consequently acquired information on these venue
the course of providing distribution services.  These promoters and venue o
are competitors with Live Nation, now fear that a merged Live Nation 
have access to give proprietary information to their competitor and dama
competition in the market for live entertainment promotion. 
  We have no evidence suggesting whether these fears are well-founde
suspect that violating the trust of former clients would not help Live Nation
Entertainment’s commercial success as it aims to acquire new information o
fans throughout the country.  We do suspect th
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Ticketmaster services upon independent concert promoters, consequently reducing 
286 erger will 
tion services of the merged entity, 
thu
argument: 
rket power in 
ticket distribution to harm competition in the promotion market, this argument suggests 
ain that a 
s anticompetitive 
inary matter, 
 properly 
defined market for promotion.  Because Ticketmaster does not currently participate in the 
market for promotion of live entertainment, the Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger would 
ill be no more 
here have been no 
alle bution services to its 
tion remains very 
small), then there is little reason to fear competitive harm after the merger. 
undle
promotion with ticket distribution, it makes little economic sense to bundle ticket 
opportunities for competing ticket distributors,  and second, that the m
effectively commit Live Nation to using the distribu
s depriving other distributors of that substantial business.
This first theory might be considered the flip-side of the previous 
whereas some critics fear that the merger will enable the leveraging of ma
that the merged firm will leverage market power in the promotion market to harm
competition in ticket distribution.  At the risk of being repetitive, we note ag
theory of “prospective tying” is colorable only if market power enable
forcing that coerces purchases of a tied product or service.  Thus, as a prelim
that this theory requires a showing that Live Nation has market power in a
not change that market’s concentration, and therefore the merged entity w
capable of coercive bundling than Live Nation is now.  Since t
gations that Live Nation currently attempts to tie its ticket distri
promotional offerings (and, indeed, its market share in ticket distribu
Moreover, for the same reasons it makes little economic sense to b
286 See Kohl Letter, supra note 4 (“In addition, independent concert halls will likely be 
under strong pressure to use Ticketmaster's ticketing services if these venues wish to get 
booking from the leading acts promoted by Live Nation.”). 
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distribution with promotion.  Such attempts at coerced tying would not be in the merged 
bited declining 
izeable.
duct and service 
ndicate that they 
intend to offer clients and fans a menu of bundled products, merchandise, and other 
services.  Without the 
 services will be 
r’s rivals and 
e Nation’s past as a 
large purchaser of ticket distribution services.  In other words, the theory goes, the new 
venture will refuse to deal with competitors and entrants in the business of ticket 
ues would not supply adequate demand to fuel a 
com  to challenge 
the assumption 
company’s best interest unless it harbored a hope that it could soon monopolize the 
market for ticket distribution services, but that market instead has exhi
margins and, due to widespread Internet technologies, might be unmonopol
Again, difficulties in achieving coercive bundling does not mean that pro
bundling will not occur, and all suggestions from the merging parties i
possibility that this bundling is coercive, the presumption is that it 
reflects procompetitive efficiencies. 
The second theory, that Live Nation’s needs for ticket distribution
captured exclusively by the merged company, thus depriving Ticketmaste
potential entrants from that share of the market, is motivated by Liv
distribution, and the remaining ven
petitive threat to Ticketmaster.  These critics conclude that for any firm
the new entity’s leadership in ticket distribution, it must enter the market at two levels–
venue ownership and ticket distribution.287
There are several faults to this theory.  First, the theory rests upon 
287 Id. (“[V]enues can now [sic] be expected to solely utilize Ticketmaster’s ticketing 
services.  Being locked out of these concert halls is likely to make it difficult for any new 
significant ticketing service to emerge after the merger.”); Pascrell Letter, supra note 4 
(“The vertically integrated firm can withhold these critical inputs, and its rival will suffer. 
To avoid such problems, an entrant would need to enter the industry on several levels at 
once….).  See generally 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, § 4.221 
(describing how a vertical merger’s propensity to raise barriers to entry by creating a 
market structure that requires two level entry can facilitate the exercise of market power). 
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that the market for ticket distribution is concentrated and that the merger enshrines 
r, 
 be quite 
er of venues that 
ences in this 
market appear unlikely, it is unnecessary to scrutinize whether the merger forecloses 
288
recent decision to 
es, a decision made 
distribution,
eady lack 
access to the business of distributing tickets for venues owned or managed by Live 
Nation.  Thus, even if the transaction somehow causes Live Nation eventually to abjure 
ity about which we 
tim will have no 
impact whatsoever upon the opportunities for entry by possible rivals in the ticket 
ansaction
d been 
Ticketmaster in a position of market power.  The evidence detailed in Part III, howeve
indicates that the market for ticket distribution services currently appears to
competitive.  The technology for ticket distribution is becoming increasingly widespread, 
with a number of new entrants in recent years as well as a growing numb
are pursuing self-distribution strategies.  Because anticompetitive consequ
entry because entry is not necessary to maintain competitive conditions.
 Second, the theory ignores the implications of Live Nation’s 
self-distribute the tickets to events at the venues that it owns or operat
before and independent of this transaction.  Given Live Nation’s self-
pursuant to a long-term contract with CTS Eventim, potential entrants alr
self-distribution, in favor of distribution by Ticketmaster (an eventual
can only speculate), such substitution of Ticketmaster for CTS Even
distribution business and thus cannot for the basis for a finding that the tr
violates Section 7.289  This would have been the case even if the merger ha
288 See 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, § 4.213 (“Barriers to entry are 
unlikely to affect performance if the structure of the primary market is otherwise not 
conducive to monopolization or collusion.”).  
289 See Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc, 386 F.3d 485, 511 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(Section 7 did not forbid merger that itself had no impact on parties’ ability to exercise 
market power, where any such power existed before the transaction and was not 
enhanced by it).  Cf. Alberta Gas Chems., 826 F.2d at 1245 (plaintiff did not suffer injury 
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proposed before Live Nation began self-distribution, when it enlisted the services of 
losed under 
sive ten-year 
 landscape of 
any of which 
have since challenged Ticketmaster in its traditional business.  Consequently, the ticket 
distribution m
etitors and entrants 
rder to 
f Live 
Nation’s control over America’s venues.  Some ticket distributors cater to niche markets 
and rely on sales to small or specialized venues to recapture a portion of their fixed costs, 
thereby reducing the number of large venue customers they would have to acquire to 
enter the market profitably.290  For instance, Tessitura tailors its services to the needs of 
Ticketmaster.  Those services were provided under exclusive contracts, so any fears of 
future foreclosure cannot be more severe than what was previously forec
those contractual relationships.  In fact, it was during Live Nation’s exclu
agreement with Ticketmaster when new technologies began changing the
the ticketing business and helped usher in several new market entrants, m
arket is unlikely to be altered by the merger and should be expected to 
continue its recent dynamism. 
 Third, this theory of anticompetitive harm assumes that comp
in the ticket distribution market require access to Live Nation’s venues in o
maintain competitive profitability.  This vastly overstates the significance o
 a perfectly 
nd subsequent conduct would have produced the very same harm); 
Bayou Bottling, Inc. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 725 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1983). See also United
States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1282 (W. D. Pa. 1977) (declining to 
count as “‘foreclosed” output that had already been sold to merger partner before the 
transaction and thus was not available to the open market in the first place). 
290 See Fruehauf, 603 F. 2d at 358 (finding that FTC overstated minimum viable scale by 
ignoring fact that facilities could produce various forms of output in addition to products 
in the relevant market).  
cognizable under the antitrust laws as the result of a vertical merger where
lawful transaction a
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non-profits that produce artistic performances.   Additionally, experience in recent 
latively
f Justice Merger 
rse [that] new 
m us entry into 
the secondary market.”   Any case against the Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger based 
on this “two-level entry” theory would fail for this reason alone.294
erger with the 
itigate the 
ists therefore broadly view 
cies, rather 
operly followed 
forcement agencies and courts generally taking a very lenient 
view towards vertical agreements and vertical mergers. 
aster merger 
able without 
291
years has shown that ticket distribution companies or firms that provide the software 
supporting self-distribution can enter the market and remain profitable at re
modest scale.292  Thus, this is a case in which, to quote the Department o
Guidelines, a secondary market—venues—is “sufficiently large and dive
entrants to the pri ary market [are] able to participate without simultaneo
293
Summary
 We close this analysis of the vertical elements of the proposed m
following summarizing remarks and preliminary conclusions: 
1. Vertical arrangements, including vertical integration, arise to m
costs of transacting in atomistic markets.  Econom
vertical integration as a manifestation of organizational efficien
than as the exercise of market power. Antitrust doctrine has pr
suit, with the en
2. Economic theory predicts that the proposed Live Nation-Ticketm
is likely to produce certain efficiencies that would not be attain
complete integration. 
291 Note that a firm could simultaneously enter the market for distribution 
and the market
to large venues 
 for distribution for small venues, thereby reducing the minimum number 
ssible entrant 
ant consideration when determining impact of vertical transaction). 
293 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, § 4.211 & n.31; id. at § 4.211 (“If 
there is sufficient unintegrated capacity in the secondary market [here, the venue market] 
new entrants to the primary market would not have to enter both market 
simultaneously.”).  
294 See 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, § 4.21 (requirement of two level 
entry a necessary condition for a vertical merger to create harm under a “two level entry 
theory”).
of large venues a firm would have to serve in order to recoup its investment. 
292 Cf. Fruehauf, 603 F.2d at 353 (stating that minimum viable scale of po
is relev
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3. The live entertainment industry appears to have exhibited a 
towards vertical integration over the past decade, with many
entertainment—including those that are unlikely to enjoy any
market power—internalizing ticket distribution, live broadcas
services that create a direct interface with fans.  The proposed Live Nation-
broad trend 
 providers of 
 appreciable 
ts, and other 
.
 enshrine 
et and enable 
ively harm rival 
dustry structure and rudimentary 
economic logic, however, indicate that the vertical aspects of the merger 
pact on either firm’s market power. 
Ticketmaster merger appears to be part of this larger trend
4. Critics suggest that a Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger would
Ticketmaster with market power in the ticket distribution mark
Live Nation to leverage such market power to anticompetit
promoters.  A careful examination of the in
would have no im
V.  Conclusion
 In reviewing the proposed Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger,
emerging out of a rapidly changing industry in which important technol
developments are precipitating significant organizational transformations.
technological developments—especially the spread of software platform
check on any market power that Ticketm
 we observe that it is 
ogical
  These 
s that enable 
large and small venues to self-distribute tickets to their events—appear to have placed a 
aster, or a merged Live Nation-Ticketmaster, 
wou erged entity 
tion and the 
and the evident growing reliance by artists on revenue from concerts) have induced 
performers, promoters, and venues to establish closer linkages with their respective fan 
base.  These organizational changes appear able to generate sizable efficiencies.  Vertical 
integration mitigates a coordination problem that hinders investment in acquiring and 
disseminating information, facilitates the cooperative adaptation necessary to respond to 
ld have to impose supracompetitive prices.  Ultimately, whether the m
can exercise market power depends heavily on the ease of self-distribu
general availability of ticketing technologies. 
 These and other technological developments (including the rise of pirated music 
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unforeseen market changes and tailor responses, and enables creators of live 
will foreclose 
ces in 
e vertical aspects 
l more likely lead to efficiencies that will 
benefit both consumers and the competitive process. 
t the Live 
t require 
t the merger’s 
s hard to 
determine how the mechanisms underlying recent price increases would be affected by 
this merger, and the efficiencies we anticipate are perhaps more likely to translate into the 
ty utilization than 
be reshaping the 
that the 
merger—and probably the general trend towards vertical integration—will negatively 
impact the secondary ticket market.  Certainly innovations such as paperless ticketing 
will reduce opportunities for secondary sellers, and perhaps other direct linkages between 
venues and fans will shut out those who seek to purchase and resell tickets.  However, 
any such pain inflicted on secondary sellers is the competitive process at work and should 
entertainment to develop and market new content.  We do not find convincing concerns 
expressed by critics that the vertical integration of these companies 
possibilities for efficient entry.  To the contrary, and consistent with advan
institutional economics and antitrust law over the past three decades, th
of the Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger wil
 Our analysis does not offer balm to all of those who have expressed fears for this 
merger.  We should be clear that even though most evidence suggests tha
Nation-Ticketmaster merger is procompetitive and therefore should no
intervention by enforcement agencies, there is no evidence indicating tha
efficiencies will slow the steady rise in the face price of concert tickets.  It i
creation of new markets, improved concert quality, and greater capaci
in lower prices. 
Moreover, the merger, along with the other forces that appear to 
industry, will probably be detrimental to certain parties.  Some have feared 
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be compared, for example, to ills suffered by travel agents when airlines popularized and 
reaped efficiencies from
igate the difficulties 
t, their 
 produces the 
ke even more 
attractive offers to artists.  While the vertical efficiencies are clearly good for artists and 
etitors.  Our 
ould bring 
mall venues will soon 
dist  they, like 
 Finally, our analysis offers no comfort to those who fear that the combination of 
two industry leaders creates a company so large and far-reaching that smaller competitors 
ic power 
sed Live 
mpetitors.”295  If 
the merged entity generates efficiencies such that they can produce live entertainment and 
competitors, such that their competitors suffer economically, then the antitrust laws 
 Internet ticketing. 
We also find no evidence to suggest that the merger will mit
that smaller venues currently have in securing marquee performers.  In fac
difficulties might be exacerbated.  If the Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger
efficiencies we anticipate, the merged entity might be in the position to ma
fans, they do place more competitive pressures on Live Nation’s comp
analysis, however, does suggest that ticketing and other technologies sh
benefits to smaller venues as well (and we predict that many s
ribute their own tickets and construct their own Internet platforms) and
other parties in the industry, will have to retool to reap new opportunities. 
will be unable to effectively compete.  This per se fear of size and econom
appears to be the source of most of the anxiety and ill will towards the propo
Nation-Ticketmaster merger.  To these critics, antitrust has tersely and squarely said that 
the nation’s antitrust laws “were enacted to protect competition, not co
serve artists and consumers alike at lower costs and with higher quality than their 
295 See Cargill Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, 479 U.S. 104, 115 (1986); Brunswick Corp. 
v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1979). 
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should provide no relief.   And if the proposed merger does not create efficiencies, then 
resu ust laws.297
sic industry—is 
ew business 
ns from 
competition.  To the contrary, such times are often when competition is most critical.  But 
laws are the law of 
the land and should be applied with discipline (as we aim to do here) and without second-
guessing the deep-rooted statutory policy of maintaining competitive markets.298
296
it necessarily creates market opportunities for these competitors.  Mere size, whether 
lting from internal expansion or a merger, does not offend the antitr
To be sure, the live entertainment industry—and the entire mu
undergoing significant structural change that will require developing n
models and bracing for adjustments, but times of transition are not exemptio
whatever one’s beliefs about the merits of competition, the antitrust 
296 See Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d
large firm does not violate § 2 [of the Sherman Act] simply by reaping the com
rewards attributable to its efficient size, nor does an integrated business
Sherman Act whenever one of its departments benefits from association wi
possessing a mo
 Cir. 1979) (“[A] 
petitive 
 offend the 
th a division 
pete in 
road-based 
rated 
considered uses of 
r will likely 
.S. 417 (1920) 
inst relying on 
 political 
 v. Addyston 
gh antitrust enforcers necessarily 
exercise some discretion in allocating their resources, their priorities have generally not 
reflected their policy views about the wisdom of fostering competition in a particular 
sector.  Those who lament recent increases in concert prices, or who wistfully recall days 
of attending inexpensive and spirit-lifting concerts, see, e.g., opening statements, House 
Committee Hearings, and question antitrust enforcement in the live entertainment 
industry because of their own policy preferences are subversive in a way that those who 
advocate rigorous enforcement of laws already on the books are not.
nopoly in its own market.  So long as we allow a firm to com
several fields, we must expect it to seek the competitive advantages of its b
activity – more efficient production, greater ability to develop complementary products, 
reduced transaction costs, and so forth.  These are gains that accrue to any integ
firm, regardless of its market share, and they cannot by themselves be 
monopoly power.”). 
297 Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. at passim (government must prove that merge
produce anticompetitive effects); United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U
(mere size is not an offense under Section 2). 
298 In 1898, then circuit judge William Howard Taft famously warned aga
“the vague and varying opinion of judges as to how much, on principles of
economy, men ought to be allowed to restrain competition.” United States
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283 (6th Cir. 1898).  Althou
